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DAY ONE 
JOSEPH KEARNEY: Good morning.  Stanley Fish told me just now that 
when he was dean, he loved opening remarks.  This, of course, is why I support 
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conferences such as this.  I would deny it, but it will so obviously be true by the 
end of the next few minutes that it would not be a plausible denial. 
I do want to welcome all of you.  My name is Joseph Kearney, and it’s a 
great privilege for me as dean of Marquette University Law School to welcome 
you here.  To be sure, I appreciate that I welcome you to your own conference.  
That won’t stop me.  I know that most, perhaps indeed all, of you have been 
engaged on this matter, together with my colleague, Chad Oldfather, and one 
another.  I understand this to be a working conference, and you may be sure 
that my welcoming remarks will not keep you long from your work. 
Certainly, this is the sort of gathering that we at Marquette University Law 
School really consider it a privilege to host, especially since we opened this 
building, Eckstein Hall, in 2010.  But even for some time before that, we at 
Marquette Law School have been known as Milwaukee’s public square.  That’s 
an appellation that the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, which we think to be a 
disinterested entity, gave us.  We have been about the business of welcoming 
the community, engaging it in substantive ways on important and difficult 
topics, long and often.  The Marquette Law School Poll, which we launched in 
2012 and of which you may have heard, and our new endowed Lubar Center 
for Public Policy Research and Civic Education are only recent examples of 
this outreach. 
But it is no hyperbole to say that we are especially glad for this conference.  
That’s not only because Chad gave me a pass on all aspects of organizing it or 
planning it.  Admittedly, he did that in part because he knows that with me it’s 
all or nothing, and so to have me organize part of it would have been probably 
not a happy collaboration for us.  But really the reason that we’re happy to host 
this conference is that the topic is truly important.  And for us to be able to 
gather here, at Marquette University Law School, substantial scholars from 
around the country is really a privilege for us.  We are somewhat by ourselves 
here at Marquette University Law School, with Milwaukee’s being unusual 
among cities of its size in the sense that there is only one law school.  I’m not 
lamenting that as a general matter, but, for gatherings such as this, it does mean 
that we have to persuade people to come and join us.  It is true that Madison is 
only 75 miles away and Chicago is not much farther, but we are really quite 
glad to have you here today in our home, rolling up your sleeves. 
I also admit or claim a certain particular affinity for your topic.  I have my 
own views about professional ethics within the law professoriate.  No doubt 
they are less well developed than (and thus easily displaceable in favor of) 
whatever principles you collectively arrive at here.  Yet I will indulge myself 
by making one specific point—an observation of a phenomenon that I find 
distasteful at best.  This is the phenomenon of law professors’ participating in 
amicus curiae briefs—or sometimes even representing parties—in litigation 
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CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPT 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/18  9:24 AM 
1086 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:1083 
outside of officially recognized law school contexts (such as clinics) and yet 
nonetheless associating themselves with their law schools in the matter.  While 
it happens all the time, I think this inappropriate, even apart from the immodest 
self-denomination by some of these professors as “scholars” when they file 
these briefs.  This is not to suggest that I myself act against this phenomenon 
any more than other deans seem to do, at least on the amicus front (you may be 
sure that I would take action if a colleague purported, in a capacity associated 
with the law school, to represent parties in litigation, as one did before I became 
dean).  None of this is to disdain the legal practice.  In fact, considering myself 
professionally, most fundamentally, to be a lawyer, I keep a hand in litigation, 
and I myself on one occasion even filed a brief for myself as an officious 
intermeddler—that’s a loose translation of amicus curiae, I know from my 
study of Latin.  But I do none of that cloaked in Marquette Law School garb.  
There we have a principle that I would commend for your consideration in your 
work this weekend.   
So that is my welcome to you, which I mean to be warm and sincere, as 
well as my short specific rant, which is perhaps self-indulgent but germane.  
The last time Chad organized a conference and allowed me to introduce it (this 
was on law clerks), I unburdened myself at somewhat greater length of my 
views of the growing phenomenon of career law clerks.  I liked my remarks so 
well that I republished them in the Marquette Lawyer magazine, our semiannual 
publication (I expect that the legal academics in the room are familiar with it), 
where they attracted some attention.  I do want you to know that I included in 
the magazine not only my own remarks but various of the remarks of the 
conference participants on their own pet peeves—I mean, their own deeply 
supported views.  Perhaps we will get to the point of doing the same again.  I 
said that I considered myself professionally most fundamentally to be a lawyer, 
and I do, but as dean I also consider myself to be a magazine editor.  So we’re 
always on the lookout for good content, and we do hope that in conjunction 
with the Marquette Law Review, which unlike us will include footnotes 
qualifying your various views, we can get to a point where, when your work is 
done, we can ensure that it receives adequate publicity in the legal academy. 
But between now and then no doubt you have a lot of work to do, and, as 
I’ve already mentioned to Chad and Paul, I, with apologies, have to run.  I have 
to meet with someone who at least on the phone a few minutes ago represented 
himself as a donor.  Now, that’s an old trick, of course.  It could be a 
disappointed applicant to the law school, but I’m reasonably confident in this 
case.  Best wishes for a great conference.  
CHAD OLDFATHER: A few words on how this conference came to be.  It 
is, in an important sense, a child of social media because it has roots in mutually 
sympathetic commentary on Facebook that led at one point Paul to say, “You 
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know, I’ve had this idea for a conference and I think Carissa might be interested 
as well.”  And I was interested, and she was interested, and now here we are.  
So thanks, Facebook, for this. 
Our format here is a little bit unusual.  It’s kind of a hybrid of a roundtable.  
Not round obviously, but tables.  And freeform discussion rather than a series 
of presentations, which I think is enjoyable and hopefully productive, and we 
want it ideally to be productive in the sense that we make some progress 
towards the production of some sort of document that purports to set forth some 
shared conceptions of ethical principles that relate to legal scholarship. 
We are recording this, and I have to give credit here to the good folks from 
the Marquette Law Review for coming up with this idea.  That’s what accounts 
for all of the microphones.  The video camera is up there in the corner.  Their 
suggestion was that we might transcribe some portion of the discussion here 
and potentially something could appear in the Law Review based on our 
conversations.  So, speak in complete sentences that cohere into nicely formed 
paragraphs and we’ll be good to go.  And we will obviously give everybody the 
opportunity to edit anything that were to come out of it in that format. 
A. Participant Introductions 
NEIL HAMILTON: Well, just very briefly, I was teaching legal ethics for 
ten years and then in the early ‘90s got interested in academic ethics broadly 
across the university, not just in the law school.  So, I spent 12 years with 
scholarly focus on academic ethics.  But, you know, there is no field of 
academic ethics essentially across the university.  I got very involved with 
AAUP, got very involved with American Association of Colleges and 
Universities, some other organizations. 
So, my main goal was, could I encourage some sort of mandatory 
acculturation into the—what we did have in terms of academic duty—academic 
ethics.  And it didn’t go anywhere.  I couldn’t get any national organization to 
really buy in, so I finally threw in the towel about 2006.  Done that.  But I still 
am very much devoted to legal ethics and a lot into medical ethics now, so two 
of the main professions are very much engaged in this, but the academic 
professions so far in my view are not so very interested in this simply because 
you’re in a new initiative trying to think through how to do better. 
STANLEY FISH: Good morning.  Unlike many of you or perhaps not, since 
I don’t know your biographies, but I’ve had another life in another part of the 
academy in humanities departments and also as an administrator.  And 
especially as an administrator I became interested in specifying the limits of 
scholarly activity and the relationship with scholarly activity, two part of 
saying, political activity.  And that interest now extends or encompasses rather 
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both my history in the humanities and my tenure in law schools.  And I continue 
to be alarmed, as many of you know, at the politicization of academic work, 
which takes somewhat different forms in the humanities and in the law schools, 
but is, in my view, equally pernicious. 
LESLIE FRANCIS: I’m Leslie Francis and I’m a professor of law and a 
professor of philosophy at the University of Utah.  Probably the way I got roped 
into this is I’m a former colleague of Carissa’s but I work in ethics.  My original 
field was philosophy of law.  I’ve taught legal ethics over the years.  I’ve taught 
all kinds of applied ethics over the years.  I publish and review pretty regularly 
in medical journals because I do a lot of work in bioethics.  I’ve also taught 
research ethics all over the place, mostly for scientists who are on various kinds 
of post-docs, so questions like “how you might make your Photoshop pictures 
that are in your articles of your autorads look better?  What’s fraud and what 
isn’t?” are the kinds of things I’ve taught to scientists over the years. 
I’ve also been involved in a lot of discussions in philosophy of academic 
ethics.  I’ve been on the board of officers of the APA a couple of times, once 
as chair of the committee for the Defense of the Professional Rights of 
Philosophers where there were a lot of academic ethics questions that came to 
our committee, and another time, more recently as president of the Pacific 
Division of the APA and in that capacity, I was involved in drafting the main 
document on the APA’s website now about good practices in philosophy. 
So, I hope I’m going to bring a kind of comparative sense because I live in 
the law world, but I live in other worlds, too.  And there’s been a lot more 
discussion I think of academic ethics in some of those other worlds.  I think 
Professor Fish is probably aware of that, too.  
RYAN SCOVILLE: So I think I’m interested in this as a relatively junior 
scholar, someone who came into academia directly from practice, and thus as 
someone who initially approached scholarship as an advocate.  I’ve since come 
to view advocacy work as problematic, but it took a while to get there.  And so, 
I come to this conference as someone who has probably breached some of the 
principles that we’re going to be talking about.  All of which is to say that I 
sense from personal experience that there’s a real need for something like this, 
perhaps particularly for junior academics who are coming directly from law 
practice and have not already internalized what it means to approach a topic in 
a scholarly manner rather than as someone who is trying to win an argument or 
prevail for a client. 
PAUL HORWITZ: Well, good morning.  I’m Paul Horwitz and I’m very 
happy to be here from the University of Alabama.  I will be slightly too long as 
usual.  I’ve always been, and increasingly so, interested in the history and 
sociology more or less of the legal academy, the kinds of culture we have, the 
ways that we live it.  It seems to me that law professors have never been fully 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3217300 
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acculturated into the academy in the way that others in the academy are.  They 
don’t have the same process of graduate study leading to developing a canon 
and a set of norms.  This is, I think, changing the growth of fellowships and the 
fact that so much hiring is done from those fellowships.  It’s kind of serving the 
proxy graduate study period.  But I think it’s not necessarily as fully thought 
out as I would like it to be.  Although I think more of those people are 
developing a sense of a canon of legal academic literature, my outside 
perspective, and I think Robin was very informative about how this can differ 
from school to school, is so much of that practice is about getting a job and the 
strategies it takes to get a job and not about what the norms should be in the 
first place, that they’re not always being properly acculturated.  So, I worry 
about that. 
Like many of us, I have long been interested in practices in legal 
scholarship, generally from a critical perspective but as my paper suggests, not 
without some ambivalence or inconsistency or what have you.  And I often post 
about these issues on PrawfsBlawg and I also have often found that the private 
conversations that law professors have about the ethics of legal scholarship are 
more revealing and more cynical than their public statements, which obviously 
I find unfortunate. 
A last thing, which is self-serving, but connected, is, in theory, I’m working 
on a book that’s under contract whose sub-title is “Social Class and the 
American Legal Academy.”  Chad and I have often talked about this, and his 
thesis, is that law professors’ social class in kind of a I guess more of a voir dire 
than a socio-economic sense but their position and what people have called the 
professional managerial class affects what they write in ways that are not 
always evident, affects their agenda and the issues that they think of as the most 
salient. 
Whether or not those are the issues that are most in need of legal reform, I 
say this because it seems like a relevant background topic in thinking about how 
law professors write and what they write, how they frame it, but also because 
the book is long enough past deadline that it’s not quite approaching its bar 
mitzvah but it’s kind of past the toddler stage, I mean, of lateness, not of 
existence. 
So, when I meet a new room of people I’m happy to say—especially people 
who have kind of relevant expertise and interest, happy to learn from you or 
chat about it. 
OLDFATHER: So, I’ll piggyback off some of what has been said and end up 
being kind of autobiographical.  I don’t have specific expertise in the sense that 
I have previously written directly about any of these topics.  I have certainly, as 
I think we all have, noticed certain things and had conversations about those 
things, including some of the phenomena that other people have already 
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mentioned.  Like Ryan, I came to legal academia directly from practice and, 
indeed, from an extraordinarily long time in practice by the standards of these 
things, which is, it was basically eight years in practice.  And in that sense, I’m 
fortunate to be here at all. 
I’m also piggybacking off of the social class aspect of it.  I’m a first-
generation college student, lawyer, the whole works who grew up in a tiny town 
in southern Minnesota not knowing any professionals at all.  And it is both a 
feature and a bug of my personality that, as a result, I have always tended to be 
somebody who is inclined to try to figure things out for myself rather than ask 
for help, which has meant that as a scholar, I’ve tended to pursue things in 
whatever direction my interests took me rather than necessarily trying to 
conform to, some mentor’s program or something along those lines.  Certainly, 
I think it’s something that comes out in the piece that I wrote. 
With that said, I will not claim at all to have been immune from many of 
the concerns that we’re going to be addressing.  I am in my second teaching 
job, and getting here involved a certain amount of strategic behavior on my 
part.  When I was submitting those first articles I said to myself, I’m not going 
to place these except in a journal that is going to get the attention of 
appointments committees elsewhere because I have this personal interest in 
attempting to relocate.  And I was able to do that and I’m quite sure it had an 
impact on my ability to move. 
I don’t feel great about that, but it is something that I did, and that in order 
to achieve that goal I had to do it and it worked out.  But I think it also speaks 
to something that is off with the system.  I think it’s also been true for me that 
the articles I’ve written since have been more sophisticated, better, and have 
also not placed as well.  And I think there is something going on there that’s 
worth talking about as well that may point to an aspect of the production of our 
scholarship that could perhaps be fixed. 
So, I’ll stop there.  I’ll ramble more later, but I’ll let Carissa talk for a while. 
CARISSA HESSICK: Thanks.  So, I was really struck by what Ryan said 
about how people who are junior should think about the ethics of legal 
scholarship because I have to say when I was junior I thought about them not 
at all, right?  I thought about scholarship as a way to get tenure and promotion 
and a way to try to get other people to think well of me in the academy.  And, 
you know, maybe because I’m a criminal law person I think to myself, “well, 
maybe that’s what this is about.”  This is about trying to get the profession to 
explain what we think people need to do in order to be thought highly of.  It 
isn’t just where they place their articles but it’s other things as well. 
I will say, I didn’t stop to think about the ethics of legal scholarship until 
just a couple of years ago when I was at a workshop for non-senior scholars 
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where people would bring very early projects and get feedback on the project.  
And I was struck by someone who I like quite a lot and I think of as very 
intelligent who had a project and everyone in the room was pushing this person 
telling him that the obvious path to take this article was down this certain line 
of thought.  And his response was, “I can’t do that because there are obvious 
doctrinal problems with that.”  And we’re like, “well, who cares?  This is a law 
review article.”  And he responded, “I’m working with a group that’s litigating 
this and we’re going to be filing a brief in whatever circuit and I don’t want 
something to be out there that makes clear how weak that argument is under 
existing law.”  And I was appalled, to put it mildly. 
And it had a really, really big impact on me such that a couple of months 
later when I went to WALS, the section on scholarship had a panel.  Dick 
Fallon, among other people, was speaking on that panel and I was really caught 
up in it.  And I happened to have been sitting next to Paul and I harassed him 
quite a bit about all of this and I think he, through that, got an invitation to help 
out with this conference in part to just leave him alone. 
But since then I’ve been struck, especially after reading Fallon’s article1 on 
scholars’ briefs, about what it is that we’re trying to do as law professors 
because I did a short stint as associate dean and was constantly telling my 
colleagues, “It’s wonderful that you’re working on this project.  Is there some 
way that we can get the word out there about what you’re doing?”  And we 
spent a lot of time talking about how we could get publicity for them, which 
meant publicity for the school. 
But in more recent years—or I should say more recent months—especially 
since the most recent election I’ve been concerned by what I see law professors 
doing in the public sphere when talking about legal issues and how they bear 
on political issues of the day.  I don’t know that I think that that is scholarship.  
You know, certainly when I talk to my colleagues about what we get to put 
down on our end-of-year form for what we’ve accomplished and what you 
would get to put in the scholarship section, I don’t think that you should put op-
eds.  I don’t think that you should put blog posts.  I know different people can 
disagree about these sorts of things, but nonetheless, I do feel as though maybe 
we need to have a conversation as a profession about what’s expected of us 
when we make those very public statements because that’s, after all, sort of the 
face that we present to the outside world. 
So anyways, I’m very interested to speak with you about all of this stuff as 
a relative newcomer to thinking about these things.  I actually think that these 
questions are very difficult and, in some ways, they bump up against what we 
 
1. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Scholar’s Briefs and the Vocation of a Law Professor, 4 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 223 (2012). 
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have been told are in our careers about what it is that we’re doing and what it 
is that we’re supposed to do and the impact that we’re supposed to have. 
ROBIN WEST: Thank you so much for inviting me.  I’m Robin West.  I’ve 
been a Georgetown faculty member for 26 years and I, too, am an ex-associate 
research dean.  I’ve been involved in appointments process, and therefore, in 
the evaluation of legal scholarship for 35 years.  I’m presently chair of the board 
of editors at the Journal of Legal Education.  I also, as we discussed last night, 
do run a fellowship program at Georgetown for folks who want to join the legal 
academy where we talk about these issues constantly. 
I did write a book about law teaching and legal scholarship that addresses 
many of these issues.  It came out a few years ago.  I focus in the book on the 
history of the legal academy’s relationship to both the university and to the Bar.  
It helps to know where we came from to understand why we are where we are 
today. 
What prompts my interest in this topic is a set of concerns that became clear 
to me as I was writing that book that the legal academy is in a very severe sort 
of “identity crisis” with respect to what legal scholarship is and what the point 
of it is. 
To just give a flavor of the split, when I was writing one of the chapters on 
legal scholarship, the nature of legal scholarship, I started asking people 
unscientifically, randomly, “what do you think of normative legal scholarship?”  
That’s the phrase that’s often used to describe legal scholarship that more or 
less takes the form “the law is X and it ought to be Y.”  
And I noticed right away one afternoon, in the same ten-minute period, 
colleagues telling me, “normative legal scholarship is just not legal scholarship” 
and “it’s not legal scholarship because it’s not scholarship.  If it’s normative, 
it’s not scholarship.  So, it’s not legal scholarship if you’re saying the law ought 
to be this.  That’s something else.  It’s advocacy or it’s adversarialism or its op-
ed writing in the guise of the Law Review, but anything that takes the form of 
the law is X, it ought to be Y isn’t legal scholarship because it is not 
scholarship.”  This was stated most definitively and most emphatically by 
colleagues who are empiricists of various stripes, social scientists, and 
economists. 
At the same time, there were others telling me, including some extremely 
distinguished law faculty, that “legal scholarship that is not normative is not 
legal scholarship because it’s not legal.  If it’s not normative, it’s not legal.  
Legal scholarship has to be normative.”  This comes out in tenure debates.  You 
will have colleagues saying, “we can’t credit this as scholarship.  This is 
normative.”  And then you’ll have others saying, “we can’t credit that as 
scholarship because it’s not normative.” 
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So, the depth of that difference and how, to restate it, how deeply that 
difference cuts, I think, makes it very difficult to think about the ethics of legal 
scholarship as a defined understood entity.  It’s not like there’s this thing there 
and we have to decide how to do it ethically and do it well.  We have very 
fundamental differences about the nature of the thing.  And I mean, one could 
go on.  There are other deep divisions about what legal scholarship is, what it 
should be, et cetera. 
I think some of these issues are pretty easy.  It seems to me people should 
not be listing these things under scholarship.  If you want to list them under 
service, that raises a host of other problems.  I do think there’s a role of legal 
academics as public intellectuals where there’s a commitment to the rule of law 
at stake.  That’s the sort of lens that I use to think that through. 
So, I concur with what Paul said in his statement that preliminarily to a 
discussion about ethics, it seems to me there has to be some sort of statement 
of at least the difficulty of specifying what legal scholarship is.  In my view, I 
have this very pollyannaish, pluralistic view of all of this and think that there’s 
room for all sorts of forms of legal scholarship.  And I don’t care what you call 
it actually, but there’s much value to be had in normative legal writing and 
there’s much value to be had in non-normative legal writing, but I do think that 
the efforts that follow from these different types of legal writing including 
critical and including anti-disciplinary are sometimes quite different. 
ELI WALD: Good morning, everybody.  I’m Eli Wald.  For the past 15 
years I’ve been teaching and researching about lawyers and lawyers’ ethics.  In 
particular, I’ve been interested in what it is that lawyers do, rules of professional 
conduct, professional identity, and professionalism.  One way to introduce my 
interest in this conference is this: because I’m interested in what lawyers do I’m 
interested in what academic lawyers, that is, law professors, do.  It continues to 
be true that most law professors are lawyers.  Perhaps no longer practicing 
lawyers, but at least the vast majority of law professors hold a J.D. degree and 
passed a bar exam.  And yet, we know relatively little about what academic 
lawyers do.  It’s as if by virtue of having gone to law school and having attended 
a few lectures over three years and having read a few excerpted law review 
articles, one is supposed to know when one becomes a law professor what to 
do, how to teach, how to write, what is scholarship, what is teaching, and what 
is service.  There’s a significant gap there, so the opportunity to participate in a 
conference that in some way–thinking about legal scholarship–might narrow 
that gap was interesting to me. 
One other introductory remark.  Lawyers’ rules of “ethics” are not rules of 
ethics at all.  Rather, the rules of professional conduct are rules of law, as 
promulgated by states’ supreme courts.  As rules of law, the “ethics” rules 
reflect political and statutory compromises that are not quite about the ethics of 
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the matter.  Similarly, the required “legal ethics” course at law schools is 
primarily not about ethics but about law—the rules of professional conduct.  
Some leading commentators argue that often the ethics gets lost in rules of 
“ethics” and in “legal ethics.”2  If we are to come up with some set of rules for 
ethical legal scholarship, I hope that we remember the ethics and that it does 
get lost in some legal formulation in our proposed rules.   
AMANDA SELIGMAN: Good morning. My name is Amanda Seligman.  
Chad said at the outset that we all know each other but I think none of you know 
me, except for maybe Chad.  So, I’m just going to take a minute or two and talk 
about how I happen to be here which is very much by happenstance.  I’m a 
historian.  In my real life I’m the chair of the history department across town at 
the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and I come to the law school once a 
week as a Visiting Fellow in Law and Public Policy at the invitation of the dean.   
A colleague did call me yesterday, a “semi-law prof,” which I think was a 
compliment, but I really don’t know much about law or legal ethics and this is, 
for me, an opportunity to do some learning in thinking about what I do as a 
historian and perhaps to have a little bit of effect on what you do, but I really 
am a free rider in the sense that I’m not writing for the symposium.  I am very 
interested in what you all have to say. 
Just to tell you very briefly about my scholarship, which is very different 
from what you do, I work on the history of ordinary people and how they 
intersect with public policy—mostly in Chicago.  Another goal that I have as 
an urban historian is to help people who read my stuff a little bit more on the 
public history side, see when they walk around an urban environment what the 
history of that place is and to be aware that what’s on the site now isn’t what 
was there before. 
I’ve learned a lot over the years by working more closely with social 
scientists.  I teach and have previously directed the Urban Studies Programs at 
UWM.  Especially in working with sociologists, I’ve learned a lot about talking 
about methods and I’m impressed with how social scientists make discussion 
of methods an explicit part of what they do—which is not something that 
historians by and large do.  Historians love narrative.  We hide our methods.  
Even in the footnotes our methods are hidden, so that as a reader you do not 
know what choices we made and what research we did and did not do.  And I 
was so impressed with the notion of research methods I actually put a 
 
2. William H. Simon, The Trouble with Legal Ethics, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65, 66 (1991) 
(discussing “legal ethics without the ethics”).  
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3217300 
CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPT 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/18  9:24 AM 
2018] CONFERENCE ON THE ETHICS OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1095 
methodological appendix in my last book as a guide to future researchers on 
that topic.3 
One of the favorite classes that I teach—and this brings me a little closer 
here—is the undergraduate history methods class.  When I was sitting and 
chatting with Chad about this conference last month, on a whim said, “Why 
don’t you come along?”  I started thinking about how I put ethics into the 
methods class.  I actually came up with a list of about a half a dozen points that 
I bring into the class, at least implicitly including ethics.  At the start of the class 
I share with the students a historian’s code and at the end of the class the last 
assignment is to write a historian’s code.  But I really don’t think that historians 
think very much about ethics and it might be good for us to do so. 
I also didn’t know until I was sitting in Chad’s office last month that 
historians have a set of professional standards.  I saw them on his desk and read 
them last night for the first time.  They looked pretty good, but I also found a 
hole in them right away, so that I immediately wrote to the executive director 
of the American Historical Association and said, “Here’s something you need 
to put in.”  He wrote back and said, “Oh, yes?”  So, this conference has already 
had an effect on historians and I’m looking forward to finding out how it’s 
going to affect the teaching I do going forward, if not the scholarship that I 
conduct as well. 
NICOLA BOOTHE-PERRY: Good morning, everyone.  I’m Nicky.  I have a 
similar background to Chad and Ryan, in that I practiced for ten years before I 
went into academia and I did not purposefully pursue a career in academia.  I 
kind of fell into it and it was probably the best fall I’ve ever had in my life and 
so I’ve been there now for 14 years.  But when I got into academia I approached 
it as I had in practice.  I was a litigator for ten years.  I was very aware of the 
rules of professional responsibility and so I approached my academia the same 
way.  And once I got on the tenure track and I had to write scholarship, I 
approached my scholarship the same way and I started realizing that not 
everybody has the same approach to even think about why I write, what I write, 
how I write, for whom I write, and what impact it’s not just having on myself, 
but on the legal community.  
And so, my scholarship for many years was on professionalism and ethics, 
a lot about professional identity, very heavily influenced by Professor 
Hamilton’s work, and in writing about professional identity and the importance 
of law students having professional identity so that they can be these amazing 
lawyers.  The last article I wrote started focusing on the law professors 
 
3. AMANDA I. SELIGMAN, CHICAGO’S BLOCK CLUBS: HOW NEIGHBORS SHAPE THE CITY 
(2016). 
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themselves.  If we are asking our law students to have these certain standards 
and ethics and professional identity, what about our own professional identity? 
So, the last article I wrote discussed the obligations of law professors to the 
law profession, to academia, to our students, with this new normal that we have.  
And so, it has the obligations of law professors and as I was writing the article, 
I found it to be really aspirational.  Even though I’m using the word 
“obligation,” it was very aspirational.  And so, when maybe Paul or Chad read 
the article and contacted me about the conference, I hadn’t really thought 
specifically about specific duties and a restatement of duties of law professors, 
but I had certainly thought about the culture that we have as law professors and 
what was lacking in that, not just for our students but for ourselves.  And so, I 
was really excited when I got the invitation to participate in the conference to 
actually come out of this with some actual duties and obligations, even though 
they may be good practices but definitely a restatement.  So, I’m really excited 
to be here and to participate in this, so thank you again for inviting me. 
 
B. Session One: What Counts as Legal Scholarship and What is the 
Obligation of Neutrality? 
HESSICK: So, our first discussion session has two questions: “What should 
count as legal scholarship?” and “What is the obligation of neutrality?”  What 
I thought it might make sense to do is spend a little bit of time talking about 
different types of scholarship, both in terms of scholarship that isn’t a book or 
an article, but also, when you’re talking about books and articles, the different 
types of books and articles that people write because I think that as we’ll talk 
about a little bit later, it might be helpful to be precise about those different 
types because we might think that there are different norms that apply to 
different types of scholarship.  And then I want us to take up the very easy 
question of “What makes for good scholarship?” because a number of people 
mentioned this at least in passing in the writing that they did for this conference.  
And then I wanted to tackle some more concrete topics, how topic selection 
plays into these issues, then get to the idea of different norms for different 
scholarship and then sort of more specifically, “What’s our obligation or norm 
with respect to neutrality?” 
HORWITZ: I want to say I know you have raised an invaluable email.  I 
think it was your email last, right?  The question, “What is the role of the 
publishing process itself?”  And I would say, that’s not necessarily off the table 
I think.  At least it’s a possibility that that seemed important to say it early rather 
than late so that it’s not forgotten. 
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FRANCIS: Yeah.  Thank you for pointing that out because one of the things 
that I just think is really hard is how we think about all of this in the context in 
which we are.  And I come pretty close to holding the position that we’re in 
such a world of hurt about how law reviews operate that it may be very difficult 
without tackling that to think carefully about how scholars ought to operate.  
And maybe just a quick observation related to that, something that was kind of 
a theme around here was a lot of people think about lawyers’ ethics and I just 
want to put out at the table that I’m not sure lawyers’ ethics are at all relevant 
to law professor ethics or that at least we ought to have it be an open question 
whether anything that is a principle of lawyers’ ethics ought to be applied to 
law professor publication ethics.  I’ve been thinking about confidentiality, for 
example; lawyers have presumptive duties of confidentiality to their clients but 
law professors in publishing may have presumptive duties to reveal their 
sources (with possible exceptions, as well as of course obligations to protect the 
confidentiality of human subjects in research).  I’ve been thinking about—you 
don’t have a duty as a lawyer to cite to the court authority from another 
jurisdiction that’s antithetical to the position you were maintaining, in a way 
the problem that Carissa raised and how that would even play into scholarly 
stuff.  You don’t have an obligation to give the court your methodology to go 
to Amanda’s point. 
HESSICK: No.  I think that those are really good points and I think it’s 
something that we should keep in mind and I’ve actually flagged this idea in 
light of the publication norms that we have.  Does that actually mean different 
things for different types of scholarship as I think Leslie suggested in the 
submission that she made for this conference? 
I do hope that at various points we might be able to come to agreement 
about certain things that we think are uncontroversial and then, of course, I 
think that there will be things that will be more controversial.  But I really liked 
Eli’s point that doing nothing isn’t enough.  That scholarship isn’t simply 
something that we do because it might inform us to read more or we might feel 
good by sort of putting some things down on the page, but that we literally have 
an obligation to engage in scholarship and for that to be part of our habit as 
scholars, even if we can’t quantify what that obligation is.  
I thought Nicky actually made a point, too, though, that’s—although I agree 
with it, I’ve sometimes seen push-back from some colleagues and that’s the 
idea that we have an obligation to increase the reach and impact of our legal 
scholarship.  That it’s not enough for us to simply write legal scholarship, but 
that as the authors of legal scholarship we should also take affirmative steps to 
ensure that what we’ve written, I suppose, reaches the audiences that ought to 
have it and can then actually change things. 
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I suppose who that audience is and what it might change might be 
controversial but I was wondering if people agree with Nicky that we have an 
obligation as the authors of legal scholarship to also help ensure that it has an 
impact. 
WEST: I disagree.  I don’t know.  I don’t quite understand the impulse 
behind it but I think you have an impulse.  I think you do have an obligation to 
get your views out there, to get the scholarship out there.  I don’t think that 
there’s an obligation to maximize its impact and I think that the worry is that 
that will quickly shade into a kind of, at least unpleasant, self-promotion that is 
antithetical to the academic spirit.  I think that what trumps it, really, is an 
obligation of humility and of openness to contest and contestation.  And when 
you’re advocating on your own behalf for the impact of your work, it can cut 
the other way. 
I know that tenure committees increasingly look at this, look at not only 
citations from other scholars, but citations by courts.  I think that’s a pernicious 
practice and does not necessarily correlate with quality.  We should be 
concerned, I think, less with impact and more with quality and I think those two 
things can cut in opposing directions. 
 FRANCIS: I think it also risks confusing scholarship with advocacy. It’s like 
the difference between pure science and applied science.  
BOOTHE-PERRY: And just to comment, I don’t think that we actually 
disagree, Robin.  I think we’re saying the same thing.  When I’m saying 
“impact” it’s not necessarily a narrow impact.  The idea is that you don’t just 
write as a legal scholar just to write.  If you just want to write, then go journal.  
But your writing should have some purpose and some meaning and not just, 
“oh, I write and so I publish and it’s in a law review, but nobody reads it.”  It 
doesn’t change anything, or it doesn’t have any kind of impact, not necessarily 
a large impact that would be influenced by political or other ideas. 
WEST: Yeah, I just worry that much of the scholarship that we do highly 
value and should highly value is not aimed at changing anything.  It’s aimed at 
understanding. 
BOOTHE-PERRY: But there’s an impact, so— 
WEST: Okay.  Then “impact” has become quite broad.  I do have a 
colleague who says that he writes just for self-enlightenment, to sort of work it 
out for himself and that strikes me as a little odd.  It is a bit like journal writing, 
but I would just hesitate.  I mean, I don’t want to sign on to what I view as an 
increasing and pernicious practice of the citation counts and particularly the 
citation counts by courts or even by legislative committees.  That, I think, is a 
worrisome trend. 
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FISH: Long ago I became enamored with a statement, and of course, have 
forgotten its author.  It went this way: “Our thoughts are ours; their ends, none 
of our own.”4  And I take that to mean, as I’m sure you immediately understand, 
that as we work things out, we are responsible for the product of that activity.  
What then happens, when and if the fruits of our labors are put out into the 
world, they are not something that we can control, although there are, of course, 
many ways in which you try desperately to control them. 
So, the question of impact is something that is so contingent.  It doesn’t 
mean that there aren’t ways that we could increase the likelihood that 
contingency will swing in your favor, but nevertheless something can always 
happen in either direction that will completely surprise you, that is, something 
that you wrote and you didn’t think that anyone would listen to it, and is 
suddenly picked up in ways that you couldn’t predict.  More frequently, it is 
something that you wrote that you were convinced the world needed to hear 
immediately and was heeded by no one. 
One other remark.  This goes back to a general question of, “What is 
scholarship and what are scholarly activities?”  In general, when I’m doing 
scholarship, and I think most of you would say the same, I’m trying to get it 
right.  I don’t know what “it” is and it varies and the complexities of it certainly, 
but I’m trying to get it right.  And I’m trying to get it right because a puzzle or 
a problem has attracted my attention and I just can’t quite figure out how 
something works or what’s wrong with this answer or what’s missing.  So, 
there’s a satisfaction, almost a satisfaction of engaging in athletic performance, 
when you can at least think that you’ve figured it out and then you can tell other 
people about it and sometimes you’re figuring it out in the company of other 
people.  
But when I’m at a conference like this one, I have absolutely no doubt what 
legal scholarship is.  It’s what we’re doing here.  That is, the feel of a 
conversation like this one.  And I’ve been struck by this many times, but most 
especially when I go to conferences and, I must now confess something which 
many of you will know, I am a card-carrying originalist, that curious group 
whose mothership is the University of San Diego where we originalists 
congregate once or twice a year. 
Now, it just so happens that many of those who espouse this faith are 
politically conservative although I myself am not.  Many are.  But I’ve been to 
many of the conferences, originalist conferences, and never has there been a 
second in which the spirit of advocacy has supplanted the spirit of trying to get 
it right.  And I’ve also often come out of those conferences, as I’m sure I’ll 
 
4. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2.  
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come out of this one feeling, “yes, that’s what the scholarly life is about and 
that’s the excitement of it, that’s the pleasure of it.” 
Now, then that leaves the key—a key question, not the key question—
always be suspicious of anyone who says “the key question”—that leaves a key 
question, “What is the value of it?”  And to that question I don’t myself have 
an answer, although I must confess that I don’t very much care. 
WEST: It’s just an add-on to what Stanley said.  I do remember Paul Brest 
telling me when I was a fellow out at Stanford, he was dean.  He said, “Look, 
your published articles are like your grown children.  You just can’t control 
them and so they’re on their own.  They have to defend themselves.  Let it be.” 
WALD: Three points about the impact of scholarship.  First, scholars have 
a duty to write and publish, not to actively promote the impact of their 
scholarship.  When we talk about impact it would be odd if we were to find or 
impose a duty to promote one’s scholarship or advertise one’s work, although 
there is nothing wrong with some forms of advertisement, for example, it used 
to be common to mail a reprint of one’s recently published article to colleagues 
in the field.  Hopefully, impact is achieved through the quality of the work, 
without active promotion.  But, while there is no duty to promote scholarship, 
one can certainly promote work unethically by manipulating citation counts, 
increasingly a common way of measuring impact. 
Second, impact matters.  Certain types of citation counts, by courts and by 
peers, are relevant and important because they tend to reflect the level of 
engagement that one’s scholarship generates. 
Finally, some scholarship, like highly specialized work, will tend not to 
generate mass referencing and that’s, of course, okay.  But in general I would 
really be quite concerned—or at least mindful of—if there was a work of 
scholarship that over time had no citations or references to by scholars in the 
field.  Unfortunately, it is not at all uncommon to have scholarly works that 
never get cited or engaged with, but at least one should be curious about why it 
is that a scholarly work is not gaining some recognition and engagement from 
some people in the field. 
HAMILTON: The conversation—because the first topic you talked about 
was just what are we going to include definitionally, which I think is 
fundamental.  We’re on impact.  Just as somebody who has been associate dean 
and an interim dean, one of the puzzles goes to Leslie’s comment.  Without a 
peer review process, you’re trying to figure out, “Does this thing make a 
contribution to some scholarly conversation somewhere?”  And you know, I 
just have never believed in placement given that the apprentices are making the 
decision as to whether that’s a quality screen of some sort and also the fact we 
don’t have a peer review.  We’re the only discipline in the world, I believe, 
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without a peer review construct in the scholarship process that would itself have 
some acculturation into what it is that’s quality. 
But anyway, so then you get stuck as a dean into a citation count and 
downloads or some surrogate that indicates that someone is involved in a 
scholarly conversation, which I think is a fallback position. 
HESSICK: Amanda. 
SELIGMAN:  I’ve translated that sort of self-defensive idea into a way of 
thinking about the role of the academy as a cultivator of creativity in a broad 
sense, so that one of the social functions of at least the humanities academy in 
which I exist is to allow all sorts of interesting ideas, some of which are 
productive and some of which are not productive, to bubble around and see 
what happens to them. 
And I think about the long conversation in which a work of scholarship 
might exist even if it has no particular currency at the moment.  This is an 
answer to your question.  But to plant a seed that will be picked up later on.  
And I think it’s particularly important to think about the academy and the way 
the academy cultivates creativity in society in comparison to business, in which 
the ends are so much more particular, to make a profit, to create a different kind 
of product.  Our social function has to do with starting conversations even if we 
can’t see where they’re going. 
HESSICK: I want to give Robin a chance to respond but before she does I 
want to jump in.  And I understand that Leslie and Chad also want to talk and I 
want to make sure we can do other things.  Who knew moderator would be so 
difficult? 
I wanted to touch on the idea of humility as scholars and I’m entirely 
sympathetic to Robin’s concern that impact can devolve into these crude and, I 
would say, misleading, if not imperfect, measures of impact with citation 
counts. 
But I’d add that I’m not sure that humility is a virtue for a scholar, especially 
someone who’s trying to get at truth, because it’s a collaborative process.  And 
if we’re trying to get at truth and we’re trying to build off the work of others 
and have them build off our work as well, I think that the norm of humility that 
was engrained in me as a child, as a young adult, can get in the way of that, that 
we ought to try to reach out to people who are doing the things that we’re doing 
or doing the things we think are relevant to what we’re doing and try to engage 
with them and to try to get them to read our things.  And we shouldn’t see that 
as a lack of humility, but rather that humility is subservient to these other goals 
of the pursuit of knowledge. 
WEST: Excessive humility is no virtue.  You have an obligation to engage.  
I would put it that way.  I was objecting to the idea that you have an actual 
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obligation to self-promote, to maximize your impact and so on.  I understand 
the spirit.  I think that it can slide into something that really can be pernicious. 
On impact and how you measure it as a dean and so on, I would distinguish 
between measuring impact in terms of scholarly citations and measuring impact 
in terms of judicial citations.  And so, it depends on what your project is, it 
depends on what your point is, but I think that measuring impact in terms of 
scholarly citations, if you don’t have any other way to go about it, it can 
certainly play a legitimate role. 
What’s dangerous is this slide toward having it be the thing, that “this is 
what we’re doing; we’re trying to maximize our citation count.”  We talked 
about the value of work before there were little computer mechanisms for doing 
these citation counts at the drop of a hat.  What I see as most alarming is the 
absence of evaluators, whether it’s the faculty as a whole, the tenure committee, 
or the deans.  Reading the work and then reading thoughtful evaluations by 
peers and coming to a judgment about the quality of the work rather than a 
judgment about the numbers. 
I’m just raising that as something to worry about.  I don’t mean to say we 
need to codify some rule that you’re not allowed to look at impact. 
FRANCIS: So I’m kind of getting back to the question of what’s scholarship 
and I really liked what Amanda said a minute ago.  One of the problems we 
have is we sort of sit at an intersection between humanities and the social 
sciences.  And law is, at least some aspects of law, and for purposes of the 
National Endowment for the Humanities, is considered a humanity.  We sit at 
the intersection between that and social science.  Some of what we do is thought 
of as social science scholarship.  That’s more the empirical.  Maybe even some 
science as people are bringing neuro-science, for example, into law and looking 
at those sorts of things. 
Something that might be a resource for us to think about is the way those 
disciplines broadly make the distinction between scholarship and advocacy.  
So, if you look at what you can submit to NEH as law, you can submit a certain 
kind of normative legal scholarship but you can’t submit what you’d be writing 
for an amicus brief.  For example, there’s been really interesting controversy 
about the social sciences aspect of the National Science Foundation.  But there’s 
a place to look at how we might think about what’s social science law and 
what’s social advocacy.  And the same kinds of questions have come up in 
science.  
HESSICK: And I’m going to give this to Chad, but I actually think that’s a 
good thing to try to focus on.  I like Robin’s definition of normative scholarship, 
“the law is X and it should be Y.”  But I think sometimes when we talk about 
advocacy scholarship we’re— 
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WEST: That’s different. 
HESSICK: It’s different.  Right, there might even be sort of a Venn diagram 
there. 
OLDFATHER:  I wonder if a way to approach that distinction between 
normative scholarship that is scholarship and that which is not is that some of 
it is a product of a process that starts with a question and some of it is a product 
of a process that starts with an answer.  The sort of thing that leads to an amicus 
brief starts with the answer and builds toward it. 
The sort of thing that I think is appropriate, potentially, as normative 
scholarship starts with a question and works in good faith towards whatever 
answer the scholar ends up determining is the appropriate answer.  So, it may 
be a question of orientation.  I think it’s at least a helpful distinction to think 
about. 
Another thing that occurs to me as we’re having this discussion is—and this 
is related—that this is in some ways parallel to the question of ideology in 
judging in the sense that you’ve got the political scientist’s view that takes this 
very reductionist approach to the appearance of ideology, finds a correlation 
between some indication of ideology of a judge and the judge’s decisions.  Part 
of the response to that has been to point out that there are some senses in which 
law is inherently ideological and builds in space for ideology to work within 
limits, which is not the same as saying, I’m a Democrat, therefore I come out 
this way or I’m a Republican, therefore I come out that way.  That is, there’s a 
distinction between the proper influence of ideology and the improper influence 
of ideology.  And a lot of what I struggle with in the scholarship I do relating 
to judicial processes is trying to figure out how to channel judicial behavior 
towards the proper and away from the improper. 
And I think some of what we’re struggling with here relates to those sorts 
of questions in that there’s room for normativity, but it’s not always proper.  
And maybe this “starting with a question versus starting with an answer” is an 
approach to it because I think the real risk here is when we are looking at impact 
and looking at other-directedness and building a name for ourselves, it’s the 
risk that Leslie identified of falling into advocacy.  There are no bright lines.  
It’s a matter of degree, but we can all recognize that at some point I’m becoming 
too much of an advocate, whether it’s for a cause, whether it’s for myself and 
my own personal or professional interests. 
Actually, I would love to meet your colleague who writes only to work 
things out for him or herself. 
WEST: You probably have. 
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OLDFATHER: As what I wrote suggests I have a great deal of affinity for 
that sort of position.  I don’t think in extreme form it’s right but, I find it very 
attractive. 
HORWITZ: I guess I’ll segue and say, provided that it is occurring within 
the domain of one’s expertise and according to the kind of academic norms and 
practices of one’s discipline writing because you just want to write, because 
you just want to figure out interesting things or a question occurs to you, that 
seems to be totally legitimate.  More than legitimate.  For me it’s almost a 
default. 
Often what interests you is going to be, especially in law, related to ongoing 
events.  I mean, you have an impetus given by court decisions and so on.  Here’s 
a problem that seems to me totally valid. 
So, I wanted to do this.  I wanted to talk about again—and as I think a 
couple of people have gone back to the question—what is scholarship and part 
of that is, as a co-organizer, I’m kind of thinking about the work product, the 
thing we have in mind at the end.  And I want to say this about that. 
So, part of my answer here, or comment, is going to be kind of schematic 
because I’m thinking about what the product might look like.  And the other 
thing I’ll say is I’m a big advocate, within the structure of the conference, of 
the idea that whatever one comes up with as a consensus document or statement 
of ethics is not only not immune from the possibility of somebody writing a 
concurrence or a dissent or kind of a statement that’s like, “This is a pretty good 
document but, in fact, it’s not possible to have a code of ethics of legal 
scholarship.”  I actually think those kinds of contributions would be very 
interesting and valuable.  In talking about what a code of ethics of legal 
scholarship would look like, I am, personally, not at all opposed to the idea that 
people can also then come at that document from the outside, critique it, attack 
it, add to it, et cetera. 
So, it seems to me, determining what is scholarship or legal scholarship 
would be something like the practice of applying one’s relevant scholarly 
expertise and, I guess, armature, the relevant skills and tools as a scholar in that 
discipline to explore issues relevant to, in our case, the law.  Nothing more or 
less. 
I don’t think it’s quite a tautological description.  It does beg a number of—
or leave open a number of questions, but that I think is the essence of it.  If I’m 
thinking in terms of a document, and a kind of a restatement like document, 
that’s where I’d start. 
And then I imagine in the caveats or sub-questions, one of which would be,  
What is legal scholarship by clinicians? By clinical legal scholars?  We handle 
these things differently in different places.  Some places clinicians are tenured, 
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in others they have kind of a security of employment.  But whatever the 
promotion process is, anybody who’s been through it knows that there are 
debates both within the clinical community and then sometimes between the 
clinical and doctrinal community about what counts as scholarship by clinicians 
both in terms of what they write about and what they submit for purposes of 
evaluation.  And I’m happy, as it were, to bracket that question, but I think it 
should be noted.  One of the responses to what I wrote on Twitter the other day 
about some of these kind of political issues was, “Well, the responder’s 
definition would count out what clinical scholars do.”  And that wasn’t my 
intention and so I’m happy to kind of bracket that question while noting it so 
that people don’t misunderstand from the get-go or have a hostile reaction from 
the get-go. 
Some of the questions we’ve addressed seem to me to be super structural, 
so I’m very sympathetic to the idea that self-promotion can be distorting, can  
have its negative effect, but that seems to me to be a “figure out the definition 
of scholarship and then what one does with the scholarship might be subject to 
separate considerations or norms.”  Do you send it out to people, do you send 
it to the newspapers?  And so on.  But if the thing itself is done properly as a 
piece of legal scholarship, that’s kind of your first desideratum. 
And maybe a third question here that seems to be raised has to do with the 
motive for scholarship and that, given the definition of legal scholarship that 
I’ve provided, I haven’t really talked about why you’re exploring it, what your 
motives are for writing a piece.  Could be for fame, advancement, could be to 
intervene in a legal issue for partisan or ideological reasons, why the law has 
nothing to say about email servers or why it does or whatever.  And so, there’s 
some question of whether scholarship should be disinterested and what it means 
for scholarship to be disinterested, whether it should be kind of academic. 
I guess that to me is the real distinction.  I mean, scholarships should have 
an academic motive.  I don’t know that you have to call that disinterested.  It 
might be passionate.  I think Stanley would say where the passion comes from 
is the academic question.  For me, the question would be, “Is your passion, 
whatever the source, properly filtered through the brain, body, blood barrier,  
whether it’s filtered through that academic barrier so that the output is correct, 
whatever the input is, whatever the motive?”  There’s some question there about 
why you’re doing it. 
HESSICK: I want to hear from Stanley because I know that he indicated he 
had something to say about the advocacy/normative line.  And then I’m going 
to turn to Eli.  But before I do that I know we’ve started touching quite a bit on 
what makes for good legal scholarship and I collected some of the statements 
that people had in their submissions.  I thought there was quite a lot of overlap 
so I just wanted to sort of report on that. 
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FISH: I’ve adopted it as one of my missions here, one that I assume will 
fail, to wean Paul from his pluralism, so— 
HORWITZ: You’re not the only one, Stanley. 
FISH: So I’m quite happy to produce a definition that would exclude much 
of what clinical scholars do.  That’s just a side comment.  Another side 
comment on impact.  Often impact will occur because your work is picked up 
in fields to which it was not originally directed and there’s no way that you 
could predict or design that. 
And then there are, of course, literary examples that talk about the 
contingency of impact.  As many of you will know, Melville’s Moby Dick was 
entirely unrecognized and unappreciated while he was alive and only came to 
be thought of as a prime candidate for the great American novel in the early 
part of the 20th Century.  A woman named Louise Rosenblatt in 1938 wrote a 
book on the relationship between literature and the reader which had to wait 
until the early ‘70s, when reader-oriented criticism became something people 
were talking about.  There are so many variables here. 
The main issue I wanted to address was, yes, the question of normative 
scholarship and advocacy.  And in reading Robin’s piece, I realized something 
that I wanted to share with you and test with you.  Whereas I had been dividing 
scholarship into legal scholarship and other forms of scholarships and genuine 
scholarship, the real thing in advocacy, I think that my taxonomy has to be 
increased and made more sophisticated, at least by the addition of one new 
category. 
So, here’s my new category entirely influenced by what Robin wrote in her 
piece.  First, I would think of scholarship as an extension of the liberal arts 
enterprise and, therefore, permitted to accurate true accounts of whatever. 
And second, scholarship is—which is specific in some way to the 
discipline, and this is where Robin’s essay comes in because she points out 
some scholarship is committed to following out justice’s imperative—to make 
the law more just, to make it better.  And there is a parallel, interestingly 
enough, in the history of literary criticism, although most of us think of literary 
criticism as the act of producing interpretations of text.  That’s quite a new 
phenomenon, late 19th century to the present.  Before that, literary criticism 
was philological, entirely descriptive.  As you notice things, you pointed out 
allusions to rivers in Scotland or you talked about certain kinds of constructions 
and how they could also be seen in poetry of the 14th Century and stuff like 
that.  But you never thought about putting this all together (a) into an 
interpretation of a poem and even (b) even more rare, into the evaluation of the 
poem. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3217300 
CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPT 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/18  9:24 AM 
2018] CONFERENCE ON THE ETHICS OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1107 
So, in literary studies, interpretation and evaluation, which are now 
considered absolutely commonplace, are new.  So, this second category, that is 
responding to the discipline’s specific commitments and, therefore, being 
committed to following out justice’s imperative. 
And then, the third, which I think Robin and I both agree, which is just, 
frankly, partisan and then to pick up on what Chad said, which begins with the 
answer rather than the question, which has as its aim, the securing of victory 
for some political or ideological or some political or— 
WEST: Opaque reason client. 
FISH: Oh, yeah, sure.  Ideological position.  And that’s a much more, for 
me at least, a more capacious definition than the one that I had before I began 
to  read these essays.  Thank you all very much for that, and Paul, try not to be 
so ecumenically generous. 
HESSICK: A few quick words on what people said about good scholarship 
or what I gleaned from what people wrote that they were saying about good 
scholarship.  So, a few people emphasized the importance of critical analysis 
and careful analysis.  I saw that in both what Nicky and what Leslie wrote.  I 
also saw it on some of the reading by Quinn.  I thought the idea there that the 
conclusions of scholarship have to be based on reliable inference and evidence.  
This idea that analysis and the quality of analysis matters for whether 
scholarship is good or not. 
I also saw, in a few of the different submissions, people talking about the 
importance of scholarly norms or community norms and saying what is good 
scholarship, that that’s not a question that we answer in the vacuum, that we 
have to look at what our colleagues in our profession have set up.  I saw this in 
what Eli wrote, that this isn’t something that we all get to choose on our own.  
I saw this in what Chad wrote about talking that, it’s impossible to determine if 
something is good scholarship without making reference to the norms.  And I 
even saw it in Paul’s comment that academics take a variety of approaches to 
scholarship, but not an endless variety, that these norms matter, and that the 
idea that what’s good or not is, at the end of the day, sort of a communal 
decision. 
I also was very interested to see both Nicky and Robin talking about the 
idea that scholarship is laborious, that there’s a process and a labor that’s not 
simple that has to be involved in it in order for it to be scholarship.  That really 
resonated with me and made me feel better about myself. 
And then I also saw the idea that maybe what makes good scholarship 
different from less good scholarship is the idea of novelty, of breaking new 
ground.  I saw this both in what Nicky wrote but also in the Jarvis reading.  
That’s not to say that it necessarily has to break new ground but that it advances 
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the ball, that it advances legal knowledge.  I know that that can be controversial 
for us because people’s over claims on novelty, so I will let Paul, I am going to 
assume, complain about the role.  
HORWITZ: No, not much complaint.  Philosophers have written about, you 
know, standard works by contra Aristotle for centuries.  So, when you talk 
about novelty I would say, contribute usefully to the discussion as opposed to—
I mean, everything doesn’t have to be a point that’s never been raised before.  
It might be a question of depth, application and so on. 
FISH: A moment of self-promotion.  In my last book, Winning Arguments, 
I explained how academic work is impelled by the obligation to originality.  
And that extends even to people who are busily and actively arguing against the 
possibility of there being anything like originality.  They still want to get that 
original argument against originality out there. 
WALD: Not to exaggerate the scope of Stanley and Robin’s agreement, I’m 
sympathetic to trying to define scholarship and its boundaries in the direction 
that they are advancing.  What’s legal scholarship?  Seeking the truth and 
pursuing specific commitments unique to the discipline of law, for example, 
justice’s imperative.  What’s not scholarship?  Partisan advocacy.  What are we 
not sure about?  Forms of normative scholarship, because some (like Stanley 
and Robin) disagree as to whether certain forms of normative scholarship 
constitute the pursuit of justice or are mere advocacy. 
So far so good.  Unfortunately, resolving disagreements about normative 
scholarship cannot be done by reference to legal expertise.   I wish it was that 
simple to say that legal scholarship is about the deployment of expertise to 
explore the law.  The problem with this definition is that it’s not entirely clear 
what the expertise of law professors is.  Some think of law professors’ expertise 
from a historical-jurisprudential perspective.  During the era of Formalism the 
expertise used to be narrow and self-contained, it was about the “law.”  Then 
came Legal Process.  Next came the “law and . . .” interdisciplinary schools of 
thought, like Law and Economics, Critical Legal Studies and Law and 
Sociology, and legal expertise expanded to include economics, political 
science, cultural studies, sociology, literature etc.  That is one concrete way to 
talk about the evolving expertise of law professors. 
  I fear, however, that when we talk about the expertise of law professors 
what others might mean really is some broad and ill-defined “engagement with 
the law.”  And if expertise was to be defined in such an open-ended manner, 
then we really haven’t advanced the definition of what legal scholarship is at 
all by saying that it is the deployment of expertise to explore the law. 
The framing by Robin and Stanley–on the one hand truth and justice (both 
scholarship) and on the other hand advocacy (not scholarship)–allows us to hold 
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onto something concrete and build on it, whereas the expertise of law professors 
is somewhat dubious to me.  What we need to do next is explain in much greater 
detail what is unique and specific to legal scholarship.  If it is to be justice, what 
exactly is the relationship between legal scholarship and justice? 
FRANCIS: I would add to your list an explicit and defensible methodology 
picking up on what Amanda said.  And also, the discussion in—I don’t 
remember the article, but the one where a string cite without an explanation for 
how you picked the cases is bogus. 
SCOVILLE: This picks up on Eli’s comment.  On the issue of expertise, it’s 
a little bit unclear to me what expertise requires, and I think that’s an issue 
because even in my own work I find myself sometimes using radically different 
methods.  Sometimes I might want to pursue an empirical answer to a question, 
but other times I might want a theory-based or a historical answer.  So, I think 
there may be a tendency for legal academics to adopt a pretty wide range of 
methods, if my own experience is indicative.  Sometimes someone might be an 
originalist and sometimes they might do a statistical analysis.  Is it okay to do 
that?  If expertise is necessary the answer seems like it might be no, but the cost 
of that is you have limited range—there will be fewer possibilities for creativity 
and less freedom to follow whatever your interests might be. 
WEST: Another distinction that I’ve heard made often and that is helpful to 
some people is distinguishing between scholarship that originates from inside 
law and scholarship that originates from some point outside law, which is the 
reference to the inter-disciplinary voice.  I do talk a lot to fellows and students 
about the difficulties that people have coming into the academy from a legal 
practice and locating a scholarly voice within them.  And having their lawyerly 
identity evolve into that of a scholar, it’s a real struggle. 
And it seems to me that there’s an ethics that does follow from a normative 
legal scholarship, if we can all agree that that’s not oxymoronic, and that what’s 
distinctive about it is the degree to which that scholarship cannot be interest-
dictated.  And so, I appreciated Chad’s note about having the question dictate 
rather than the answer.  But I think it’s also that the interest can’t dictate and, 
in other words, there’s a difference between writing toward the end of better 
protecting victims of domestic violence—which I’m all for with passion—and 
writing up a piece of scholarship about DV law, I think, and it’s that the interest 
can’t dictate.  And so there’s an ethic of disinterestedness that I think needs 
exploration because I don’t think we have a very good grip on it in the legal 
academy, which is why we have so much trouble distinguishing normative legal 
scholarship and what’s good about it, if anything, from advocacy scholarship 
and why that sounds to many people, including me, like something that’s 
oxymoronic that just isn’t possible and it seems to me the difference does have 
to do with this disinterestedness.  I don’t think it’s the case of clinical faculty 
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are not capable of achieving that kind of disinterestedness, but it’s work.  It’s 
work to achieve it.  It doesn’t mean that you don’t care, it doesn’t mean that 
you’re not passionate, it doesn’t mean that you’re cold and calculating.  You 
better care or you’re not going to be able to finish the work.  And passion helps 
but there’s a difference in the scholarly voice and the advocate’s voice when 
dealing even with scholarship that has to do with these issues and at its root, I 
think the difference is this disinterestedness. 
HESSICK: So, I want to hand this over to Amanda.  But before I do, I just 
want to point out that I think here what we’re talking about—the 
disinterestedness point—is an important one.  And I also think that it raises 
questions the extent to which that norm affects different types of scholarship or 
different situations.  I think people feel pretty comfortable saying that the 
funding source needs to be disclosed or perhaps people ought not write research 
that had been funded. 
But I do think that there are other questions about when people have a point 
of view or activities that aren’t directly motivating it.  Paul suggested that 
people should be transparent about all these things and that disclosure can solve 
these problems.  I’m less confident that that’s true.  I do wonder whether— 
WALD: Tell us what you find dubious about the effectiveness of disclosure. 
HESSICK: Oh, because I often think that those disclosures sometimes are 
seen as a mark of expertise rather than a mark of “don’t take me seriously.”  
Maybe I’m wrong.  Maybe that’s just how I read them and I also think that 
maybe it might let people off the hook, that they feel as though if they make 
this disclosure, that’s enough for them to have filtered what their views were.  
I guess what I’m trying to say is I think that the disclosure can both set the 
wrong signal and also not accomplish its goal. 
But I wonder how much more we need to worry about when we have to 
worry about disinterestedness.  When clinical faculty choose to write 
pedagogical scholarship as opposed to non-pedagogical scholarship and if that 
pedagogical scholarship is to talk about a method that they’re using at their own 
institution, would we expect that to be a disinterestedness piece of scholarship?  
I’ve personally never seen one that has said, “And the program that we use is 
actually really terrible and we should have done something else,” for example. 
What about getting invited to a conference?  You get invited to a conference 
to write on a phenomenon or something that happened and if you happen to 
write something that’s negative it’s quite shocking.  Everyone talks about Judge 
Posner’s contribution on the death of Justice Brennan.  “How could you 
possibly write something that was critical of Justice Brennan?”  That raises 
perhaps other questions, but I don’t think that it goes away. 
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I want to raise these questions but not necessarily answer them and then 
also say, we have this norm of methodological disclosure, I think, for empirical 
papers and I think Baude makes a good argument that maybe we need a similar 
methodological approach to doctrinal scholarship and do people have to be 
especially worried.  There was something in one of the readings talking about 
how if you are writing normative scholarship it’s less important to disclose the 
interests that you have than if you are writing descriptive scholarship, because 
if you are writing normative scholarship people would be on guard for the idea 
or that you might have a point of view, but that’s not the case if you’re writing 
a treatise.  This is actually one of Eisenberg’s points. 
SELIGMAN: So, I want to make a kind of observation about the kinds of 
questions that I’m hearing here to help move the goal forward a little bit.  I’m 
hearing four different kinds of questions and I want to know about what they 
matter for.  So, one question is, “What is scholarship?”  The only thing that I 
really heard that matters in answer to that question is tenure and promotion. 
I also have been hearing questions about what is good and bad scholarship.  
I’ve been hearing questions about why do we create scholarship, what are the 
motives or goals.  And then implicit in what I’m hearing as an outsider is kind 
of taxonomy about kinds of scholarship assuming that you count things like 
tweets as scholarship—which is not necessarily the case—but there’s a whole 
bunch of things that you as legal scholars do, not all of which are narrow.  Some 
of which are broad. 
So that it might be worth in the final document to enumerate different types 
of things whether or not they count as scholarship.  The question I want to throw 
back with that observation is, “Which of those are questions that matter for the 
ethics of legal scholarship and which of them are just sort of interesting?” 
FRANCIS: So, I want to go back to how people get into the legal academy 
a little bit to reflect back on methodology and scholarly quality.  The 
methodology that lawyers have been trained in, who move into the academy, is 
advocacy.  For example, how do you write a good brief, how do you construct 
a good oral argument, do you stand up? 
It’s not just that people who are in graduate programs in disciplines 
typically have lengthy discussions about the ethics of their discipline as part of 
graduate training programs.  It’s also that they learn a scholarly methodology.  
When a historian is trained as a historian, there are things you learn about how 
to be a historian, how to find documents, what kinds of documents you find, 
how to analyze documents, and so on.  Same thing in literary theory. 
I see a lot of normative scholarship where people are not trying to be 
advocates but it’s really terrible normative scholarship because they don’t know 
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a thing about how to do moral analysis and they’re trying to do moral analysis.  
They need a good ethics course. 
WEST: Right. 
FRANCIS: They come out with some piece of junk about utilitarianism or 
whatever and I just cringe when I read this stuff. 
Now, I put a little a plug here about the expertise point.  Frankly, there’s 
nothing wrong with co-authoring and there’s something to be said, I think, for 
if you want to do statistics don’t go to two minutes or half-a-day workshops at 
the ALS and think you’re done.  Associate with a good statistical methodologist 
and so on. 
BOOTHE-PERRY: In the same vein with Amanda to try to get a document 
out of this and to answer some of these questions and kind of piggybacking on 
what Leslie said about how those of us who move from practice into academia 
and we don’t have any instructions on how to do this, I think what’s important 
for our discussion as we talk about an ethical obligation of a scholar and, in 
thinking about what is legal scholarship, the question of expertise, I think we 
would need to be very careful about what that is because if we’re talking about 
what is good scholarship, certainly your scholarship, if we’re going to classify 
it as being good, will not be good if you don’t have a background in the subject 
matter. 
Certainly, if you come from practice into academia—I didn’t know how to 
write a law review article, I didn’t know how to do scholarship, so I had to start 
somewhere that either I was drawing from my experience in practice or maybe 
it was a new topic for me.  And actually, it was a new topic for me.  So, I 
certainly wasn’t an expert in the sense that I had spoken at a number of 
conferences or published widely on the issue, but through research, it’s parallel 
to the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.1 says that you have to be a 
competent lawyer.  And it says you can develop that competence through 
appropriate study or with associating with someone who has the expertise, 
which would be like a co-authoring piece, so certainly the expertise is 
necessary, whether it comes from your years of experience in writing this type 
of scholarship or speaking on it or in your research, but I think expertise would 
be part of the obligation of a scholar to determine what something is that’s legal 
scholarship, going with Paul’s definition that he has, that expertise is important 
in that sense, though.  I don’t want us to dismiss it that easily. 
WALD: While a common misconception, it is not true that the dominant 
methodology of law practice is advocacy.  It’s false.  It has always been false.  
Certainly, zealous advocacy has historically been a preoccupation of codes of 
conduct and is the cornerstone of the adversarial system and the dominant 
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ideology of the legal profession.5  At the same time, most practicing lawyers 
are not trial attorneys or litigators and will never see the inside of a courtroom 
unless they are defendants.  Of course, corporate lawyers and many other 
attorneys sometimes engage in advocacy when negotiating transactions, but it’s 
not what we think of as advocacy when we have a litigator in mind because 
negotiation is often not a zero-sum game of winning, losing, and slicing up the 
pie, but rather about getting to a yes and increasing the size of the pie.  So, we 
should probably shy away from simplistic assumptions about advocacy as the 
central methodology of law practice with an image of a litigator, Atticus Finch 
style, in mind. 
By the way, even if advocacy was the methodology of practicing lawyers, 
it would not necessarily help us define or identify the methodology of legal 
scholarship for academic lawyers.  In fact, as we have already discussed, we all 
seem to agree that zealous advocacy pieces are not scholarship. 
WEST: I also want to pick up on the really interesting point.  I think the 
problem is bigger.  I agree with what was just said, but I think the problem is 
bigger.  The academy, and the bar and the bench do not have a history of 
developing an understanding of justice.  And this is perverse and it is shocking 
to realize but there’s a history to it.  Langdell thought that justice equals law 
and so the expertise in law is all you need.  He said this quite explicitly over 
and over and over again in after-dinner talks.  If you want to know what justice 
is, go read the law. 
So, to be able to accurately state the law for Langdell meant that you were 
doing justice.  So, if the law scholar who is not advocating a client’s interest is 
writing within a legal method that assumes that law equals justice, then expertly 
and accurately explicating the law is doing this moral project, is doing this 
normative thing, but there’s no jurisprudence, there’s no philosophy behind it 
that celebrates what that justice is. 
Now, on the other hand, at the same time Langdell was writing, Holmes, 
who disagreed with Langdell on everything, agreed that justice is [nonsense].  
He said it explicitly over and over and over again.  He said, “I hate justice.”  He 
wrote that in a number of letters.  What did he think we ought to be doing with 
law?  Promoting utility.  That’s why you get all the normative scholarship that 
carries on about utility.  And so, between those two poles you don’t have the 
developed philosophy that would give this method of the legal scholar actual 
content and moral depth. 
FRANCIS: And where did Law Reviews originate?  They originated with 
Langdellian legal education. 
 
5. William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 
1978 WIS. L. REV. 29.  
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WEST: And with the restatement projects, just the straight explication of 
law.  
HESSICK: So, we are out of time, but because I moderated I will take 30 
seconds to add two things.  One, I was very struck with Leslie’s point about the 
training that we get, but I actually thought many of us got a particular type of 
training that does teach us how to be disinterested, or at least we tell ourselves 
that it does, and that was a judicial clerkship.  I actually think that that 
experience could be a model that we could try to reference and ask people to 
try to think back on. 
And then the last thing that I’d say is I love the idea of a norm of 
disinterestedness and I think that probably many, if not all of us in the room, 
could agree on it.  But I’m thinking about my colleagues in criminal law who 
are often hired precisely because of their experience as a defense attorney or as 
a prosecutor and I wonder how easy it would be to sell them on 
disinterestedness as a norm. 
FISH: Is there a literature devoted to studying people who transition from 
practice to the academy? 
HORWITZ: There are guides, but I don’t know that they are often guides 
that involve the kind of, let’s say, ethics or norms of practice.  More like “how 
to get a job.” 
FISH: In other words, the experiences that some of you are reporting could, 
I think, be made analytically interesting.  And I wasn’t aware that anyone had 
written on this phenomenon, what happened. 
C. Session Two: The Obligations of Sincerity, Candor, and Exhaustiveness 
HORWITZ: The official title of this session is “The Obligations of Sincerity, 
Candor, and Exhaustiveness,” and I don’t think this is a sign of creeping 
pluralism, but I acknowledge upfront treating it as a topic does not mean that 
one can’t dissent from it, but here’s how I’m going to proceed just the same.  
We have the three terms.  I’ll start at the broad level of definition.  I will then 
ask—and I think I’ll do it early rather than at the very end—whether people 
think that there should be other values, whether we’re missing anything that 
might be productively added at this point by way of kind of broad “umbrella” 
values that ought to be mentioned at this point, and then we can perhaps talk 
about caveats, applications, and so on.  So, let me start kind of with the big 
picture.  So, sincerity, candor, exhaustiveness. 
So, let me start with sincerity.  If people were coming up with a definition 
of sincerity, or again, if they don’t have a complete definition, if they have, as 
I’ve said, key words or basic concepts that they think would help us illuminate 
what sincerity is, where would you start?  
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HAMILTON: I thought it was an ambiguous term, but could the author tell 
me up front what’s the motive?  It goes back to I think what Chad was talking 
about here, “What is the motive behind this piece?”  And then I can decide 
whether they are what I would call traditional scholarly ethics or whether they 
are  advocacy ethics.  I have up front what am I looking at here in terms of the 
piece. 
HORWITZ: And I can see or anticipate that we might have some question 
about when something belongs under the category or rubric of sincerity and 
when it belongs under candor, but we can kind of take each as they come.  Are 
there other suggestions?  Again, key words or ideas.  What constitutes sincerity 
in the context of the ethics of legal scholarship?  Stanley? 
FISH: I just don’t think that the sincerity requirement or bar should be made 
too high, so that it begins to approach something like transparency, which is 
both psychologically and existentially impossible. 
FRANCIS: Could I ask you why you’ve got that as a separate category?  I 
guess the reason I’m asking it is I haven’t ever seen that proposed as a scholarly 
norm in other disciplines.  I’ve seen other disciplines have enormously difficult 
conversations about why you select the research problems that you do, whether 
there are things you should never do, which is something we don’t have up 
there.   
HORWITZ: Right.  Well, so I think I can take the co-organizer’s privilege 
and say it is not clear that there is any perfect answer to that.  That’s to say it’s 
not that we had a long debate and decided sincerity has got to be on the list, and 
if it’s productive, we can move pretty quickly.  What I’ll do is ask, whether  
anybody has anything more to say about sincerity and then we can move pretty 
quickly to candor, which I suspect will capture some of the things.  But I’m not,  
in my moderator’s capacity, counting out—people may say yes, it belongs 
there.  
BOOTHE-PERRY: When I think about sincerity, I think about one of the 
pieces I wrote, the author was writing about intellectual honesty.  So maybe 
that could be something we have in there, being honest about the evidence that 
you’re presenting, and then it kind of goes back to what we were talking about, 
about what constitutes legal scholarship and problem of promotion, but also 
being honest with what your purpose is in doing it.  Is it for financial gain or 
something else, those disclosures, so some form of intellectual honesty. 
SCOVILLE: Two points.  One, it seems like everything we’ve talked about 
so far is actually candor.  Second, I’m not sure sincerity should require 
consistency.  I think sincerity was in a couple of the draft codes that we read.  
To me, it seems fine for someone to argue X in one piece and then not X in 
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another, just to test out ideas.  I don’t see why you should have to have some 
sort of logically consistent end-game that ties all of your scholarship together. 
WALD: What about the opposite of X?  You said not X, what about the 
opposite of X?  Can you argue X and the opposite of X? 
SCOVILLE: Yes. 
HORWITZ: And that may end up applying to candor or transparency or 
whatever one argues for.  I want to explore the possibility of not X seems valid.  
I have argued a lot for what I call an institutionalist approach to religious liberty 
and religious autonomy, but it also seemed to me at some point, for a particular 
conference I was doing, I was interested in the economics of religion and I 
wanted to come at the question that I had advocated for, from a contrary 
position and take a kind of poke at it, and sometimes I think a scholar might 
say, “I’ve argued for X and now it’s also time for me to ask some of the negative 
questions that have occurred to me along the way,” and that seems to me valid.  
But again, I’m not categorizing here, it may end up being a question of some 
other category. 
OLDFATHER: So, this isn’t directly responsive to any of the things on the 
board, but is just tossing out some related ideas from codes of ethics from 
history and political science.  The historian’s piece speaks about—under the 
heading Shared Values of Historians, Integrity, so “historians cannot 
successfully do this work without mutual trust and respect.  By practicing their 
craft with integrity, historians acquire a reputation for trustworthiness that is 
arguably their single most precious professional asset.”6  Political scientists do 
use the word transparency and in two senses, there’s production transparency, 
which is with respect to data generated or collected.  I think more pertinent for 
our purposes, there’s analytic transparency, where “[r]esearchers making 
evidence-based knowledge claims should provide a full account of how they 
draw their analytic conclusions from the data.”7  That is, clearly explicate the 
links connecting data to conclusions. 
FISH: Why do we call that transparency?  Why not just making a good 
argument?  I hate transparency.  I wish I’d never heard the word. 
HORWITZ: Well, if “Against Transparency” hasn’t yet been taken as a book 
title, I’m looking forward to your next book. 
 
6. AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT ON STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT (rev. 2018) (1987), https://www.historians.org/jobs-and-professional-
development/statements-standards-and-guidelines-of-the-discipline/statement-on-standards-of-
professional-conduct [https://perma.cc/B5ZM-PJAT]. 
7. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, A GUIDE TO PROFESSIONAL ETHICS IN 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 10 (2d ed. 2012), 
http://www.apsanet.org/portals/54/Files/Publications/APSAEthicsGuide2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DR35-3GF4].  
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[LAUGHTER] 
FISH: I’m trying to think of moments when the question of sincerity might 
arise and I’ve only been able to think of one; someone who gives a presentation 
or even hands someone a piece of work and then the response is “Well, do you 
really mean that?”  Which I take it to be a question like, “Are you just trying to 
get a rise out of us, are you just trying to be provocative or contrarian?” 
HORWITZ: You’ve heard that question? 
FISH: Yeah.  I always mean everything.  So, is that what you have in mind?  
Do you really mean that and are there good reasons, even in scholarship for 
sometimes, not saying what you mean, but just following out a line of reasoning 
because it might provoke helpful responses, or is that a form of meta-sincerity?  
These things get me. 
SELIGMAN:  I have a naïve, non-lawyer question: is sincerity an issue here?  
Lawyers, as opposed to legal scholars, sometimes represent people or entities 
that they do not like, that they think are bad, but don’t particularly really want 
to have them win, because they think—believe—that people deserve access to 
the court process, that they need due process? 
FISH: Well, sincerity’s a test sometimes, in some parts of the world. 
HORWITZ: As people have noted, there’s been some suggestion that it is 
not clear that sincerity is necessary as compared to candor.  It seems a good 
time to move on.  So, candor, people may have more positive views on that.  
Again, I think the question is—leaving aside, and I think we can do this at the 
end, whether one or more of these values should be stricken from the list, 
assuming it is a value and one that counts for the ethics of legal scholarship, 
What do we mean when we say candor? 
HESSICK: I just want to repeat what I said at the end of the last session, 
which is I’m not a big fan of the idea of disclosures.  Both, because I think that 
they can send the wrong signal, they can actually send a signal of expertise.  
But also, because I think that to the extent that we expect them to do work, 
that’s problematic.  If we have some sort of tie to an issue that might require a 
disclosure, I think we can sort of take one of two approaches.  We can either 
try to guard very much against whatever those interests or biases or prior 
commitments might be, or we should not engage in the process.  And I’d extend 
this to—maybe it’s a little bit different when we talk about funded research.  I’d 
be quite comfortable with law schools not doing funded research, although I 
understand that it’s quite common at some institutions and for some types of 
work.  But if I’m writing this book review because this person’s my friend and 
I want to get them good publicity, and so I’m going to put a little footnote, “This 
person’s my friend and that’s why I was asked to write this review,” then you 
shouldn’t be writing the review, if you can’t write an honest, straightforward 
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review, and if you feel as though people need that information in order for—
but I understand that not everyone’s going to agree with me. 
SELIGMAN:  I’d just like to offer a different way of thinking about what 
candor might mean other than simply disclosure, although I appreciated that 
point very much and I’m going to be thinking about it for a while.  But let’s 
think about what anthropologists (particularly those who do ethnographic 
research) do.  In their scholarship, they write about how they are situated, which 
affects exactly what they were able to see and not see.   That’s something that’s 
very well worked out in anthropology. 
FRANCIS: I just wanted to point out that I think we need to ask the question, 
“Candor about what?”  Because I think candor about methodology matters a 
lot.  Candor about—so, that’s part of the anthropologist.  I mean, if you’re doing 
qualitative work, you describe your methodology and that includes, if it’s 
participant-observer research or whatever, what your connection is.  I also think 
that there’s pretty well worked out norms about candor about what would be 
called a direct conflict of interest.  That’s usually defined in monetary terms.  
And also might be spousal terms.  There are also, in other disciplines, and I 
thought a bunch of the articles were great on this point—there’s a lot worked 
out about disclosure of authorship and the law profession.  Law scholarship has 
been pretty bad about that and— 
HORWITZ: Can I ask you what you mean by that? 
FRANCIS: I mean, you’ll actually see in science journals where there’s a 
laundry list of folks who might or might not be authors, an exact description of 
what each person contributed.  “So, so and so brought patients to the table; so 
and so did the primary drafting; so and so did the this.”  In the footnote, at the 
beginning.  Now, there are a lot of allegations that law professors use their 
students’ work in a way that would actually count as authorship in other fields, 
and that was actually the point that I had in mind.  Or don’t even disclose their 
research assistants.  But the development of norms about what you need to say 
about who was an author or the contributions that people made.  So, those are 
three areas where we might start—methods, direct conflicts of interest of 
whether your relative is different from your good friend, and authorship. 
HORWITZ: So, let me offer a comment or two.  Regarding authorship, there 
are the big, kind of the scandal issues, the ones that occasionally pop up.  I don’t 
know whether it’s an endemic problem in the legal academy, in part because 
I’m really bad at using research assistants, but others might have a different 
empirical or other take on this.  Yeah, I would say there seems to be an 
increasing norm toward listing co-authorship with law students, that that has 
become, I think, more frequent.  I’m not sure exactly why, it might just be that 
some leading people, like Marty Redish, made a habit of doing it and so others 
felt more comfortable doing it, or it might be because authorship counts 
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increasingly in the job market, there’s more of an incentive if you’re pushing 
your student forward to want to do it.  But clearly, that’s fair as a concern.  The 
other thing I’d note, and this goes a little bit to Carissa’s point, with which 
you’re right, I don’t completely agree.  The Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct for lawyers might be relevant here in thinking about conflicts of 
interest in that there are—and it’s a nebulous standard—but there are cases of 
conflict where you’re completely conflicted out.  It’s what I tell the students is 
a consent plus regime—consent alone is not enough, disclosure alone is not 
enough.  In some cases, you are incapable of serving your client or may be 
incapable of serving your client and the consent can’t be worked around, so you 
have to withdraw.  There are other cases where you may have an interest, but 
the interest is not sufficiently strong that you believe, in good faith, that you 
can perform a diligent and competent job of client representation.  So, there 
may be cases where I could not write that book review or should not.  I have in 
mind a review that appeared pretty recently, within the last three or four years, 
where two friends and colleagues at an institution reviewed the book of a third 
colleague who was at the same institution.  One of them might have moved on, 
but at some point, they’d all been colleagues and co-authors and so on together.  
And without any disclosures, that seemed to me a pretty obvious problematic 
case.  On the other hand, I just criticized Nelson Tabby’s book in a book review 
and I kind of said “I’ve worked with him on this and that.”  The review was 
pretty critical.  I think one can quarrel with it, with my choice, which I did run 
by the editor of that magazine, but there may be cases where you have a 
potential conflict, and this is where candor may be relevant.  So, we can 
imagine—this is a little different from exhaustiveness, but we can imagine 
candor as being some kind of requirement to give information in a piece of 
scholarship, relevant to evaluating that scholarship, which can include a variety 
of things including funding, personal interests, even ideological interests so that 
the reader-critic has the tools needed to evaluate it.  
FRANCIS: Could I just throw in, it’s not just “candor about what”—we 
might also want to think about “candor to whom?” 
SELIGMAN: The flip side of writing positive or negative reviews of one’s 
colleagues is holding back the full weight of your negative evaluation of a work 
out of politeness. 
WEST: I just want to push back a little.  First, against the idea that one needs 
to expose one’s ideological priors.  That strikes me as indulgence, not candor.  
There’s no need and let the work speak for itself, so to speak.  And then second, 
perhaps there’s a worry about not letting loose with the full fusillade, but there 
are also other ethical constraints on one as a human being and so, I don’t know 
how to deal with that, but there’s ethics of politeness, of friendship.  Someone 
who’s being asked to vote negatively on a tenure decision involving of someone 
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who’s become a friend shouldn’t make the vote on the basis of friendship, but 
let’s not deny that this is an ethical conflict.  And so, I just don’t want these 
rules to become sort of trump-like.  “Trump” meaning in the cards sense of the 
word. 
BOOTHE-PERRY: While you’re writing, just a quick comment on the other 
norms that we are concerned with when we’re talking about our scholarship, as 
Robin just pointed out.  In the ethics of friendship and the ethnics of politeness, 
maybe it might be wise for us, in this document, to maybe put a distinction 
between ethics as being more like the Rules of Professional Conduct and some 
specific obligations and a moral compass or a societal separation from the 
actual restatement that we’re doing.  There was some differentiation there. 
HORWITZ: One thing I’ve done, just in response to Robin, to the way I put 
it is kind of note other ethical issues, so to speak, external to scholarship, which 
is to say we obviously have certain role ethical obligations, but that does not 
exhaust our ethical obligations as human beings, and so candor is, in that sense, 
not a trump.  I guess I’d say one of the answers is there are times when the 
answer is to abstain, don’t write the article and so on, because you might be 
able to do this, but you can’t then properly follow other obligations. 
WALD:  The distinction between common morality and role morality is a 
well-known one in legal ethics.8  The basic idea is that acting as lawyers, 
members of the legal profession may follow a specific role-differentiated 
morality that may at times conflict with common morality, if their role is 
justified and legitimate.  The distinction between common and role morality 
gives rise to interesting ethical questions such as, “Can a good lawyer be a bad 
person?” 
It is not, however, clear to me that we can import the idea of role morality 
to the realm of legal scholarship and law professors.  The problem, or challenge 
in doing so, and part of what we came together today to discuss, is that we do 
not have an agreed upon understanding of the role and ethics of law professors.  
Remember that role morality is only justified and one is only permitted to 
deviate from common morality, if one’s role is justified and legitimate.  If we 
do not know exactly what law professors do and should do and if we do not 
have a well-reasoned definition of their role, it makes little sense to talk about 
law professors’ role morality. 
It follows—and this may sound surprising coming from someone who 
makes a living teaching the Rules of Professional Conduct—that it may make 
little sense to borrow from lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct when 
thinking about rules of professional conduct for legal scholars.  The Rules of 
Professional Conduct give life and operationalize, if you will, lawyers’ role 
 
8. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975). 
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morality.  To the extent that law professors have a role morality different than 
the one lawyers follow, then I’m not sure that the Rules of Professional Conduct 
are generally helpful here in delineating specific rules for academic lawyers. 
But the Rules may be helpful in some limited circumstances.  Rule 8.4, for 
example, deals with lawyers’ trustworthiness and honesty9— 
HORWITZ: That’s the catch-all chapter. 
WALD: Right.  Borrowing from 8.4(c) makes sense in thinking about law 
professors’ duty of trustworthiness and honesty.  But more generally using the 
Rules to help think about law professors’ duties may make less sense.  Think 
about the rules pertaining to conflicts of interests.  The conflict rules are so 
embedded in the notion of lawyers’ role-morality as representatives of clients, 
such that borrowing from them, out of context, in thinking about law 
professors’ duty of loyalty may be confusing.  For example, one basic notion in 
the conflicts rules is that there’s something called a conflict, and if it exists, 
then it may be cured when a client gives her informed consent.  That’s Rule 1.7.  
How might this notion apply to legal scholarship?  Suppose a law professor 
writing a law review article has a conflict of interest.  Who is the “client?”  The 
readers?  The law professors’ home institution?  And even if we can identify 
the “clients,” in what meaningful way can we empower them to give something 
akin to informed consent and what would that mean?  Borrowing from the 
conflict rules of lawyers, as you can see, might be quite difficult to do.   
Or think about the notion of giving clients notice in the Rules as an 
alternative means of, in some circumstances, curing a conflict of interest—and 
this is going back to Carissa’s point about whether disclosing a conflict is 
sufficient to cure a law professor’s conflict.  When I read scholarship, 
sometimes disclosures are helpful to me, because but for them, I’ll read an 
article with an eye toward deferring to the author’s subject matter expertise.  I’ll 
assume that the author has the expertise and that the article reflects it.  In 
contrast, if I know, for example, that some work has been funded by an 
interested party, an institution with a particular agenda, it’s not that I won’t read 
the paper, but I might read it with a more critical disposition, not deferring to 
the author’s expertise to the same degree given the disclosed conflict.    
The same thinking applies to the conflict that arises when academics review 
or engage with the work of colleagues in their own institution.  I don’t think 
there ought to be a ban on such practices, that strikes me as ridiculous, because 
colleagues in an institution that work in the same area and have complimentary 
expertise should be permitted and perhaps encouraged to review and engage 
 
9. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“It is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation.”). 
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with each other’s work.  But, to the extent that some people are unaware of 
those relationships that might in some way color or influence how we read or 
how we ought to read the review or scholarly engagement, these relationships 
ought to be disclosed. 
Can we or should we then borrow from the notice and disclosure 
requirements in the conflict rules when we think about the disclosures law 
professors should make?  I doubt it.  The Rules’ notice requirements are so 
grounded in the particulars of representing clients that they make little sense 
outside of that context. 
HORWITZ: I’m going to offer two quick responses.  I guess I get to be both, 
kind of manager and occasional participant.  So, I agree with—Eli makes the 
valuable point, that the lawyers’ ethical rules involving conflicts are there in 
part because you are an agent for a principal and so you’re worried about, kind 
of, agency slippage and so on, and you actually have a client to represent.  
That’s not true for scholarship.  One might rightly or pompously or somewhere 
in-between, kind of say “Well, I’m serving the muse,” or “I kind of represent 
the truth” or something of the sort, but it’s not quite the same thing.  Again, it 
may be that the response to this is more disclosure and less disqualification.  
It’s not necessarily the response, but if you have a wide audience and the 
concern is how the audience will receive or evaluate it, then it might be that 
that’s one of the ways to address it rather than kind of the lawyerly 
disqualification model.  Whatever my second point was can’t have been that 
important, so I’ll leave it. 
OLDFATHER: All right.  Just a couple points.  This, I think, goes back to 
Neil’s point with respect to sincerity, but I think candor, as well, is tied to 
motivation and I like the “no other ethical issues external to scholarship” 
because it seems to me as well that what we’re talking about here really 
concerns at what point does something imperil the status of the project as 
scholarship and that disclosure is tied to things that might lead one to question 
whether the person, the author, is engaged in something that we want to call 
scholarship as opposed to something we want to call advocacy, what he or she 
is actually motivated by.  And I think in some instances, the disclosure strikes 
me as fine.  It’s the author saying “I am aware of these facts, I have accounted 
for these facts that might make my analysis seem to be not disinterested, but 
I’m attempting to set them to the side as I conduct this.”  I think at some point 
though, they become too extreme.  It starts to remind me now of the 
“appearance of impropriety type standard,” with respect to judicial recusal.  
There—we expect and we allow for judges to bring all sorts of priors to their 
analysis of cases, but at some point, it becomes too extreme and we say you 
can’t do it, you can’t be a judge under that circumstance.  I think we will draw 
the lines very differently, but there comes a point at which we should be willing 
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to say you’re not a scholar at that point, you’re doing something else, you 
shouldn’t be doing it. 
HORWITZ: So, let me first of all, steal the opportunity to mention the point 
that I had forgotten about Robin’s comment about ideology.  I’m not 
unsympathetic.  I think that cannot always be useful or relevant, or terribly 
important, and sometimes it’s clear.  My concern, I guess the reason I bring it 
up, is maybe, particularly in constitutional law, it’s often the case that is what 
is doing a great deal of the work is—I won’t call them priors, but the premises 
that go unstated about relevant values.  So, I don’t care if somebody’s goal, for 
instance—to kind of paraphrase Mark Tuffin is, “What’s going to serve the goal 
of socialism in the United States?”  But it helps me sometimes to evaluate an 
article if a premise that’s not clearly stated or a baseline that’s animating the 
piece and it’s really underwriting a lot of the work is stated—and maybe that’s 
just the question of what constitutes well done versus not well-done 
scholarship, so— 
WEST: I agree with where you wound up.  That’s a bad argument, if there’s 
also a premise in a constitutional argument that is a statement of general 
political moral theory and so sure, if it’s not explicit, then it’s a poor argument.  
I don’t think you need to add an additional obligation of candor with respect to 
one’s ideology. 
HORWITZ: Yeah.  And I certainly don’t want to confuse questions about 
the quality of scholarship with questions about the ethics of scholarship, at least 
not in every case.  
FISH: Two points.  One is I’m uncomfortable with sincerity as belonging 
here at all.  I’m not sure that it’s available to the kind of standards or even quasi-
formalization that you might desire, and I’m remembering in the conscientious 
objector cases, Seeger10 and Welsh11, how unsatisfactory the sincerity standard, 
which was the only one the Court left itself, was at the end of that process.  My 
second comment had to do with the question of tone in relation to candor and 
goes back to someone who talked about reviewers—all people responding to 
essays pulling their punches, being less than “candid.”  Well, this might be a 
matter of disciplinary difference.  When I taught some years ago at Columbia 
University, a young woman who was visiting from Oxford was writing her 
dissertation and wanted to sit in on my classes, because she told me my work 
would be part of her thesis.  Of course, no one can resist that request and I 
simply did not.  And then after a certain amount of time, she asked me if I would 
look at some of her work, and of course, I did.  So then I met with her and had 
this following conversation.  I said, “Have I ever, in any way, harmed you?”  
 
10. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
11. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
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She said, “No.”  “Have I ever, in any way, harmed anyone that you loved or 
cared about?”  And she said, “No.”  And so, I said, “Why are speaking, then, 
so viciously about me?”  Not in terms of disagreeing with one’s arguments, but 
in terms of something that grows to the level occasionally of name-calling, 
almost name-calling.  And she replied, I’m not sure about whether this is 
accurate or not, and I’ll ask Leslie.  She replied that that was the decorum in 
philosophical debate.  That’s what she said. 
FRANCIS: That’s Oxford philosophical debate. 
FISH: Perhaps it was only the decorum that her mentor had delivered to her.  
But I know, again, in literary studies, one usually tries fairly hard to be polite 
and to have ready locutions, like “I think the point that was raised is an 
important one and I’m grateful to Professor X for directing us to this line of 
inquiry, but I don’t think that his way of pursuing it will lead us to the best 
result,” or something like that.  As opposed to “Man, this is stupid, how did this 
person ever get a position in a university?”  And so forth.  So, is this a matter 
of what we might call a general requirement of collegiality even in the midst of 
fierce difference of opinion or does it vary across disciplines?  I don’t know. 
HORWITZ: Neil?  And then let me say, since everybody’s at least had one 
round, and I know there are hands up, I’m going to move to exhaustiveness, 
which I suspect is a briefer topic, not necessarily.  Okay, we’ll try to keep them 
short and let’s move to it as quickly as we can, in part, because I suspect the 
others are relevant questions and I’m keeping an eye on the clock, but go ahead, 
please. 
HAMILTON: Well, two points.  I’m agreeing that on the sincerity piece, at 
least to my experience, I’m not seeing it in other disciplines, it’s a bit of an 
outlier to me, and on that point, since our target audience ultimately is the legal 
professorate and they’re going to be most influenced by whatever we can point 
to in other—particularly the medical profession, the social sciences, the liberal 
arts tradition—I mean, to where we see it well-developed these concepts, 
whatever their title is in these other disciplines, would be well served, 
especially, I think the medical, but in terms of what influences the legal 
professorate.  Just back to if we had agreement on the various major categories 
of scholarship, which goes back to Stanley and Robin’s comments, the 
discussion earlier, let’s say, the scholarship of the liberal arts tradition, the 
normative scholarship, the frankly partisan, that’s what I meant.  If I knew 
which tradition they’re in or which context, then it helps me with 
exhaustiveness, because then I know.  Because if it’s the first type, I think I’m 
reading a piece where they’ve done their best to explore all the counter 
arguments and all the counter evidence, whereas if it’s in the last group, I’m 
quite confident I’m not looking at that. 
HORWITZ: So, Amanda, is it a short order or is it— 
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SELIGMAN:  Yeah.  I just wanted to speak briefly about pedagogy since 
Stanley raised this question as well.  It’s very good that your discussion is 
limited to legal scholarship, as opposed to legal teaching, because I think that 
there are situations in pedagogy which call for us not to be candid with our 
students and certainly not to disclose things.  So, I think that part of what we 
need to think about in this process is the code switching that you as faculty do 
between your roles as scholars and your roles as teachers. 
WALD: Well, if you’re moving on, would you just mind adding to the other 
list Stanley’s point about—I’m going to loosely call it decorum, so we might 
get to talk about it later. 
HORWITZ: All right.  And I’ll say, by the way, that question about code 
switching is, I won’t say newly controversialized, but again, controversialized 
in part because of the accessibility of social media, op-eds and so on.  But I’m 
thinking of debates about whether Amy Wax at Penn should be allowed to teach 
first year students, in part on the basis of extra academic writings, maybe 
academic writings, but not specifically classroom statements, so those code 
switching debates are a matter of controversy right now.  They don’t need to be 
addressed here, but I do think there is a connection between candor and 
exhaustiveness or a potential one because, there may be a duty to exhaust 
relevant research sources but sometimes there’s also a duty to explain the scope 
of your research or the scope of your investigation, and so that maybe segues 
us into exhaustiveness.  So, let me, at least in the interest of time, push us in 
that direction.  So, what does exhaustiveness mean?  And maybe part of the 
question here is, Are there different kinds of exhaustiveness that are relevant, 
ethical scholarly duties?  Anybody want to lead off on that?   
FRANCIS: Well, my “to whom” comment—the reason I wanted to just sort 
of expand on it, is often conflicts are disclosed to expert bodies, which then 
make a judgment about whether or not they rise to the level of more general 
disclosure, so there are conflict of interest committees at universities and 
frequently, people will be expected to make disclosures to editors, and that’s 
another place where—and the editor can make a judgment—but where student 
edited journals could be a real problem for us because students are just in a very 
difficult position, not only not having the expertise, but not having the authority, 
so I just wanted to raise that.  About exhaustiveness, we use footnotes in law 
publishing very differently from the way footnotes are used in other disciplines, 
and it might be worth reflecting on that.  Just two little quickies.  Often in 
philosophy writing, the thing that you’re setting aside, that’s not the topic of 
this article or that somebody might want to think much more about, but you’re 
not doing it here, that’s what footnotes do a lot of the time.  And footnotes for 
us tend to be some sort of bizarre notion of authority and either it’s everything 
like, “See generally Locke.” Anyway, I’ll stop there. 
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HORWITZ: Yeah, and just to raise Eli’s blood temperature, add that there 
are cases in legal ethics where one cannot split off a particular portion of a case 
or particular piece of legal work, that is to say sometimes you can limit what 
you’re going to do for a client and sometimes it’s not ethically permissible to 
say, “I’m going to do X but not Y,” which is intimately connected to—and it 
seems to me that although we often make scope statements, and that’s part of 
the exhaustiveness question in a sense, there may be cases where it is not proper 
to —at least it seems to me, to say, “I’m setting aside this question that is clearly 
relevant and determinative on the issue I’m writing about,” particularly if 
you’re doing so for strategic reasons.  “I know I can sell the ultimate outcome 
I want by kind of presenting it as a sheep and I’ll leave out the wolf that I know 
is kind of really hiding in the weeds on this argument.”  You know, “This 
argument has the following implication, I know that if I know that there’s an 
intimately connected issue that has bigger implications, that are going to make 
people disagree with me, I’m setting it to one side.”  I think there are cases 
where that’s unproblematic and others where it might be problematic, but, 
Robin, you had a comment, I think, on exhaustiveness. 
WEST: A few, yeah.  So, first, I think it’s worth remembering that the older 
idea of legal scholarship was really neither normative nor inter-disciplinary, it 
was descriptive.  The point was to describe accurately the content of the law, 
and I think our fixation with footnoting and with citation to authority comes 
from that tradition.  If the point is to say what the law is and if we understand 
as lawyers that to say accurately what the law is, means to be completely 
steeped in authority, you are not supposed to be original here.  You’re saying 
something that has been authoritatively laid down in the past and so you’ve got 
to get the past right, so there’s this compulsion about having authority for every 
proposition that’s stated.  And then as we’ve moved away from that, as sort of 
the normative—in the other sense of the word, normative, form of what legal 
scholarship is towards other things to do, we haven’t dropped the habit of, 
perhaps, excessive footnoting.  But, even in normative legal scholarship, and I 
would say also—and we haven’t talked about this at all—but in critical legal 
scholarship and theoretical legal scholarship, which are just forms that I talk 
about when I do my whole taxonomy, it still is a distinctive feature of legal 
scholarship, to be embedded in authority and that counts against originality, it 
counts against a lot of things that are valued in these other disciplines.  It’s all 
about being embedded in—working one’s position in—interweaving it with 
authority so, there’s just going to be more citation of authority.  I think the sad 
thing with law review editing is that the students are habituated to that and so 
push for the citation, the unnecessary citation, the citation that says, “See 
Locke” for everything, et cetera, when it just isn’t appropriate.  I want to say 
that this is an example of what underscores Leslie’s very first, very well-taken 
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point, that it’s hard to talk about this apart from what should be the ethics of 
law review publication, so much of this is generated by habits of law review 
editing.  Oh, and I also wanted to add, under other, if we could just add 
disinterestedness.  I don’t mean to keep hammering away on this, but I would 
just like to have a focused point where we can address that. 
OLDFATHER: I really liked Robin’s point about that there’s this origin story 
for why we have so many footnotes and there’s the reality of what they’ve come 
to be.  I’m reminded of when I was working on the very first article I wrote as 
an academic and was still transitioning from being a practicing lawyer to being 
an academic.  I thought that—and I think I thought correctly—that one of my 
jobs was to survey all of the past history of legal scholarship to see who had 
talked about the thing that I was talking about and what had they said and how 
could I situate what I’m saying within that.  And I tried to do that and 
fortunately, I identified a pretty good topic and it turns out that there was almost 
nobody who had said anything about it, so that was a win for me.  Later, doing 
a different article, I had the following experience.  I was doing some research 
and I found this very well-done, I thought, piece on an issue that was written 
by—I won’t name any names, but somebody at a law school of no great renown, 
published in a pretty good, but not exactly great journal, and I thought, “Oh, 
that’s really well-done, it’s too bad that didn’t place better.”  And then I’m 
continuing along, and I find a piece written by somebody whose name you 
would all know and it took up the very same question, analyzed it in roughly 
the same way, and did not in any way acknowledge that anybody had spoken 
at all about the particular point ever in the past.  It seems to me there’s a decent 
amount of that, that goes on, and I find that troublesome, and that seems to me 
to violate a norm of exhaustiveness. 
FRANCIS: Or perhaps plagiarism? 
OLDFATHER: Well, I don’t even know that it was plagiarism.  I don’t think 
that there was any direct lift.  Now, it may well be that there were research 
assistants involved in the process, who might have impacted this.  But it wasn’t 
that there were words lifted or that the analytical path was necessarily identical.  
But the topic, and the general track of the analysis were such that there ought 
to have been acknowledgment. 
HORWITZ: So, I’ll make a short two-part intermission.  One is, obviously 
again, this is related to peer review.  Obviously, peer reviewers are imperfect, 
particularly in a profession in which it’s not clear that we’ve been steeped in a 
canon, but that’s one way to ferret out these problems.  And the second is, it 
may be related to the pressure, both in terms of placement and so on, to be 
novel.  So, I like to joke that every—almost every law review article these days, 
certainly many well-placed ones, have the paragraph that says, “This is the first 
article to ever,” and then at the footnote, soon after, that says, “Of course there 
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are honorable exceptions,” and then lists a bunch of articles, which ought to 
make you question the first article proposition.  So, exhaustiveness may be 
damaged by the incentive to appear novel.  It doesn’t mean not reading them. 
OLDFATHER: I certainly agree with that point, and I have another story that 
I’ve shared with you, that relates to that specific problem.  I think, given the 
identity of the person who wrote the article that completely ignored the second 
one, novelty claims, worries about placement were completely non-existent.  
This really seemed to be a situation where the author thought, “I’ve got 
something interesting to say and because I have this thing to say, and it’s 
interesting to me, I assume the rest of the world will find it interesting, too.”  
The idea that someone else might have thought of it before might not have even 
occurred to the author. 
WALD: When we talk about exhaustiveness, we might mean at least two 
things, both of which are important.  The first is subject matter exhaustiveness, 
and I find Robin’s departure point fantastic in thinking about this notion.  It 
used to be that the law was primarily about case law and statutory provisions, 
so subject matter exhaustiveness had to do with getting the law right, citing and 
discussing all the relevant cases and statutory provisions, and if one missed 
some of these references, that was poor scholarship, in terms of exhaustiveness.  
And then, Robin points out correctly, things have changed.  Today subject 
matter exhaustiveness includes not just case law and statutory materials, what 
we refer to as primary sources, but secondary sources as well, such as law 
review articles.  If someone has written about one’s topic before, if there’s a 
law review article on point and one fails to spot, acknowledge, and discuss it, 
that’s a problem of subject matter exhaustiveness.  Robin even pushes us further 
to acknowledge that these days, it’s not just primary and secondary sources, 
there are also non-law materials that come in, so not knowing what you don’t 
know could trigger an exhaustiveness concern.  But we’re not experts in 
everything, so one might miss a few non-law sources, and do we still call it 
failure of subject matter exhaustiveness? 
Another issue of exhaustiveness is strategic exhaustiveness.  For example, 
can a scholar ethically follow this line of thinking: “I’m going to leave out from 
the argument certain components that are going to be more provocative and 
more problematic because I have an agenda or because I want to drive home in 
this article a particular part of the argument and leave more challenging 
questions to another day?”  If a scholar engages in such strategic 
exhaustiveness, must she disclose it to her readers?  And note that subject 
matter and strategic exhaustiveness can intersect in a Venn diagram, when one 
identifies a relevant and important line of inquiry related to her subject matter 
but decides not to engage it in detail because she does not know the issues well 
and the discussion is likely to be complex and distracting to her agenda.   
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We can then talk about the ethical qualities of strategic exhaustiveness.  It 
seems to me that perhaps all we might require is good faith, if only because it 
will be quite hard, I think, to scrutinize strategic exhaustiveness in a meaningful 
way other than to insist on good faith.  And to that end, let me give an example 
of what we might mean by good faith.  Unrelated to this conference, I have 
written an article for the Marquette Law Review, in which I wanted to explore 
social and cultural capital.12  As many of you know, when one talks about the 
use of social and cultural capital, often these issues are mired in debates about 
gender and racial inequality and discrimination, and I didn’t want to go into this 
usual rabbit hole not because gender and racial equality are not exceedingly 
important—they are—but because I wanted to explore the use of social and 
cultural capital and its relationship with merit and success not in the context of 
gender and racial inequality.  In other words, I engaged in strategic 
exhaustiveness, deciding not to explore in this article phenomena—gender and 
racial inequality and discrimination—clearly relevant to my subject matter—
social and cultural capital.  So, I picked as an example for my subject matter, a 
novel about academic life that some of you have read, called Stoner.  It was in 
the news quite a few years ago and I picked it exactly because the protagonist 
in the book, one William Stoner, was a white male who lived and worked in a 
time and an era that for better or worse featured predominantly white males in 
academia.  The choice allowed me to explore Stoner’s experiences and 
highlight social and cultural capital without getting into gender and racial 
discrimination because women and minority professors were not featured in the 
novel.  Now, is there a problem of strategic exhaustiveness here?  Is it legitimate 
to examine social and cultural capital without discussing gender and racial 
inequality?  I acted, I hope, in good faith, intending to advance the scholarship, 
not to hide the ball.  My article explicitly states, “I’m sidestepping these issues 
because I want to focus on aspects that sometimes get bogged down in other 
issues.”13  But what if I had not provided an explicit disclaimer?  Would not 
disclosing constitute a failure of strategic exhaustiveness? 
HORWITZ: Let me do this, with the time available.  I know people have 
particularly wanted to at least put on the board, so to speak, disinterestedness 
and integrity, so I’ll certainly eat a little bit of our lunch time, so to speak, but 
not too much.  Do people have comments about these or things they want to 
add, think should be on this list? 
FRANCIS: So, I’ve been wracking my brain to try to think of one, but I think 
we ought to have on the table the question of whether there are some areas of 
scholarship that people should think twice before they ever enter into or at least 
 
12. Eli Wald, Success, Merit, and Capital in America, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
13. Id. at 3–4. 
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open up the question about that.  So, the examples from the sciences might 
involve how human embryos are used past so many days or stem cell research, 
cloning research.  There have been environmental issues about things like GM 
products and there have been various moratoria, there have been public bodies 
that think about those questions, and I don’t know whether there are areas like 
that in law, but there might be, and whether we ought to at least attend to that 
possibility. 
HORWITZ: So, I’ll put this down, I’ll say probably to the extent that law is 
part of the humanities, the answer would be maybe not to the extent that it is—
legal scholarship to the extent that it’s part of the professions.  I think you would 
at least find some people who would make that argument.  I would not be one 
of them, but it’s possible that someone— 
FRANCIS: “No go” areas. 
HORWITZ: Yeah, I was going to call it “problems areas.” 
FRANCIS: Or areas that should be thought about publicly before they’re 
“go” areas.  Cyber security, certain forms of cyber terrorism are coming to 
mind. 
HORWITZ: So, one can imagine, for instance, an article about “here is the 
perfect strategy for concealing all your investments off-shore, here’s a law 
review article saying there’s a terrific gap in the law that would enable people 
to get away with just straight out theft.”  That would be maybe a good or bad 
illustration of the kind of thing you’re talking about. 
HESSICK: So, I just wanted to say something briefly about the decorum 
point and about whether there’s too much politeness, I think, as Amanda put it, 
“a culture of politeness.”  And I want to say that I’m pro-politeness, because I 
actually think that at least at some schools—some faculties are known—you 
give a talk there and it’s going to be all about ripping you down and blah, blah, 
blah, blah, and they pride themselves on it.  I actually think that the problem 
with the politeness norm is that sometimes it leads people not to engage because 
people fear that engagement is inherently impolite, and I actually think that 
what the politeness norm ought to be is all about figuring out how to engage 
politely.  That is—and maybe politely is the wrong way to think about it—how 
to engage on the substance in a way that is productive, that isn’t mistaken for 
an attack on the author and that isn’t seen as anything other than engaging with 
the author’s idea in good faith in order to further sort of the joint enterprise.  So, 
I think that those sorts of conventions that Stanley mentioned, I don’t think that 
those are a bad thing, I think that we should engage with people’s ideas, we 
should reframe their ideas in a way that presents them in their strongest light, 
and then say the extent to which we think that those ideas are valuable in what 
they add, and then talk about the extent to which they fall short.  I think that’s 
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more likely to get the author to engage with your criticism, but I also think that 
if we can see engagement as having both sort of the “pat on the back” aspect to 
it that’s a genuine, “here’s what was done well,” and then the “here’s what left 
me wanting more or dissatisfied,” that’s something that could really help the 
community.  But I think that maybe the idea is it needs to be framed as 
constructive engagement so that the idea of being polite isn’t then failing to 
engage, because I think that’s a real error. 
HORWITZ: And I don’t want to—and I could do it wrongly, ventriloquize 
Stanley, but it seems to me if an issue was academicized, it’s easier to have 
strong disagreement, the danger in our discipline with its debates about how 
normative the work is—and I’m not saying that’s a good or bad thing, but it’s 
not fixed, and the fact that we write about current events is people often kind of 
assume an article is a stalking horse for a political position and that makes it 
sometimes a more fiery engagement.  If we agreed, we were fighting over the 
article might be a different situation.  
WEST: Okay.  I’ll be quick.  I just remember teaching an article in my 
fellow seminar about whether or not Roe v. Wade14 led to the plunging of the 
crime rate 20 years later, and a couple students opined that this research should 
not have been done and the article should not have been written and we 
shouldn’t be reading—it smacks of eugenics—even though the authors of that 
piece were very careful to say this is not an argument for Roe v. Wade, so it’s 
an example.  I’m not sure that anything about that can or should be codified. 
BOOTHE-PERRY: Actually, to piggyback on what Robin just said.  I have 
some discomfort in accepting the idea that there are areas that legal scholars 
should avoid.  I think we have an opportunity to push the envelope in many 
cases, and as legal scholars, that might be something that we should be doing 
in some instances.  Again, if we know what the end goal is of our scholarship, 
if we are not trying to write the manual for the thieves to get the off-shore 
accounts, but to maybe instruct or persuade the legislators to change the laws 
or the statutes, then if we academicize how we write it, we should be able to 
attack any area, really, even the taboo areas that people don’t want to talk about 
as legal scholars, that’s part of what we do, we talk about these areas for some 
better good, some end goal. 
HORWITZ: Stanley? 
FISH: Yeah, going back to the candor and decorum questions and the tone 
question.  My thinking about these matters, is dictated by three events.  One, 
the first talk I ever gave at a law school was at Columbia Law School at a 
workshop, presided over by Bruce Ackerman.  Here was his introduction to me.  
 
14. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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“Here’s Stanley Fish; go get him.”  And then I received, much earlier, when I 
was an assistant professor at the University of California–Berkeley, and had not 
yet given any talks on anything, when I began to give talks or, I got a couple 
invitations, I got two pieces of advice from senior scholars.  One was from the 
philosopher, John Searle, a friend of mine, who said, “Watch out for the head 
hunters,” by which he meant that any time you give a talk, there’s someone in 
the audience who believes that he or she should be up there on the podium and 
not you, and wants to take your head home as a trophy.  And the second thing 
that was said to me was by a historian, by the name of Hayden White, who said 
to me about going out to give a talk, he said, “You’ll know you’re in trouble 
when the second question is about the Holocaust.”  These were really good 
pieces of advice and have proven true time and time again. 
HORWITZ: I don’t want to take too much from lunch, so consider it kind of 
a miscellanea—miscellany, or concluding comments or what have you, for this 
section.  Anyone?  
SELIGMAN:  So, I’m going to take advantage of the opportunity to say 
something I wanted to say about exhaustiveness, which is that I really actually 
wanted to speak against exhaustiveness.  As a historian, everything is related; 
you could get to the point where you can’t actually publish anything because 
you have to continue to research and you have to continue to write and your 
footnotes will take up the entire universe.  So, in my discomfort with the word 
exhaustiveness, I wondered if thoroughness might be a better word. 
HORWITZ: That’s right.  Yeah, and I think some of it, hopefully is reflected 
in the regarding scope so that you’re not trying to do the history of the world, 
you’re trying to do what happened on a street in Chicago, but— 
SELIGMAN:  But I have to say, I mean, as somebody who writes about what 
happens on a street in Chicago, I don’t look at all the primary sources.  The 
litmus test that I get myself to is when do I have enough to say something that’s 
new, that no one’s said before? 
HORWITZ: Fair enough.  Yeah. 
WALD: At the risk of sounding like a lawyer, maybe Amanda will take the 
following as a friendly amendment.  I don’t know that renaming exhaustiveness 
“thoroughness” will do the trick.  Perhaps what she means is reasonable 
exhaustiveness?  One doesn’t have to cite and substantively engage with 
everything that has ever been written on one’s subject matter because that might 
be redundant.  Instead, one has to be reasonably exhaustive when it comes to 
subject matter, exercising reasonable professional judgment as to what to cite 
and what to engage with. 
HORWITZ: In a restatement, reasonable papers over all matter of 
differences, right?  Other kind of concluding remarks or things people want to 
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sneak in on this topic before we have lunch?  All right.  Appreciate it.  Let’s 
eat. 
D. Session Three: The Mechanisms of Legal Scholarship, Especially Law 
Reviews and the Issues They Create 
OLDFATHER: Moving now into the section where we’re talking about the 
mechanisms, and particularly law reviews and the various issues that those 
might create.  During the break, Stanley pointed out, I think, quite appropriately 
that we might broaden the focus a little bit—whether it’s at this stage or looking 
back on what we did this morning—to potentially include case books as 
scholarship.  I think at least some of them might fall into that basket.  Certainly, 
one can think of something like “The Legal Process” as a set of teaching 
materials, that became extraordinarily influential both as teaching materials and 
as scholarship.  So that certainly those might be accounted for somewhere along 
the line.  With respect to the mechanisms, and focusing on law reviews 
especially, I think we’ve got several sets of questions to consider.  There’s the 
question that Leslie raises most directly, which is whether this approach to the 
production of scholarship is appropriate at all, and whether we ought, instead, 
to move to some sort of peer review model.  My instinct with respect to that is 
yes, ideally, we would, but also, I don’t think that’s likely to happen anytime 
soon, and so I wonder whether it makes sense for us to spend too much time on 
that topic because I think, to some degree, we just have to take the world as it 
is and comment on that.  Then there are questions with respect to our obligations 
on the author side of things.  And I think that is probably our primary focus.  
The ethics on the journal side of things we might touch on a bit, but they were 
the subject of the last model code related to these general topics, published in 
the Marquette Law Review twenty-six years ago.15  I think as well that Scott 
Dodson’s model code does a fairly nice job of covering a lot of these issues as 
well.  So, we may want to consider to what extent we want to leave them largely 
to the side.  
I don’t have a particular framework for our discussion in mind.  Looking at 
it from the author side of things is probably the most logical place to start given 
that our focus has been on scholars and scholars’ obligations.  We can consider 
things like puffery.  We can think about things like the phenomenon of, as it’s 
often referred to, “walking a piece down the hall” on behalf of a friend or a 
colleague at another institution and recommending it to the law review editors 
within one’s own institution.  And I’ll stop talking, but only after raising that I 
 
15. Michael L. Closen & Robert M. Jarvis, The National Conference of Law Reviews Model 
Code of Ethics: Final Text and Comments, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 509 (1992). 
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saw in the ethical standards for the political scientists a requirement on the part 
of peer reviewers to “disqualify themselves if they have a reasonable doubt 
about whether they can exercise the responsibility with scholarly 
detachment.”16  So, there’s a discipline that is asking of reviewers that they be 
able to review things in a scholarly detached manner and, boy, our process does 
not seem to be one that includes such a norm to any real degree, at all.  That’s 
what I’ve got by way of an introduction.  I’ll open it up to comments. 
HORWITZ: I guess I’ll make three comments.  One, and I know Carissa 
wrote about this specifically, it’s not clear where in the schedule the question 
of work by legal scholars not in law reviews or book form falls.  It might fall 
here if we widen the scope to case books, it might make sense to at least briefly 
discuss that question.  I do think some of that work is subject to standards or 
that people should leave off the institutional letterhead if they’re unwilling to 
abide by certain standards.  And that will be good for democracy if more people 
wrote as citizens rather than writing as ostensible experts.  But that’s one 
question.  How do we do with non-scholarship or when do we deal with it?  
Tomorrow morning there is a “what have we missed” session so it could very 
well be placed there if we had to.  The second is, particularly in an age of 
increasing empirical work, some question about data, access to data seems 
relevant here or kind of what obligations you have to make your work replicable 
or falsifiable where it relies on data.  And I think the third was the—I think this 
can be formalized, but while I would, on the whole, prefer peer review, and I 
will say not unaware of all the controversies over the peer review, so it’s not 
that it’s ideal.  It’s like democracy.  It’s better than the alternative.  So, while I 
might prefer peer review, in its absence I would probably, or I could imagine a 
kind of restatement section that says peer review is kind of the gold standard to 
the extent we don’t have it, law reviews should move toward having anonymous 
professional evaluation of articles.  And faculty, when reviewing scholarship, 
are obliged to review the scholarship, not review the placement.  So, 
particularly when you’re reading, read the article, judge it for itself as you’ve 
said earlier don’t be overwhelmed by the fact that it appears in a fancy school 
that does not necessarily have peer review or where something’s been walked 
down the hall. 
OLDFATHER: And I’ve taken the point about data disclosure here and I use 
the word “transparency” because that’s what the American Political Science 
Association uses in order to do that.  So, sorry Stanley. I felt I had to.  But 
there’s one where another discipline certainly has a provision speaking exactly 
to that. 
 
16. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, supra note 7, at 14. 
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WALD: At the risk of being somewhat of a devil’s advocate, I most 
certainly don’t think of peer review as a gold standard.  It’s anything but.  It’s 
complicated, it’s messy, and it has its own downfalls.  Peer reviews take forever 
to complete.  Although anonymous in theory, in practice they are often not blind 
because the pool of experts in a specialized field is small such that reviewers 
realize who the author is and the author often knows who the reviewers are.  
And the process is often tainted by academic politics. 
Accordingly, I was wondering if we can talk a little bit about some of the 
reasons for the background assumption that law reviews are second best to peer 
review.  One place to start this conversation is to talk about the ongoing shift at 
elite law reviews to a hybrid peer review model.  The so-called elite law reviews 
have recently introduced a quasi-peer review process.  One gets a call and is 
advised that, “Your article is going for a vote before the entire board.  In 
conjunction with that vote, we are soliciting outside reviews of your article.”  
This hybrid model, initial selection by article editors and a vote by the students-
editors, informed by outside peer reviewers’ input, strikes me as a problematic 
process, even if one generally favors a move toward peer review.  This evolving 
hybrid model, in which there are no clear standards for soliciting peer 
reviews—sometimes an author will be asked to identify the peer reviewers and 
sometimes the peer reviewers will get three days to respond substantively 
before the vote with the incredible pressure of trying to give a meaningful 
assessment without costing a colleague the opportunity to publish in an elite 
law review—is quite troubling.   
I’d like to suggest that although the current law review process is far from 
ideal, it is not clearly inferior to either traditional peer review or to the emerging 
hybrid model adopted by some law reviews.  Moreover, the idea that we law 
professors are subject to the review of the best and brightest editors who are 
second and third year law students, such that we have to write articles that make 
sense to smart and well-intending student editors, does not offend me.  It’s far 
from ideal, to be clear, but I’m not at all sure that it’s inferior to the peer review.   
OLDFATHER: I kind of like this moderating thing because you get the 
microphone whenever you want it.  I think that, and this may be the point that 
Robin is about to make, but that the historical point she made with respect to 
footnoting may have some applicability here as well, in the sense that, 
traditionally, law reviews were about the doctrinal work that had as its audience 
not specialists, but generalists, practicing lawyers, and judges.  And that it 
would serve then the very useful function of making sure that legal scholarship 
was pitched at a level to be understandable by and useful to those folks.  As we 
have moved to a world in which there is more specialization and more 
scholarship that is more academic in nature, that may have fallen away.  There 
may still be value to an approach that has this gatekeeper that forces us to use 
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language in a certain way that appeals to those young in the discipline.  So, 
there is something to build off your point. 
WEST: Thanks, not what I was going to say but I’ll sign onto it.  So, at 
Georgetown at any rate, the students increasingly use faculty as outside 
reviewers and it leads to its own problems which are, I think, quite severe.  The 
main one being that calls from a faculty member at one school to a faculty 
member at Georgetown or at the receiving school asking for that faculty 
member’s assistance in getting one’s own article published or the article of a 
junior colleague or the article of a friend.  And that has to stop.  And so, it seems 
like this is a solvable problem that law reviews from each of us, our own law 
reviews could be encouraged to seek out outside reviews, but to do it 
anonymously and to resist all pressure from their faculty.  And pressure from 
the faculty should be regarded as an ethical problem.  I mean, not a fireable 
offense, but as something that should be discouraged. 
FRANCIS: So, I agree very much with what Robin just said.  And to expand 
on it a little bit, we’re not going to be able to change the current structure of 
law reviews directly, but we could indirectly make recommendations to law 
faculties about best practices for the law reviews which, after all, they sponsor. 
WEST: And give credit for it. 
FRANCIS: That’s right, yeah.  And then give student credit for.  And it 
seems to me that maybe a way to go about it is to look at what are the worst 
problems, as we see it, with current law reviews that, and I’ll go to what you 
were saying because you’re right, the hybrid doesn’t solve the problems at all.  
And it seems to me that there are two problems, one of which, what Robin just 
mentioned—favoritism.  So, that’s a real problem, with who gets published 
where.  And we need to work to end that.  And on masked reviewing and getting 
comments.  But the only way you can start to tamp out favoritism is to mask 
the identity of authors.   
The other thing that I think is a very serious problem, and it came up in the 
puffery discussion, is that no matter how smart students are, they don’t have the 
whole sweep of the field.  And so, there’s really a lack of expertise in making 
decisions about what gets published or not.  And a start on that is using people 
in the field in your own—if it can be masked at your own law school.  But 
another way to do that is to have an identified pool of people around the country 
or at other law schools that, and now what journals in other fields do, they 
protect very carefully the anonymity of the peer reviewer, but they’ll publish at 
the end of say every two-year period or something like that, a list of the folks 
who have reviewed for them, with a thank you.  And the advantage of that is 
you can tell the quality of the folks who review.  You could also figure out 
whether everybody who reviews for a journal is from the Federalist Society, 
just to take one example.  You know, you could figure out whether there are 
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systematic biases that go into that.  So, maybe what I think we ought to do is 
make a set of recommendations for law faculty as supervisors of journals about 
some of what we think are the worst abuses. 
HAMILTON: Well, let me build off what Robin and Leslie just said.  I might 
have pushback on Eli here because I just published an article on Professional 
Lawyer on the faculty’s ethical failure with respect to law review.  The basic 
theme is in all the professions, I think without exception, except ours, the 
properly qualified credentialed and licensed people are responsible for 
supervising the unlicensed, uncredentialed people, reasonable supervision in all 
professions, except ours, on this, because we don’t, although we have examples 
around the country as you suggest and others, of faculties who are stepping 
forward more and, obviously, we have increasing number of peer review 
journals, but, even among the student-edited, we do see examples of more 
faculty involvement.  I just think it’s absolutely fundamental that there be some 
kind of reasonable faculty supervision that the apprentices are doing this 
competently.  But I don’t want the perfect to get in the way of the good in this 
whole project.  And on this particular one, I’m agreeing with Chad.  I mean, 
we’re not going to change this culture.  This has gone on for decades and 
decades.  So, maybe it is just some suggestions about good practices and this 
would be one where we observe some of the key problems of the current 
system.  Frankly, as we have discussed this today, I think this drives a lot.  
Because without peer review, you don’t have these qualified scholars who are 
insisting on some sort of academic ethics, some sort of scholarly ethics.  And 
the students are not in a position to do it.  Again, these are bright young people 
who can—sometimes they’re not young—bright entrants who are deeply 
committed and they give us their time.  But are they in a position to push back 
on a piece that doesn’t, has some of the problems we’ve discussed, especially 
if faculty members in the building are pushing them on something.  I see so 
many problems here that relate back into the general themes we’ve been 
discussing. 
HORWITZ: A couple of points on these I think.  First of all, on this is a point 
of information.  The South Carolina Law Review is experimenting with or has 
launched a, I think they call it, “Prism.”  What it is, is a group, double blind 
peer review process, where law journals that sign up to be part of this kind of 
consortium, people who participate, who submit within that network, the article 
is then subjected to this kind of peer review generally.  So, you know there’s a 
pool and that solves some of the selection bias problems that are involved in  
own-school review or a journal coming up with a list so you know you have a 
pool of reviewers.  That’s one thing, one resource we might look at and/or 
encourage as an example of sound movement toward a better process.  The 
second, although again I appreciate that the students have their own interests 
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and also, it’s harder for them to resist, but we could certainly recommend as a 
best practice that review be of the article, not of either the resume, the cover 
letter, or the abstract, all of which are subject to—I think it’s a sad, but true fact 
that there are many journals where people will start with the resume and then 
put something on the read-sooner and read-not-at all pile.  And letters, cover 
letters and abstracts are both subject, as we’ve talked about a little bit, to the 
kinds of manipulations that, can again, be problematic.  It’s a tough process but 
to the extent that we have a law review process, making them read the article 
would be a recommendation that I’d stand behind, if that’s not too radical. 
HESSICK: So, a couple of quick words.  I’m sort of with Eli on this.  I 
actually think that there are some virtues of the law review model.  And one of 
the virtues that I see is it allows us to have a format for work that should be of 
interest to a more general audience.  To the extent that we do want lawyers or 
judges to pay attention to what we do, I think it is helpful to have that format.  
And I understand that it’s contestable about whether we want lawyers and 
judges to pay attention to what we do.  I do know some people who, their 
scholarship is they are engaging with three other people.  Sometimes it’s three 
and sometimes it’s fewer.  And it’s a back and forth between them.  And I don’t 
think that it’s a bad thing for that discussion to happen in a specialty journal or 
to happen on blogs.  I don’t know that that has to go into a law review.  That’s 
my own personal feeling about that thing.  If people are hashing out really minor 
disagreements about a much broader topic, I don’t think that that’s the worst 
thing in the world.  But leaving aside the virtues of law reviews, maybe there’s 
something about law reviews that we could then use to try to help these 
pathologies.  If people are making claims about novelty, why not have, or what 
their contribution is, why not have that be something that we footnote, that we 
explain where that claim about the impact of the paper comes from?  Why is 
that not the sort of thing that we would then expect the students to be able to 
look and to check?  Because I suspect if we turned that into a norm, into the 
profession, people wouldn’t say, “This article is the first to whatever.”  They 
would instead say, “This article contributes to the following literature in the 
following way.”  And in the footnotes, could explain a little bit more about what 
that literature says, as opposed to what the article is doing.  I know the 
footnoting of articles is something that we don’t like because of how ridiculous 
some of the requests are about what ought to be footnoted, but it strikes me that 
that’s not a crazy thing for us to have to footnote.  If we’re making a claim 
about the potential impact of our work, why is that not the sort of thing that we 
wouldn’t have to back up.  And then the last thing, I’m sympathetic to what 
Neil said about how the students are looking for guidance.  They’re coming to 
us because they’re concerned about whether they’re publishing something 
that’s valuable or not.  They’re grateful if you say, “I know so and so has a 
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piece and it hasn’t been picked up yet, and I read it at a workshop and it’s good.”  
They’re not grateful with “so and so is my friend.”  I think there they feel 
pressure, I think that’s right.  But why not have that then more formalized?  
Why not, if you really feel as though this paper that you read at a workshop is 
a great paper, peer review could be the sort of thing that journals ask people to 
do or we could do it voluntarily.  That could be part of the cover letter to the 
journal.  “These three people have said that they think that this article should 
be published,” because, I bet if we had to write down “I endorse the publication 
of this article,” we’d probably be really limited in the number of articles we’d 
be willing to do that for.  And I don’t know, anyways, these are kind of, you 
don’t think so? 
HORWITZ: I don’t. 
HESSICK: Okay. 
HORWITZ: Unless there were some reputational penalty, I think it probably 
happens as a matter of course.  I mean, not as a matter of course, but it happens 
and I don’t think anybody suffers for recommending a piece. 
FRANCIS: Just quickly, another problem.  Law reviews have no 
institutional memory.  It dies with the existing editor. With their graduation.  
So, if so and so really did a horrible thing to your journal two years ago, there 
may well not be any memory that you’ve gone through the editorial process and 
then they pulled it because they got a better offer. 
OLDFATHER: Let’s actually ask the question.  Michael, Nick, and 
Apallonia, do you guys have a list of problematic faculty members or authors?  
Any sort of institutional memory from past years?  No is the answer.  I’ve 
wondered about that sometimes because you do hear horror stories of authors 
acting in particular ways.  And I would think as a journal editor I might be 
inclined to make a list and leave it for my successors.  
FRANCIS: There’s also no obvious way to do retractions or to do, if there is 
some sort of a discussion about whether there was a scientific problem with a 
piece, how to make sure that gets appropriately investigated and then 
considered. 
OLDFATHER: Right.  What I’ve seen in terms of corrections are stickers 
placed on the published copies of articles because somebody missed a comma 
in a footnote that really should have been there or something along those lines. 
WALD: Two quick points.  The first is about the notion of institutional 
memory.  Law reviews often lack it, but that’s as much a function of poor 
faculty advising and mentorship as it is a critique of law reviews and their 
editors.  Oftentimes, the institutional memory of a law review is its faculty 
advisors, but that ought not be necessarily the case.  Maybe one 
recommendation we could make is about the institutionalization of faculty 
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support for law reviews, including the creation of infrastructure for institutional 
memory that does not depend on who on the faculty serves as the journal’s 
advisor.  So, that’s the first suggestion.   
The second is less of a suggestion and more of a question to everybody.  As 
late as 15 years ago, when I started publishing, I seem to recall that it was the 
habit of law review editors to offer substantive feedback to authors.  Certainly 
at the so-called top law reviews, but also throughout the system one would send 
in an article and would get back, in addition to requests to fill in the 412 missing 
footnotes, some substantive feedback.  That was fantastic, both in terms of 
faculty mentorship of law review editors who would benefit from the 
substantive exchange with the authors, and in terms of the insights to the 
authors and the resulting improved articles.  Another pair of eyes, or more than 
one pair of eyes, of editors who actually read the article start to finish, thought 
about it, and then came up with some substantive suggestions, that was often 
very helpful.  It appears that substantive feedback is increasingly a thing of the 
past.  The vast majority of law reviews will say as a point of pride, “We give 
you complete freedom of authorship and we don’t edit for substance anymore.”  
Even at elite law reviews, substantive feedback appears to be less common.  It’s 
too bad, some kind of a race to the bottom in terms of law reviews fearing that 
if they offer substantive constructive criticisms they might lose the article to 
journals that offer fewer edits.  Should faculty advisors at least suggest or 
intercede or have a discussion with editorial boards about whether or not the 
students should limit themselves to comments that sound in “are you 
conforming to Bluebook or not?” 
SELIGMAN:  I just want to bring some perspective as somebody who works 
in the field with lots of peer review.  One of the things that I’ve done in recent 
years is to become involved in digital history, although I do not go so far as to 
call myself a digital historian.  I blog as the Reluctant Digital Historian.17  One 
of the things that digital history is doing is pointing to the ways in which the 
notion of peer review can and should be expanded.  So, what Leslie calls 
masked peer review is really a very specific form of prepublication peer review.  
Digital history suggests there’s lots of other things that can count and should 
count as peer review.  It might be worthwhile thinking about your culture as 
law professors and how you have institutionalized peer review that doesn’t 
happen at the law review itself.  So, to the extent that you have faculty 
workshops (I don’t know how normal that is), to the extent that you give 
 
17. Amanda Seligman, THE RELUCTANT DIGITAL HISTORIAN, 
http://reluctantdigitalhistorian.blogspot.com/ (last visited May 23, 2018) [https://perma.cc/282W-
DNQV].  
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conference papers, to the extent that you shop around your articles and ask your 
colleagues to read them ahead of time before you send it off to a journal for 
review.  In digital history, one thing that people are experimenting with is an 
open writing process in which they draft on the web and then use Twitter to get 
their colleagues to come and read and leave comments.18  There’s essentially a 
process of peer review during the writing.  There’s also a process by which you 
can have a peer review period for a digital publication so that you try to round 
up people to come and read stuff.  And it’s not blind at all.  I participated in a 
very fun experiment.19  When you write a grant application, there’s peer review 
involved in the grant application.  And one more suggestion for the student law 
journal editors is that you might think about either a peer review process that’s 
before publication that’s online.  People might be encouraged to come and leave 
a comment or a post-publication peer review where people leave comments and 
give meaning to what’s in an article, even though it’s fixed in print in some 
sense. 
FISH: Well, I’m working off the comment about peer review during the 
writing process with the aid of technological developments.  Not being blind at 
all, in fact, of course that’s obviously true.  Almost 40 years ago now, I wrote 
an essay called No Bias, No Merit20 against blind submission.  And I still stand 
by the argument there, which is basically that the distinction between intrinsic 
merit and extrinsic merit doesn’t hold up.  And what you have when you switch 
from non-blind to blind is a whole other set of political factors which are 
unacknowledged operating, including the great game of guesswork, “Who 
wrote this piece? To whom is this piece really addressed? Or, against whom?” 
Is it [indiscernible], so I still stand by that argument at least as a theoretical 
argument, which says, in effect, that blind submission cannot live up to its 
claims, which is the claim to produce more objectivity, less bias, et cetera.  So, 
I’m in the uncomfortable position of, at the same time, being against the 
politicization of scholarship, as I have said earlier today, but for the 
acknowledgement and inclusion of political factors in assessing essays.  And 
the reasoning behind this is very simple and I’ll just use a literary example, 
 
18. Michelle Moravec, Writing in Public, MICHELLEMORAVEC.COM, 
http://michellemoravec.com/michelle-moravec/ (last visited May 23, 2018) [https://perma.cc/T6MY-
9MF5].  
19. WRITING HISTORY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (Jack Dougherty & Kristen Nawrotzki eds., 2013), 
https://writinghistory.trincoll.edu/ [https://perma.cc/XJ7N-MTX7]; WEB WRITING: WHY AND HOW 
FOR LIBERAL ARTS TEACHING AND LEARNING (Jack Dougherty & Tennyson O’Donnell eds., 2015), 
https://epress.trincoll.edu/webwriting/ [https://perma.cc/JW83-LARP]. 
20. STANLEY FISH, No Bias, No Merit: The Case Against Blind Submission, in DOING WHAT 
COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL 
STUDIES 163 (1989).  
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which may not be familiar to you but it’s easily rehearsed.  Under blind 
submission, if you had in the 1980s a submission—I think this is a humanities 
context—on myth theory and the author of the piece was Northrop Frye you 
would then, in fact, have received a piece on this topic by the person who 
invented the topic.  So that, by definition, whatever he had to say about this 
topic was of intrinsic interest because he said it, not because it seemed to be 
intrinsically interesting, independent of any knowledge of what he said.  Now, 
I’m quite aware that my ability, or at least what I think of my ability, to totally 
undermine the arguments for blind submission.  That does not necessarily mean 
that it’s a bad idea because, again, like democracy and some other things that 
have been named, it may be a bad idea but better than the alternatives.  So, those 
are just some of my musings which go back, as I’ve said, many years. 
OLDFATHER: I want to go back to one of the points Eli made, with respect 
to substantive feedback in the editing process, and particularly since Robin is 
here, maybe she knows something about what I’m about to discuss.  I’ve 
published twice with the Georgetown Law Journal.  And the first time, they 
sent my article, after it was accepted, to one of your faculty colleagues who 
wrote a very lengthy, detailed, incredibly helpful letter of commentary on it, 
that I was then able to incorporate into my changes to the piece.  Second time, 
there was none of that.  And so, I’m wondering was that a regular practice?  
Was it something that fell by the wayside?  It certainly led to feedback that was 
more substantive than what I often get.  
WEST: I know at Georgetown this just comes and goes with the various 
boards.  There’s no law school policy over time.  So, your first editor wanted 
to get the outside read and then the faculty member happened to be very 
engaged in it.  But sometimes the faculty who are asked will just say, “Yeah, 
you should take it,” or, “No you shouldn’t.”  And then sometimes, they’ll be, 
as you said, a detailed read.  But I’m not aware of there having been an actual 
change in policy. 
OLDFATHER: I think it would be an interesting thing to do.  One of the 
difficulties here would be that we have a smaller faculty than we used to and 
our expertise only goes certain places.  Now, that’s not to suggest we couldn’t 
say something useful about an article anyway, because we probably could.  It’s 
an interesting idea. 
HORWITZ: So, I’ll try to keep it short.  I have found that I’ve gotten some 
very helpful memos and so on from law review editors.  I have to say it has 
varied with the school, for better or worse, but it’s varied with the school in 
ways that tend to meet the standard credentials as rankings and so on.  It seems 
to be some of these best practices are good ethical practices.  Others, I’m not 
sure whether I’d consider them strictly ethical norms or just better or worse.  
So, I’m trying to think about what absolutely belongs and what doesn’t.  
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Another reason, I think, that there’s less substantive reading going on is in the 
era of straight doctrinal or normative scholarship where it was case-crunching, 
at least in theory, the students could kind of do some of that.  The more 
interdisciplinary the work gets, the more difficult it is to provide that.  The third 
thing I’d say is just try to focus shift a little bit, which is, maybe people disagree 
that we can or should do any of it.  But is there an ethics of, “What are the 
obligations on the author side?”  So assuming that people either agree that the 
current student-side system is broken, or at least acknowledge that it could use 
some fixes.  What about authors?  Either in terms of placement or in terms of, 
I guess we’re talking about the mechanics, so the way we’re writing the articles 
or the way we’re trying to place them or so on, I still think there’s probably 
more to be said there. 
OLDFATHER: And is that something that is distinct from the sincerity and 
candor-type obligations?  How do we isolate those things?  I know Amanda had 
something she wanted to get out. 
SELIGMAN:  Yeah, but just a small point that if you move to a model in 
which peer review was used more often or it was a standard rather than a student 
review, my question would be, “What is the obligation of faculty members to 
participate in peer review?”  So, what does that do to your workload if suddenly 
all the journals are requiring you to review things for them and it adds to the 
amount of labor that you have to do? 
OLDFATHER: And could we, as one of the potential standards that we offer 
up, state, at some level of generality, the idea that service to the law journals at 
one’s home institution is a prioritized piece of service? 
FRANCIS: One other thing I bring up that we haven’t talked about that’s 
related to the question of obligations of authors, is that I did some Googling of 
different law reviews to see whether they had an “instructions for authors” page 
of the kind that journals in other fields have.  It’s very uneven whether they do.  
And actually, I could only find the South Carolina Prism thing.  The last stuff I 
could find on that went back to 2013, I think.  So, it was difficult to find out 
what the current situation was, with respect to that.  But if you’re an author and 
basically all you know is they take ExpressO.  There’s nothing that tells you 
this law review objects to the colleague carrying it down the hall.  And it’s 
going to be quite rational behavior, after all, if you’re desirous of moving ahead 
in the profession and getting your work published.  You’re going to do what 
seems rational.  I think a minimum expectation is that an author shouldn’t 
violate the stated policies of law reviews.  So, that could go back to saying, 
maybe, another obligation of faculty would be to work with their law reviews 
to publish instructions for authors that made it quite clear that certain kinds of 
behavior was inappropriate. 
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HESSICK: I just had a really quick thought about some of the other 
obligations that authors might have to law reviews.  And it reminded me of two 
things.  One, it reminded me of a woman who I know, who I respect a lot, and 
she asked me to read an article that had already been accepted for publication.  
And the last part of it was really unfinished.  There were like some sentences 
in a couple of paragraphs and some brackets saying, “Fill this in, whatever, 
whatever.”  When I asked her, I was like, “How did this get accepted by insert 
fancy journal that we all get excited about?”  And she said, “Oh, I had submitted 
a paper that focused more on X, but after it was accepted, and I spent some 
more time with it, I realized that I really wanted to sort of shift the paper and 
change it and improve it.”  And it struck me that there’s a tension there between 
us trying to be thoughtful and careful and produce our best scholarship and, 
possibly, giving law reviews not what they accepted to publish.  And maybe 
this happens in good faith and maybe it doesn’t.  
But then, more recently, I was at a conference and had a fascinating dinner 
with a very junior person at a top five school, who informed me that his 
colleagues routinely submit papers that are incomplete and they’re noticeably 
incomplete.  And they are routinely accepted by top five law journals who think, 
“So and so fancy person, this sounds like a good idea.  I’m sure they’ll make it 
sound good.”  So, I’m not offering anything prescriptive, I’m just flagging these 
two things.  The first, I think, is a difficulty.  Do we have to stop trying to 
improve the piece after it’s been accepted?  I think we’d all say “no” to that.  
But how much can we improve it before we have to worry about the bait and 
switch problem?  And then the other thing, which is just, you know, part of this, 
might just be that the law review submission process looks really different for 
some of us than it does for the rest of us.  And I would say I’m the rest of us. 
FISH: Well, speaking to your second question, that was part of the point 
that I made in that long-ago essay where I said I’ve been in this game for a 
while.  I’ve done X, Y, and Z.  The result is that, when my name appears on 
something and they submit it to someone, they’re going to pay more attention 
to it.  And I said, “Why shouldn’t I have the benefit of that?  I did the work.” 
WALD: Carissa raises interesting and troubling questions.  Do law reviews 
apply different standards for accepting articles to different authors based on 
status, or for that matter, based on any consideration other than merit?  And if 
so, how?  Is it that informally law review editors are somewhat susceptible to 
advice about what articles to publish from their own faulty members who know 
some authors but not others—I suspect this has long been the case, or is it that 
partial submissions from elite professors get accepted based on their potential 
whereas non-elite professors are required to submit complete polished articles 
for consideration?  It would be quite helpful to find out what the realities on the 
ground are. 
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HESSICK: No, no, I’m with you.  I was like, “Are you punking me?” 
OLDFATHER: I will say that it’s been a good quarter century plus, but I 
distinctly recall, as an articles editor at Virginia getting a submission from 
somebody at Harvard, looking at it, and we all said basically, “Well, this doesn’t 
look so good to us and if somebody at Harvard is trying to publish with us, it 
must be their worst work, so we’re not going to take it.” 
FISH: You made three mistakes then. 
OLDFATHER: It wasn’t just three. 
HORWITZ: I mean, it’s not that I have any more than anecdotal experience.  
Yes, it happens and there’s also, of course, the “this is so and so’s tenure piece” 
thing, which I don’t know how much of that happens now, certainly, was once 
common.  And is talked about in Rising Star21 by David Garrow on Barack 
Obama, that was roughly your period, right? 
OLDFATHER: I’m in there twice. 
HORWITZ: There you go.  So, it seems to me, Stanley, I don’t know enough 
about the community in which the reader reception was going on and so on, but 
in 1977, the American legal faculty was smaller in number than it is today.  
There were all kinds of problems involved in it being a small community.  I’m 
not glorifying it, but it was potentially easier to make substantive judgments 
about Stanley Fish, we know he’s going to make good, or so on.  The larger the 
community gets, maybe the harder it is to make that judgment and the more that 
it makes a difference that the editor who is saying, “It’s Stanley’s work and I 
know he’s going to make good,” is a faculty member, as opposed to a grad 
student in English, who probably would still be in better shape than some law 
students.  But the larger the community is, the more likely it is that the person 
that says, “Well it is so and so is making a very shallow judgment of that sort 
rather than a meaningful judgment.”  And that the person who writes the 
breakthrough article who is at school X.  Sometimes it’ll happen for them but 
it’s just more unlikely that it’s going to happen. 
OLDFATHER: Do we want to try to move toward making this a little more 
nuts and bolts?  What might we actually find ourselves including in a model 
code? 
HESSICK: Can I actually just say one thing?  I understand that we’re here 
to talk about the ethics.  But I’m a criminal law person, so I always think about 
how people will react to things.  And I actually wonder if ExpressO and 
Scholastica aren’t something to be embraced here?  Why is the pressure not on 
ExpressO and Scholastica to say, “We will perform a scrubbing function so that 
this is a blind submission process?”  As opposed to what they’ve done instead 
 
21. DAVID J. GARROW, RISING STAR: THE MAKING OF BARACK OBAMA (2017).  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3217300 
CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPT 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/18  9:24 AM 
1146 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:1083 
which is to say, “Authors, law review editors have told us that a CV is the most 
important piece of information that they have about you, please don’t forget to 
include your CV.”  So, I understand that we’re talking about the ethics here.  
But I just wanted to point out, to the extent that we have a practice or we have 
systems in place, the systems right now are pushing us in precisely the opposite 
direction of blind review and so, if people like blind review, the fact that this 
has become centralized into two platforms could facilitate that sort of blind 
review.  I think that that’s just at least worth noting. 
OLDFATHER: Am I remembering correctly that there’s at least been a 
proposal out there that AALS should undertake to create its own article 
submission platform?  Maybe I’m confusing it with SEALS and the hiring 
market.  But maybe that’s a legitimate question, too.  Should this be something 
that AALS could do? 
WEST: I can just tell you that I’m on a panel at the next AALS meeting 
about the role of AALS in scholarship and I don’t think, from what I’ve seen, 
that there’s any set agenda on that or that there are any commitments that have 
already been made.  So, I think the answer is no, there is nothing on the table 
right now, but there may well be recommendations that come out of this next 
meeting.  Oh, I just have one more anecdote and that is a top five journal, that 
we’d all be excited to hear about, accepting an article—not one word of which 
had been written—from a very junior person. 
OLDFATHER: I’m going to try that. 
HESSICK: Yeah, I mean, I don’t know that about a junior person, but I do 
know the whole, “Oh, we’re full.”  I mean that’s not to say, “We’re definitely 
full.”  So and so’s research assistant says he has a piece coming.  If that doesn’t 
happen, we may have one more slot but otherwise we’re full.”  And I should 
add I don’t think that that author knew what was happening, I don’t.   
I don’t think that it’s someone that I think highly of.  I think it might have 
been like the research assistant talking to the journal.  I don’t think it was.  I 
could be wrong. 
OLDFATHER: Let’s throw out on the table, too, if we want to talk about it 
from the journal side.  And I am still skeptical of focusing too much on that.  
The practice of internal submissions and the differential treatment of internal 
submissions, that’s another topic that comes up quite a bit. 
SELIGMAN:  I just want someone to find me during the break and explain to 
me why student journals have so much status. 
HORWITZ: We are status oriented. 
HESSICK: Yeah, that’s true. That’s what it is. 
FRANCIS: So, one thing we could do empirically, it is an expected practice 
of any professional journal to publish what your reviewing process looks like 
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and to publish your instructions for authors.  I mean, there is a very interesting 
group called the Committee on Publication Ethics.  And we could go to at least 
a random sample of law reviews, some of them flagship, some of them not, and 
we could see from their websites.  I would actually be happy to get an RA to do 
that.  Whether they even have the appropriate documents on their website.  And 
if we made a list of some of the content things we think ought to be in there, to 
see how many of them do or do not include that, if they do have such statements. 
It wouldn’t be hard. 
OLDFATHER: And if [the editors] want to get in and defend your honor at 
any point, by all means.  We’re more than happy to have your contributions. 
SCOVILLE: Just to extend a little bit on something I said in the little piece 
that I wrote for this conference, I think that you could conceivably do something 
similarly useful with respect to the contracts that authors sign with law reviews.  
They seem to be pretty bare-bones in most cases, although I must confess that 
I don’t read them all that carefully, on the presumption that issues aren’t going 
to arise.  Conceivably, law reviews could add stricter requirements with respect 
to author behavior in order to enforce some of these standards.  Something to 
consider. 
OLDFATHER: And I think too there is some limitation on putting too much 
of the burden on law reviews to enforce this.  The boards are around for a year 
and they spend a bunch of time trying to fill their slot full of articles.  I suspect 
that there are a lot of disincentives to playing hardball with an author.  Yanking 
an acceptance will just entail more work and, “Oh, by the way, I’ve got classes 
and I’m a third year and somebody told me I could actually enjoy the second 
semester of my third year and relax a little bit.”  So, there are other sorts of 
limitations in addition to all the power imbalances in the process.  The 
incentives, I don’t think, necessarily line up well for the editors to enforce a lot 
of these things. 
HESSICK: I just wanted to say about the ethics of home submissions.  It 
gives me the heebie jeebies to submit to my home journal.  And it was 
interesting because some of the folks who wrote about law review submissions 
in the ‘80s and the ‘90s seemed concerned that faculty would use the home 
submission to try to expedite to another journal.  I’m actually less concerned 
about that sort of dynamic than I am of law review editors potentially feeling 
pressure to accept articles from the professors that they see every day, that they 
might currently be taking a class from, that they might be trying to get a 
recommendation from.  Depending on the school, the law review, the identities 
of the articles editors could be very well known.  The process at some schools 
is very well known.  And, I don’t want to get into too much detail, but my 
impression is that at least some of the editors that I have spoken to feel pressure 
when they’re reviewing an article by someone who teaches at the school.  And 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3217300 
CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPT 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/18  9:24 AM 
1148 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:1083 
I think that that’s worth thinking about whether that’s an appropriate dynamic 
to create. 
HORWITZ: So, I guess it’s a bifurcated problem.  Most schools that are not 
Harvard or Yale or one or two others are not going to be impressed by a tenure 
piece published in their own home journal, I think.  When we’re looking at—
and I actually think it’s a problematic practice—but when we look at tenure, 
we’re looking for our juniors to publish and what I think somewhere we can 
call like schools, journals that are better ranked than ours.  And it would be nice 
if we just focused on the substance of the article.  But if you’re a Harvard 
professor seeking tenure, at least up until recently, then getting a tenure piece 
in Harvard was counted.  Post-tenure, it’s kind of maybe a different story.  I 
think the worry then is about pressure rather than about advancement.  And this 
can be true for elite or non-elite journals.  I’m the faculty advisor for my journal.  
There’s probably one particular faculty member who used to have a bad habit 
of this and my introductory speech to the new editors every year was, “I’m here 
to run interference for you so, if so and so is pushing you to publish a piece, 
send them my way.  That’s my job to tell them to leave you alone.”  So, again, 
what I want to say is everything said has had some merit.  Where the push 
should be targeted is a question.  I think your point about Scholastica and 
ExpressO was valuable, and I’d abstract it to say the question is, I guess, “What 
internal ethical duties do we have as scholars?”  And then, two, “Structurally 
who’s the least cost avoider?”  I mean, if we’re going to prescribe something, 
the question is, “Where is the prescription most effectively and efficiently 
aimed?” 
FISH: I tend to agree with Paul that law schools that see themselves at a 
certain level or at a certain rank are going to want their junior colleagues to 
publish in law reviews that are at least deemed to emanate from a higher ranked 
school.  I’ve had two experiences over my lifetime with Yale University.  And 
they have been exactly the same in one important respect.  When I was a 
graduate student in the English department, the idea that anyone who was not a 
member of the Yale English department had anything interesting to say was 
never even entertained.  So, all of the references in any of my classes to essays 
or books written by someone other than my present instructor were to people 
residing down the hall.  Then, when a few years ago, I taught at the Yale Law 
School, it was exactly the same thing.  The idea at Yale that someone who is 
not at Yale would have something very significant to say was simply not 
entertained.  So, I think we have to understand the cultural/political/hubristic 
differences in these matters. 
OLDFATHER: Things that we have missed.  Are there things that we ought 
to be saying in this session about non-law review means of scholarly output and 
the mechanisms there? 
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FRANCIS: This isn’t about non-law review, but we haven’t raised the 
question of author behavior—trading up—and that practice, and the, “You need 
to take the first offer,” or some version of that.  I think we ought to think very 
seriously about the whole expedite trade-up phenomenon and what it does to 
scholarship. 
OLDFATHER: Right, and I would broaden that to include the practice where 
one submits in the first place with the idea that the goal is to provide a source 
of an expedite and with no real intention to publish.  And then the behavior that 
follows after that. 
WEST: Just two quick thoughts.  I think you should worry about what 
trading up does to the practice.  You should also worry about what it does to 
character.  I find it just so offensive, but I also find it shocking that the law 
review student editors themselves expect it.  So, it’s become a widely accepted 
practice, which I think is really a reflection of something that’s wrong with the 
culture.  But I’m not sure it’s fixable.  We haven’t focused really on the virtues 
of student-edited law reviews with the exception of the comments that you 
raised.  But I do think that there are an awful lot of student-edited law reviews.  
There’s so many of them.  A lot of what’s published isn’t very high quality.  
But just the fact that there are so many does provide us a solution or sort of 
safety valve for some of these problems.  Yeah, there are these terrible stories 
of people getting their friends’ work published and so on.  But just because 
there are so many law reviews, people do get their work out there.  And now 
with SSRN, if the work is out there, it’ll be read by the people who have an 
interest in it.  And so, I just don’t want us to lose track of the fact that there’s a 
lot that’s fine about this culture, the publication culture in law schools. 
FISH: Yeah, I would second that and say that one of the things that’s fun is 
the symposium collections.  If you’re working in an area and trying to figure 
out what’s going on and you know that there’s been a symposium on the subject 
recently published in a law review, it’s invaluable, not necessarily solely 
because of the quality of the essays, but because of the volume of the footnotes.  
And you can quickly educate yourself, at least to your obligations, what pieces 
or books you should now read.  That’s a genuine service. 
HORWITZ: So, I’ll make a practical suggestion.  It feels very “faculty-
politics” or “politics in general.”  The next step is the “blue-ribbon commission” 
or the “more-study is needed” approach but it does strike me that, to the extent 
that we can batten down on hard standards or recommendations here, all to the 
good.  But there are serious arguments about which path the legal publishing 
process should take.  The ethical duties and responsibilities are going to vary 
depending on the environment and so the legal academy needs to “come to 
Jesus” and amass information on the following and have a meaningful 
institutional resolution, pan-institutional resolution of some of these issues.  I 
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know that’s weak sauce, but I feel bad, as a character matter, about some people 
gaming aspects of the system.  If the system is what it is, but not all of them 
strike me as unethical and some do, and some just strike me as, kind of, sleazy 
in a different way.  So, maybe it’s just time to figure out how clearly the 
problems can be identified and put to the academy as a matter of questions that 
need to be dealt with. 
SELIGMAN:  I’m going to pretend that Chad asked this question that I’m 
going to answer, which is, “What else should we be thinking about there?”  I’ll 
just say, again, as an outsider, that it’s striking to me that the question posed is 
here, generally about the mechanisms of legal scholarship, but the focus has 
been almost exclusively on law reviews, as opposed to some of the pieces that 
you all wrote in preparation for today.  There are other venues of publication or 
for the output of the ideas of law professors that I think might be worth 
discussing for a little while.  I might be wrong about that.  And it’s also quite 
notable to me as an outsider influenced by social scientists that there’s been 
zero discussion of the ethics of the research process, which is the foundation of 
publishing and scholar publishing. 
HORWITZ: I did say we should make data sets available.  I think that was - 
OLDFATHER: Yeah, but that’s right and be exhaustive.  Or at least 
thorough, reasonably.  I would like us to speak to the other outlets mentioned 
and we don’t have to limit ourselves to mechanisms.  We are running close to 
the end of this session as it’s formally designated, but next is thinking in terms 
of nuts and bolts.  So, we can start to orient ourselves in both of those ways. 
BOOTHE-PERRY: My comment might actually be a little bit more nuts and 
bolts, kind of piggybacking on what Paul was saying as we were thinking about 
doing the restatement and having some ethical obligation specifically regarding 
the law review process and not really discussing revamping the law review 
process because I don’t know to what extent we could do that in quick form.  
But, in discussing the law review process, and not to borrow from the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct because they don’t apply to us as legal scholars, 
necessarily.  I think we had that discussion a little bit earlier.  But in the teaching 
and when you write about legal ethics, and you write about professionalism, 
legal ethics are a standard of rules that you have obligations and you have a 
duty to abide by.  And if you don’t, there are some ramifications.  
Professionalism, on the other hand, is something a little bit not as concrete for 
some people.  And so, when Paul talks about those things when we’re talking 
about law reviews that might feel kind of sleazy or they don’t feel right, it’s 
kind of like, the judge once said, “Pornography, you know it when you see it.”  
I think we might want to be thinking about that when we do the actual drafting 
of this to know that there would be some ethical obligations we’re talking about 
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and then these other “good standards, professionalism” sounding things that 
are, the sleazy things. 
WALD: I’d like to clarify and add to my earlier point about the Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  As a matter of law, some Rules, as codified in whatever 
state those of us who are lawyers are licensed in, certainly apply to our conduct.  
A law professor, who happens to be a lawyer, who commits an act of 
dishonesty, say plagiarism, is subject to discipline per rule 8.4(c) under the rules 
of the jurisdiction where she is licensed.  As a lawyer, I’m mindful of the fact 
that I must comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct and that some rules 
apply to my conduct as a law professor.  But, importantly, I’ve always thought 
of myself primarily as a professor who’s subject to some Rules, not as a lawyer 
who happens to be teaching at a law school.  And so, while as a technical matter, 
yes, some of the Rules of Professional Conduct apply to my conduct, as a law 
professor I do not think of the Rules as playing an important role in guiding and 
shaping my conduct as an academic.  I suspect most law professors who are 
lawyers are in the same boat: they are mindful of complying with applicable 
rules but the Rules do not meaningfully inform their conduct as law professors.  
By the way, there are more and more—yet still a minority—but increasingly 
more law professors who are not lawyers, and I don’t mean because they 
haven’t kept up with the licensing.  I mean professors who are not lawyers, such 
as sociologists, economists, so on and so forth.  These law professors, of course, 
are not subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct at all. 
FRANCIS: One other observation that I don’t know where to take, I’m sort 
of making a whole bunch about the current landscape.  The law reviews that 
occupy the current landscape come in many different flavors.  There are the so-
called flagship law reviews of institutions.  There are ones that come with 
particular political perspectives.  For example, the ones that are associated with 
Federalist Society views.  And there are ones that are special area ones.  And I 
don’t know that there’s anything to say or whether we want to have out on the 
table, something about whether it’s appropriate to have ideologically driven law 
reviews or, I mean, maybe there isn’t anything we can sensibly say about that.  
That may not be a fair characterization in any event. 
HORWITZ: There are a few [law reviews] that I think are explicit about it.  
There are one or two, maybe more than one or two.  There are a few that are 
not just about a subject matter or not just environmental law but with a general 
preference for saving rather than destroying the environment.  There are a few 
that are kind of explicitly political, but there are not a ton.  Of course, it is true 
that, you know in the JLPP or a few others you can generally guess where things 
are going to come. 
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FRANCIS: My own view is that disclosure on the part of the review is the 
right way to handle that.  But again, I think it’s just a phenomenon that’s out 
there in the territory that we shouldn’t entirely ignore. 
FISH: There have been cases in which the law review at a law school had a 
higher reputation within the law reviews than the law school might have had 
and, in part, this has happened—at least in the ones I am thinking of—because 
there was a deliberate decision to strike out in a path that might amount to 
occupying a niche of some kind.  So, it was a strategic decision.  Not to be “just 
a law review” but to be known as “the” law review, the “go-to” law review or 
one of them at least.  I have no normative conclusion to draw from that 
observation but I just thought it should be put on the table. 
E. Session Four: The Mechanisms of Legal Scholarship, Continued 
OLDFATHER: So, to the nuts and bolts.  We begin with modesty and 
humility.  As we move into this last phase, let’s bear in mind that we’ve got 
Stanley for exactly one more hour, so let’s make the most of it.  So, go get him.  
Was that what it was?  Have at him, something like that.  An issue that came 
up during the break that we want to put on the table is the question of author 
behavior with respect to law review editors.  I’ve had to involve myself in 
situations where authors sent intemperate emails to editors. 
FISH: Intemperate in what direction? 
OLDFATHER: Intemperate in the sense of generally being difficult to deal 
with and accusing the student editor of being unprofessional in various sorts of 
ways.  I don’t remember all of the details.  I do remember my response where I 
confronted this person with being intemperate and unprofessional and so forth, 
and the matter was resolved.  
FISH: Is this bullying or attempted bullying? 
OLDFATHER: Bullying is a word that would work, yeah.  It was, I’m 
oversimplifying here, but “I don’t want to do your stupid footnotes.  Don’t make 
me do them.  I’m coming from a different discipline.  We don’t do it that way. 
I think this is all ridiculous.”  That sort of thing. 
FISH: Not a law person. 
OLDFATHER: This is somebody from outside the legal academia.  So, I 
think there is something to be said there for a norm of civility in dealings with 
law review editors, recognizing once again that there is this power differential 
there, among other sorts of differentials.  
Having started with that, we’re now at the difficult part of our endeavor 
here, which is to attempt to take these discussions and turn them into at least 
the basis for a first draft of a set of ethical standards.  I think I’m going to work 
off of Paul’s draft here as we start our discussion.  It takes us back to the 
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beginning, right, which is what are we talking about?  What is our subject?  
What do we mean by scholarship?  Do we approach it, I didn’t capture in my 
notes the three-part definition that, I think, Stanley formed based on a reaction 
to Robin’s piece, but that was mentioned a couple times as a, what was it, 
scholarship in the tradition of the humanities? 
FISH: Just [indiscernible] scholarship which has its compelling motive 
getting something descriptively accurate truth and so forth.  And then 
scholarship second, the scholarship is responsive in a particular sphere of the 
enterprise that is the law realizing the incurring of justice or making it a little 
better.  And then there was work that was, frankly partisan, precisely 
endorsing—that is, it started with the answer. 
OLDFATHER: Is that a useful division of the world? 
FISH: I thought so. 
HAMILTON: This approach made a lot of sense.  I had it really defined into, 
the frankly partisan form, which to me was in the advocacy ethics.  “No 
affirmative lies” was kind of my outer boundary on that.  But you can certainly 
leave out a lot of evidence that doesn’t support your position versus—this goes 
to exhaustiveness actually—versus the other model which I thought was 
signaling that it was a good faith effort to explore all the evidence, conflicting 
as well as favorable to your position, and then coming out.  It doesn’t have to 
be exhaustive to everything but at least good faith.  But this picks up a nuance 
that I didn’t have. 
FISH: Yeah, and I would prefer good faith to sincerity because good faith 
obviously refers to patterns of behavior even though the word faith is there.  It’s 
not being used to refer to some inner-mysterious thing or, as sincerely always 
seemed to me to be, some inner-mysterious thing.  So, I like good-faith. 
HORWITZ: So, if I’m thinking again about what a hard copy looks like and 
I should say two things.  Three of us here will do as much of the work as 
possible, not to steal it from you but to take the burden off your shoulders and—
this session in part is about, “You give us the map, or the skeleton and we’ll try 
to fill stuff in with what you said or vice versa.”  We gave you the basic map, 
you can argue with it and/or provide flesh on the bone.  This seems to me a 
place where I guess caveats or qualifications start coming in, so you have a 
definition of legal scholarship and then one of the questions is, “What about 
non-scholarship?”  It seems to me, it would be a relevant comment if I’m 
thinking in the restatement fashion.  Or maybe to put it differently, the question 
is not just, “What is good?  What is the purpose of scholarship?” but, “What is 
scholarship as an entity?  Does it include an op-ed written by a law professor?  
What does it include written by a law professor?”  Maybe put it in a more open-
ended way. 
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OLDFATHER: Including potentially books—case books and other teaching 
materials and so forth.  Nicky. 
BOOTHE-PERRY: When we were having the discussion, I was just jotting 
down recurring themes or recurring words.  So, what I have is when we were 
defining what is legal scholarship.  It’s a good faith, collaborative, engaging 
process that contributes usefully to the law or the legal landscape.  And then 
underneath that would come, well, what types of that collaborative process 
would qualify where we would go into those.  I’m again just thinking of writing 
the restatement. 
OLDFATHER: Do we want to expand on the idea of collaborative? 
BOOTHE-PERRY: By collaborative we were talking about, everybody kept 
saying, “You’re engaging with other scholars,” or “You’re engaging in some 
conversation.”  But that word kept coming up with the collaboration. 
OLDFATHER: Does the audience for scholarship consist primarily or 
exclusively of other scholars?  Does it necessarily extend to the bench and bar?  
Does it possibly extend beyond that into the general public? 
BOOTHE-PERRY: So, would that go to a comment under that when we’re 
talking about what types of writings qualify for scholarship?  Because every 
type of writing will have a specific type of audience.  But you’re still engaging 
in some collaborative process for that audience, whether it’s to influence judges 
in their opinions or whether it’s to influence the public in an op-ed or whatever 
else.  We were thinking of scholarship, but it’s still collaborative, right?  Just 
collaborative in a different scheme depending on what the scholarship is. 
FRANCIS: I guess, I’m a little puzzled about, and I thought scholarship had 
something to do with the production of knowledge, or maybe I’m not quite sure 
how much the dissemination of knowledge here also matters.  But I’m not sure 
it’s scholarship to write a letter to the editor or an op-ed or blog or a Tweet.  If 
all I’m doing is expressing my opinion.  It might be—suppose I’ve written 
something that’s aimed to contribute to new knowledge and I, then, disseminate 
it to a different audience by a different medium which involves some rethinking 
about presentation.  That might count.  But I think we need to be really careful 
about what the scope is.  And just on collaboration, there is always going to be 
collaboration with audience.  But I think we have to be really careful not to 
have it look like it always has to be co-authors or something like that. 
SELIGMAN:  Just to amplify a piece of that that I think got buried, was the 
piece of “what makes it scholarship is the new knowledge.”  And so, the focus, 
I think, of your thinking needs to be on the production of what went into the 
output, rather than the place that it is put out.  So, what I could imagine putting 
new knowledge out in an op-ed, although that would not be very wise.  So, that 
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would give research underneath that.  The key isn’t the final place.  The key is 
the process behind it. 
OLDFATHER: And does motivation matter? 
HAMILTON: Well, I mean, I think it’s good to look back as to what others 
have thought about this.  So, going back to Ernie Boyer in Scholarship 
Reconsidered22 in 1990 that coming out of Carnegie, remember, he argued for 
the four categories that it’s scholarship of discovery, integration, application, 
and teaching.  Because they wanted to create a new field of the scholarship of 
teaching, which I think was a wonderful new initiative and fits with some of the 
teaching materials, ideas, and then they proposed in the ‘97 book, “Does the 
scholar identify important questions?  Does the scholar adequately consider 
existing scholarship?  Does the scholar use appropriate methodology 
recognized by the field?  Does the scholarship add consequentially to a field?”  
So that one you can see, if you go that route, then we’re not including the op-
ed piece, that category doesn’t get included. 
WALD: We fairly casually drew a distinction between codes of conduct and 
restatement-style documents, and should spend a little bit more time talking 
about it.  The goal or objective of the Rules of Professional Conduct is two-
fold.  One is to guide the conduct of practitioners, the other is to protect 
clients—assuming that clients will often be vulnerable vis-à-vis their lawyers 
and in need of protection.  In contrast, restatement projects, in general, are 
primarily meant to codify the existing law and guide practice.  This distinction 
suggests that we might gravitate toward a Rules-style document, at least to the 
extent that what we have in mind is not just the guidance of the practice of 
academics, but also the protection of others, such as readers of legal scholarship 
and editors of law reviews.  It doesn’t mean that at the end of the day our work 
product must look more like a code as opposed to a restatement, but it does 
mean that if we draft a restatement like document, we might want to keep in 
mind the objective of protecting readers and others who interact with legal 
scholarship. 
Unrelatedly, it seems that we are making a background assumption here 
that all law professors regularly engage in scholarship.  But some of our 
colleagues do not have strong scholarly work habits, and therefore we might 
consider making a statement about the duty to regularly engage in scholarship 
and what such a duty might entail.  To be clear, by a duty to engage in 
scholarship I do not mean to suggest some magical standard of productivity—
so many articles or book chapters a year—rather, I mean a statement about what 
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it means to consistently research, have strong work habits, read and comment 
on the work of others, publish regularly, etc.   
OLDFATHER: Two quick reactions to that before you pass it to Robin.  One 
is, I think that should be a non-controversial sort of idea in the sense that if one 
looks at the university faculty handbook for Marquette University, for example, 
there is a clear statement of an obligation of a faculty member to continue to 
produce scholarship throughout his or her career.  And I would expect that’s a 
fairly common sort of provision.  With respect to the counting, I went to an 
associate dean’s conference this summer because that’s where I find myself 
these days sometimes.  And one of the panels there was some folks who were 
or have been deans, and among the questions they were dealing with was how 
do we assess scholarly productivity.  And somebody remind me to bring up the 
rubric that Don Weidner at Florida State used to assess faculty productivity 
there because it was very much, “If you do this sort of thing, you get one point.  
If you do this other sort of thing, you get a half point.”  And it all factored into 
a number at the bottom which worked quite well for Florida State, but I don’t 
know what I think about the idea in general. 
WEST: Okay, much of what I was going to say has been said, so I can be 
very brief.  I do think the question, “What is scholarship?” has to be couched 
as, “What is scholarship for, what purpose?  Why are we engaged in this 
definitional project?”  Because the content of the definition will depend 
somewhat on why you’re doing it.  The context in which this definitional 
question is often posed is a tenure or a hiring decision and that’s not what we’re 
engaged in here.  So, “What is scholarship for purposes of generating a code of 
scholarly ethics?” is a better question to start with than simply, “What is legal 
scholarship?”  I do also, though, just want to stress that I don’t think we should 
be overly pluralistic.  On the other hand, I don’t think we need to assume that 
we can say something about all forms of legal scholarship.  There are other 
things.  There are other kinds of scholarship which we haven’t discussed and 
which we don’t need to, perhaps.  But there is still a lot of straight descriptive 
legal scholarship that just aims to elucidate what the content of the law is.  
There’s analytic jurisprudence, you know, a bunch of people used to talk about 
in the 19th century.  There’s scholarship that’s quite self-consciously critical, 
which is not normative but it is also not particularly inter-disciplinary.  There’s 
theoretical scholarship and then there is something called adversarial 
pedagogical or “clinical written” work, which I don’t want to sign onto a 
document that disclaims the value of that.  Again, I don’t care that much what 
things are called.  But I don’t want to sign onto something that disclaims the 
value of that.  Okay, why it matters what type of scholarship we’re talking 
about: I do think for ethical purposes, the virtue that you ascribe to scholarship 
does determine some of the ethics.  So, to say that the purpose of scholarship is 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3217300 
CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPT 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/18  9:24 AM 
2018] CONFERENCE ON THE ETHICS OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1157 
knowledge is to imply a certain set of constraints, all of which make sense to 
me.  I do believe that the purpose of much normative scholarship is to improve 
the justice of the legal system.  That implies a different set of constraints—
overlapping, of course—but that’s why I wanted to keep insisting the 
disinterestedness stay on the table because to my mind disinterestedness is right 
at the core of it.  And then my last comment is that I think it’s important for us 
to say something on a preamble or otherwise about the obligation to do 
scholarship because the question facing so many law schools right now is 
whether to have any scholarly role at all for legal academics, given the expense 
of a legal education, given the need of their students to find jobs, the question 
that a lot of faculty and a lot of administrators are trying to answer is whether 
we should ask faculty to do this at all or is it simply a luxury that we cannot 
afford, we have to focus on training our students and the skills that they need 
to be functioning lawyers.  And so, I think it’s important to just—and in any 
gathering like this that talks about the ins and outs of scholarship—to just 
continue to insist on the importance societally, as well as professionally, of 
having an academy that’s independent of the bench, independent of the bar, that 
produces a body of work that is about law and all these various ways but 
including critically as well. 
HORWITZ: So, one thing, you haven’t quite weaned me from pluralism, but 
you all have made me think carefully about what, I, in a more disinterested 
fashion, think needs to be there and which things that I bring to the table are 
kind of “hobby horses” that are important to me but don’t necessarily have to 
be addressed.  And it seems to me that one way to deal with this more generally 
is by a careful statement or limitation on scope.  There are questions that we 
might not want to answer or be able to answer, without having to make a 
statement.  But to say, for instance, this is not a statement about, I’m thinking 
of the classic joke—have any of you read Thomas Reed Powell’s mockery 
statement of constitutional law where there’s the bit about the dormant 
commerce clause and he’s kind of like, “Some amount of interference with 
commerce is too much—note how much is too much is beyond the scope of 
this restatement.”  It’s a very clever bit.  But it’s possible to say, for instance, 
“What counts as clinical legal scholarship is beyond the scope.”  And I don’t 
consider that fudging.  I’m actually more willing than I was to accept Stanley’s 
answer that we might value it, but still not call it “scholarship.”  But I am happy 
to just put it aside and make a scope statement.  And that might apply to a couple 
of things.  So, scope exclusions, these are valuable here.  And the second thing 
I’d say, the reason I asked about what I’ll call legal academic non-scholarship 
is that partly because things like amicus briefs and professors’ letters are so 
prevalent these days and partly because they specifically involve what I think 
of trading on authority—they specifically involve not just, “Here’s a 
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statement,” but, “Here’s a statement coming with ostensible authority” cloaked 
in the, whatever it is, mystique or expertise of the legal academy and the 
institution.  I don’t know whether it, therefore, in my view, must be included in 
dealing with the ethics of legal scholarship or whether one says we are not 
addressing—except in so far as it’s immediately relevant—legal academic non-
scholarship but there may be duties that appertain to it.  And that is an important 
issue but beyond the scope. 
OLDFATHER: I think Neil and then we’ll go to Leslie. 
HAMILTON: If we’re including Stanley’s frankly partisan as part of the 
definition of scholarship, it would pick up— 
FISH: I wouldn’t want to. 
HAMILTON: Oh, you don’t want to.  Oh, I see.  The other point I was going 
to make is if you want to start with, “Why is there a duty?” you’d go to social 
contract which I think was in Nicky’s piece as the social contract argument. 
FRANCIS: So, we’ve been talking about whether scholarship includes 
dissemination or advocacy and whether there are lines there.  One other line, I 
don’t know if it’s a line, but I just want to bring it up is creative works.  So, 
would To Kill a Mockingbird be legal scholarship?  Well, it might be, I don’t 
know.   
HESSICK: I know why you’re asking those questions. 
FRANCIS: Well, we had an example like that in law school of somebody 
who wrote plays.  A colleague of mine in the philosophy department is a fiction 
writer, and she wrote a lot about bioethics dilemmas and her fiction involved 
bioethics dilemmas and there was a question about—now that goes back to 
Robin’s point—would you account for tenure, but whether any of the kinds of 
standards that we’re thinking about might also apply to certain sorts of creative 
works that people might do—as calling on their legal expertise, and in an 
interesting sense, contributing to how it is that people understand the law.  I 
mean, if you’re thinking about the justice project, that’s partly why I thought of 
To Kill a Mockingbird.  But I just wanted to mention that could potentially be 
part of the landscape. 
OLDFATHER: There certainly are plenty of law professor fiction writers 
and not just at Yale. 
WALD: Let’s talk a little bit about what may, or should be, distinctive about 
law and legal scholarship–Justice.  In an excellent book, Robin talks about 
justice and its neglect in law schools and legal education.23  Assuming and 
hoping that justice will one day play a more significant role in law, what role 
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should it play in legal scholarship?  I don’t think that every piece of scholarship 
necessarily has to directly engage in some way with conceptions and the 
application of justice to count as legal scholarship.  Of course not.  But, should 
legal scholars generally be committed to, think about, research and write about 
aspects of justice, to correct for the suppression and irrelevance of justice at law 
schools, legal education and legal scholarship? 
FISH: What are examples? 
WALD: My concern is that law teaching and the practice of law more 
generally is completely, practically speaking, devoid from commitments to and 
engagement with justice.  Examples?  I believe I’ve read recently a piece that 
points out that although we have approximately two hundred accredited law 
schools in the United States, all are called and referred to as schools of law, and 
not a single one is known as a school of justice.  Is that a coincidence?  More 
generally, most law schools do not have a required class called Justice, although 
many teach Jurisprudence as an elective, a course that may or may not explores 
conceptions of justice, and do not systematically explore justices pervasively 
throughout the curriculum or outside of it.    
WEST: I know.  No, let me just clarify.  I’m not saying that law has always 
been about the suppression of justice.  Legal discourse has neglected the topic 
of justice.  And so, in my essay I wanted to insist on two things.  One was this 
disinterestedness point and the second was that law scholars who do normative 
legal scholarship, I think, have a sort of general, ethical obligation to say 
something about their normative structure, if you want word less loaded than 
justice.  And so, some people do this, the people who feel very strongly about 
efficiency, say lots about it.  Many of us don’t share that commitment.  And so, 
if there’s another way to describe what you think it means to say that this is a 
better legal solution to this problem than that.  What’s the better and they’re 
referring to.  I think for a lot of people it’s not stated explicitly.  But the implicit 
premise there is justice.  This is more just than that and so we should be doing 
it this way rather than that way.  And if that’s true, then I think we have an 
obligation to think a little bit more clearly and explicitly about what that norm 
means. 
OLDFATHER: Thinking about it in terms of our code, then, is that 
something that would be part of a disclosure-type norm?  I mean it’s not the 
same, but on the other hand it’s—or is it candor or transparency to use that word 
again.  How do we formulate the norm? 
WEST: I meant it as an intellectual project, not that you’ve got to disclose 
your hidden thoughts about this, but that one should be—partly it has to do with 
candor—but one should be open to argument about what it is that you think the 
point of this field of law or the point of the rule of law, generally. 
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OLDFATHER: Could we state it as something like an obligation to articulate 
one’s premises as best as one is able? 
WEST: Yeah, I would say one’s moral premises.  But yeah, I just resist, or 
I recoil, at the sort of subjectivity of that because I think that what I would 
envision would be an obligation to engage in an inquiry about the—sorry to use 
the expression—objective truth of the matter.  So, what does justice require?  
And it’s not a question that’s been a familiar one in the legal academy.  I think 
we’ve neglected it, the neglect of it has had consequences and most of them 
have not been good.  So, at any rate, if so many law professors continue to 
engage in normative legal scholarship that takes the form, “This is the way the 
law ought to be,” and it’s not all bad writing and it does have scholarly virtues 
of depth and breadth and so on.  It seems incumbent to have an obligation to 
say something about that moral structure.  And we haven’t, as an academy, as 
a group done much of that. 
HESSICK: So, that’s why I’m glad that you’ve kept the value of 
disinterestedness on the table.  I think that that’s when we talk about candor and 
when we talk about exhaustiveness, I think disinterestedness needs to be in 
there and maybe we should flag it when we define scholarship.  And I think that 
the definition of scholarship should embrace normative scholarship with the 
caveat that it’s especially important for normative scholarship to adhere to an 
ethic of disinterestedness.  And then that would be dealt with below and the 
code.  Maybe I’m wrong. 
WEST: I’d be really happy with that. 
HESSICK: As I’ve been listening to you, that’s where I thought we were 
going with it and it made me quite happy that you pushed disinterestedness back 
to the forefront because I think that when people hear the word normative 
scholarship, they necessarily worry that it is interested or partisan or 
adversarial.  And so, I think it could be helpful to flag that in the definition of 
scholarship and then to make reference to the value that will be explained more 
later. 
FISH: I agree completely with the desire to put disinterestedness in a 
particularly favored position in whatever statement is produced.  But we should 
be aware of the, shall I say, political/rhetorical pitfalls of doing so.  Because 
some people will read disinterestedness as a neutrality, which brings with it a 
whole other host of definitional problems.  Some people will read 
disinterestedness as a hands-off ivory tower kind of thing.  So, I don’t know 
exactly how this could be accomplished, but one has to.  One would hope it 
would be possible to promote or celebrate disinterestedness as a genuinely thick 
value, rather than the antiseptic character traits that some people will 
immediately jump to. 
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OLDFATHER: Note takers, are we satisfied on the definitional question?  
All right, so then we should move into the topics from the second session.  We 
had sincerity, which I took to be an idea that there was some sympathy for 
excluding from our project here.  Candor, we talked about disclosures.  Candor 
about what, whether it was about methodology, whether it was about 
information relevant to the evaluation of the scholarship, including, but not 
limited to, ideological considerations.  Maybe we should focus on that before 
we move to exhaustiveness because I think there’s a lot on the table with respect 
to the candor point. 
FRANCIS: As I understood it, the predominant one wasn’t so much political 
or ideological persuasion as it was methodology, conflict of interest in the more 
classic sense. 
WEST: On candor? 
FRANCIS: Yeah, what sorts of things were needed to disclose. 
OLDFATHER: Modifications to that. 
WEST: No, I don’t want to lose track of Carissa’s point, that there’s a point 
past which disclosure is not sufficient and you really want to discourage going 
there.  It’s not just a matter of disclosure.  If you’re in the middle of litigating a 
case, you can’t be writing about it at the same time in order to influence the 
judge.  I don’t think. 
OLDFATHER: Disclosure is a partial remedy but for some situations 
recusal, so to speak, is the real remedy.  Not doing the project. 
WEST: I don’t know.  Does everyone agree with that? 
HORWITZ: Yeah, so my assumption will be something like, whatever the 
duty of candor describes, either in a comment there or elsewhere, one says, “It’s 
not a necessary remedy for all evils,” and, “See conflict of interest below.” 
Something of the sort.  I guess that’s how I’d put it.  In terms of how I’d define 
candor, maybe this is overbroad or over-vague, but something like, “The 
scholar has a duty to provide information,” or maybe, “Non-obvious 
information,” takes care of the point that you don’t think it’s always necessary 
to disclose every political viewpoint, for instance, necessary for a sound 
evaluation of the work on a piece of scholarship. 
WEST: Are you going to provide examples like in the restatement? 
HORWITZ: I think so. 
WEST: Okay, but what would an example be of something that should be 
disclosed? 
HORWITZ: That the project is funded by a particular group, to take an easy 
one, I guess, that the person has filed an amicus brief in this case.  Not that 
they’re simultaneously gaming the system, but let’s say they’re analyzing a case 
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where I filed an amicus brief in this case.  Those are the kinds of standard 
disclosures that might be relevant. 
FRANCIS: The third disclosure was any data sources.  So, the way social 
science journals—if you collect the data, the raw data are available. 
SCOVILLE: It might also be useful to reference the value of more 
substantive forms of candor, not necessarily process candor like most of the 
issues we’ve been talking about so far.  In other words, candor about 
uncertainties regarding the implications or the strengths or weaknesses of a 
piece.  Candor about counter-arguments obviously.  That sort of thing. 
WALD: Does that fall under candor? 
OLDFATHER: It is kind of related to the humility point. 
SCOVILLE: So, where would you put it? 
WALD: Well, I’m reminded of Stanley’s point at the beginning of the day 
that “you just do the work.”  Not engaging with likely critiques of your own 
work, not anticipating them, not responding to them to the best of your ability 
would simply constitute weaker, poor scholarship.  A good scholar would 
anticipate and respond to reasonable challenges, as part of what we referred to 
earlier as subject matter exhaustiveness and competence.  The “geographical” 
location of this argument, if you will, is not candor.  It’s about doing the work 
and doing it competently. 
HORWITZ: It would be Rule 1.1, right? 
WALD: Right.  The issue is one of competent legal scholarship, unless by 
candor you mean to revisit strategic exhaustiveness.  
OLDFATHER: In some respects, are we not, here, defining what constitutes 
competent scholarship?  It is candid.  It is exhaustive.  And I think with respect 
to the disclosures we might borrow from the securities laws and use the word 
materiality, the concept of materiality. 
FISH: Not only is acknowledging and anticipating objections an important 
part of doing the work: It’s a wonderful teaching tool because, as you know, 
I’m sure all of you had the experience of realizing that some of your students 
don’t know what an argument is aside from thinking it’s a quarrel of some kind, 
and have one way of talking about it, and therefore, have difficulty in knowing 
how to organize the presentation.  And one way is to teach them the “I-know-
what-you’re-thinking” move, meaning at this—which, more formally, is “at 
this point someone might object that,” you know, which is not only an 
obligation under the heading of exhaustiveness and perhaps of candor, but it’s 
a wonderful way to facilitate the unfolding of your argument. 
SELIGMAN:  Chad, I’m not sure that good scholarship is the same thing as 
ethical scholarship.  I think that there’s a Venn diagram in which they overlap 
and we would probably all like to be in that overlap, but I’m not sure that as I 
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have heard you define the project today that the project is to make 
recommendations about how to have quality scholarship so much as to have 
ethical scholarship. 
OLDFATHER: The implications for our definition of candor being? 
WALD: Stanley offered a compelling example earlier.  Once you author 
something, it’s out there and you no longer have control over it.  You could 
adhere to the best ethical standards, produce a piece of scholarship that you 
stand behind ethically and then down the road it’s being used for very bad 
purposes.  As a scholar, you would not be accountable for the manipulative uses 
of your own work. 
OLDFATHER: It can certainly just be horrible scholarship and be 
completely ignored.  And I agree with that. 
SELIGMAN:  I think what I was responding to particularly was the piece 
about figuring out what all the objections to your argument might be and 
building them in.  I don’t see that as a point of ethics, I see that as a point of 
quality. 
HESSICK: Well, I see that as a point of ethics.  I think that it’s one of the 
things that distinguishes, I think, legal scholarship from legal advocacy is that 
you actually make the case on the other side and then, in light of the case, have 
to argue why you nonetheless don’t think that that’s correct.  And I should 
qualify that by saying and sometimes you don’t do that.  If you’re doing an 
empirical project all you’re doing is acknowledging the shortcomings but it’s 
really important that you do that.  I do think that that’s ethics.  And it’s true.  
Sometimes we say, “Oh, this isn’t a good piece of scholarship because” but I’ve 
heard other people describe it in terms of, “This person wrote this paper, they 
know there is this other argument and they did not talk about that.”  And that 
wasn’t just a lapse in quality, I think we would say it was a moral lapse. 
HORWITZ: There’s the distinction though: One can sloppily, 
incompetently fail to spot.  One can carelessly, incompetently omit a counter 
argument.  One can knowingly and deliberately omit a counter argument and it 
seems to me the intent to conceal or avoid the fact that there is an authority or 
an argument that you know exists is an ethical problem.  The first is just 
something to be judged as poor scholarship. 
SELIGMAN:  I think we may be at the point of disciplinary difference, 
because I’m not sure that historians would feel quite as strongly as clearly the 
legal scholars do.  And we might hide it in our narrative anyway, glossing over 
the problems.  But it sounded to me in what you said like the legal scholar has 
a responsibility for imagining all objections to that scholar’s points.  And then 
writing about it and including them.  But what if they didn’t think of them? 
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WEST: No.  I think the objection is to the decision.  I’ve seen this in 
colleagues’ writing—and I hope not in my own—in consciously deciding not 
to address a counter argument that you know full well is out there and you don’t 
include it and address it because you don’t want a court to pick it up. 
SELIGMAN:  And I wouldn’t object, I wouldn’t argue with that point. 
HESSICK: And I don’t care about why you don’t address it, I care that if 
you don’t address it, that’s a problem. 
SELIGMAN:  So, you would say it’s okay for the scholar not to think of 
everything and that there to be room for some other scholar to move in later on 
and think of this? 
WEST: Yeah, of course. 
HESSICK: That’s right. 
BOOTHE-PERRY: For purposes again, and a lot of what I’m saying at this 
point aren’t really my views, but I used to serve as a rapporteur, so I’m trying 
to formulate in my mind how a code or something would look.  So, tell me what 
you said again because I just got so caught up in making sure you knew these 
aren’t all my views.  When you were just talking about— 
SELIGMAN:  That a person can think of something and you wouldn’t call it 
unethical if they didn’t think of everything. 
BOOTHE-PERRY: I was saying, maybe we can put this under the 
thoroughness or the exhaustiveness section because if you do exhaustive 
research you know what the counter arguments are, just thinking, “Oh, I wonder 
what there could be,” but it’s actually that you’re aware of counter arguments, 
not just imagining. 
SELIGMAN:  I think you might need the word sort of consciously in there. 
HESSICK: I agree. 
OLDFATHER: Should we move to exhaustiveness then?  Having exhausted 
candor.  And I think there we have on the table the notion of having explored 
all of the criteria, inputs, whatever, within the subject matter.  We had a 
proposal that there was then non-law exhaustiveness and strategic 
exhaustiveness and a suggestion of a good faith related standard here.  Also, a 
proposal that thoroughness be a better word or in any case the word reasonable 
be appended to either of them. 
FRANCIS: I don’t know that this is quite on exhaustiveness, but you brought 
up the example of the article in the lesser law review not cited.  And I said, 
probably too quickly, “plagiarism,” but I think there’s strategic choices people 
make about what not to cite to make their stuff look more original.  It’s not just 
they don’t want the court to think of it.  It’s that they’re downplaying other 
work or they’re just, maybe it’s conscious suppression of other work in the field 
and that’s problematic.  Another problematic practice in some other fields that 
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I think happens in law is this so-called salami slicing.  You publish five articles 
when it should really just be one. 
HORWITZ: We usually have the opposite problem, don’t we?  Publish with 
a couple hundred-page article which should be in a book or five articles. 
FRANCIS: Yeah, that’s another, well, we have both problems.  But the 
salami slicing one is that you make a whole lot of articles out of, essentially, 
one idea.  And I’ve seen people do that in law. 
WALD: Can you say a little bit more?  What are some possible ethical 
failings in what we refer to as salami slicing?  Is it that you repeat yourself or 
self-plagiarize? 
FRANCIS: Self-plagiarism is something that’s considered unethical in other 
disciplines.  So, copying something you have had somewhere else.  I keep 
having a lot of trouble about how to write this without some reference at the 
front to we’re working in the context of the current landscape, which we regard 
as problematic in many ways.  One of the reasons salami slicing is regarded as 
problematic in the sciences is the way it consumes scarce resources.  And the 
scarce resources consumed include journal space, the expense of publication, 
the genuine involvement of peer review.  Now, in law somebody made the 
comment a bunch of times and it was so wonderful to get to meet you. 
FISH: Well, I’m very pleased to have been here.  Thank you. 
[Stanley Fish leaves] 
FRANCIS: But those resources were sort of infinite.  “There’s always 
another law review.”  Well, I’m not so sure that we should think about it that 
way because a lot of resources go into the publication of the law review.  
There’s the editing, maybe student labor is infinite, but we ought to be 
husbanding our students’ time and not having them work on stupid stuff.  
There’s also the question that it costs law schools time and money to produce 
journals and we kill some trees.  So, I don’t think resources are infinite.  And 
so, I think that’s a problem with salami slicing in law reviews too. 
WALD: Other than self-plagiarizing, which is a significant ethical failing if 
done without proper citation and attribution, what are other examples of salami 
slicing? 
FRANCIS: Well, so here might be an example.  You have a clever tool or 
you know the clever distinction and it can help make sense of three different 
problems.  Well, one way to do it is to publish the little methodology, the 
distinction and problem A and then you do it for problem B and then you do it 
for problem C.  So, that could be one kind of example, when you could write 
an article that is actually a richer article in a way because it shows the 
comparative of how the tool works and another way would be you have a data 
set and you publish this little result from the data set and then you publish this 
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little result, when you could be publishing a more comprehensive account from 
the data set. 
SELIGMAN: Yes, I agree entirely with what Leslie is saying.  When I was 
a junior faculty member, somebody came around on some occasion, was giving 
advice, and this was sort of negative advice, but advice nonetheless to think 
about.  What was the least publishable unit of your scholarship?  The example 
that he gave was of somebody who had written an article in which his research 
had discovered that the favorite color of people with schizophrenia was orange.  
And that was published separately.  And I agree with all of the arguments that 
Leslie made and I would like to just point back toward Ryan’s piece on puffery 
that basically what you’re engaging in when you go with the LPU is résumé 
inflation. 
OLDFATHER: Right, and I specifically recall as a junior scholar having 
people say to me, “It’s always two articles, always make it two articles.  Always 
split it up as much as you can.”  So, I have certainly received similar advice.  I 
want to go back to the example that I had raised of the situation of the scholar 
not citing or, I think probably not even noticing the existence of the prior piece 
that had taken up the same question and analyzed it roughly the same way.  I 
think there are some scholars out there and I’ll mention a name and use an 
example because I think incredibly highly of this person’s work.  If you read a 
piece by Fred Schauer, for example, there are not going to be a lot of citations 
there.  It’s certainly not because he’s plagiarizing, but he knows exactly where 
in the puzzle this particular piece fits.  And I guess kind of expects the 
readership to know it as well.  And there’s really no effort at all to place it in 
any sort of context.  I find as a reader, I’d really like a lot of the time to have 
had it placed in context because it would help me in undertaking the research 
project that I’m involved in to be able to know what’s he drawing on here, 
where does this fit, what are the other things I should be reading.  I don’t think 
that there’s any sort of intentional violation of any kind of ethical norm going 
on there.  And so, I think one of the things to account for in an exhaustiveness 
norm is whether there are circumstances in which it can be waived. 
HESSICK: I want to say that the example that you gave initially about the 
law review article—not mentioning the first law review article.  I think that 
there are two pieces to that.  The first is, “Did the person actually bother to read 
in the area before writing?”  Because, and I guess this gets at subject matter 
exhaustiveness.  Do we have an obligation to be well-read in our field and to 
continue to be well-read in our field?  I think that the answer to that is “yes” 
and I think it’s relatively uncontroversial and I think that that’s a pretty easy 
one.  What I think would be a new norm would be that there’s an obligation to 
signal in the paper how our contribution fits into the existing field.  And this 
pushes back directly on claims of novelty and those sorts of things.  I’m just 
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mindful of the extent to which we’re stating things that people probably agree 
with and things that might be controversial.  So, I think it’s not controversial to 
say we have an obligation to know where the field is and what’s being written, 
especially in an area where we’re going to be spending enough time to write 
something new.  But I think that it would be useful if we came to a norm of 
instead of spending the beginning of our articles saying how different what 
we’re saying is from everything that’s been said before, instead trying to talk 
about the ways in which it’s the same or borrowing.  I don’t see that as 
plagiarism.  I see it, instead, as—it could be a signal of expertise.  I don’t know 
what the other signal would be.  I do think that the number one is 
uncontroversial.  The idea that being an expert in the field includes continuing 
to read, because I think that there are plenty of people who stop reading at some 
point. 
FRANCIS: You know, plagiarism can be straight out copying, obviously.  
But if the scholar had actually read that piece and it played a role in how he 
structured it, or she structured it and it wasn’t cited, that’s a wrong to the scholar 
whose work was used.  And I think we ought to say that.  I also, maybe you 
said it might have been a research assistant.  And another point we haven’t 
made, if I’m a lab supervisor in science and the post-doc in my lab does 
something that involves what’s potentially an unethical practice and I haven’t 
appropriately supervised that post-doc, that’s on me.  So, suppose your RA—if 
you haven’t given your RA instructions about what they’re supposed to do in 
terms of making sure that you appropriately credit other peoples’ ideas, I think 
that’s on you, not on the RA. 
WEST: I don’t know if we should keep walking around like that.  Anyway, 
I just want to agree strongly with the first half of what you said.  I don’t have 
views on the second half, but on the first half, I think that’s completely right.  
And I do think that it’s worth saying because my sense—and it’s completely 
speculative—is that people may be aware of the existence of an article, may not 
have read it carefully, but they look at it, “It’s in this rinky-dink law review by 
somebody teaching at rinky-dink law school, I don’t need to bother, and more 
credit to me if I can present myself as the first person to say this.”  But I do 
think it’s very hierarchy driven.  I also think it’s got a gender and a race 
component, not that we need to go down that road.  What gets cited and what 
doesn’t is a problem and it’s an ethical problem. 
OLDFATHER: Should we, in our 30 seconds remaining here, talk about the 
last piece, which is our obligations with respect to the mechanisms of 
scholarship, the law review process.  Or have we fulfilled the exhaustiveness 
norm for the day?  I guess, we will then pick up again in the morning with that. 
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DAY TWO 
A. Session Five: What Have We Missed?  Additions and Modifications 
HORWITZ: All right.  So, first of all, let me—I guess on behalf of 
everybody, express our thanks for a lovely dinner last night and your 
hospitality. 
 And again, we’re delighted to have our friends from the Law Review here.  
So, the title of this session is “What Have We Missed?  Additions and 
Modifications,” and prior to that, off-transcript as it were, there were 
discussions about the nature of—and I think unsurprising question—but the 
nature of the enterprise, specifically what the lead document that we foresaw 
would look like.  And I think that’s a valid question.  It’s certainly something I 
know that Chad and Carissa and I worried about along the way.  And so, a 
couple of people have specific comments about that and before I kind of give 
the floor to them, I’ll say a couple of things.  Yesterday, there was some talk 
about restatement versus code versus aspirational principles versus something 
else.  In other words, the format—having a document, agreeing that it starts 
with a document—but what the format should be, so that is very much I think 
on the table.  Our assumption, I think, had been that it would be valuable to 
have some kind of document, not because we expect that it would perfectly 
capture the exact sentiments of everybody in the room, or because we think it 
would be taken as a document that people would then use, but because it would 
be good, and also unusual for conferences, to come up with a discussion, to a 
document that could be used to provoke further discussion.  So, we do our best 
to come up with something, we comment on it, eventually a journal like the 
Journal of Legal Education, for instance says, “Look, here’s this document, 
we’re going to reprint it, solicit views.”  So, it is a starting point for 
conversation.  In that sense, we expect it to be imperfect, but I think there are 
valid questions about doing it or how to do it.  And the second thing I’ll say is 
that I think—although everybody has done admission tickets, done papers, 
certainly—at least in my view and depending on space and so on, at least it’s 
always been my view that dissents, partial concurrences, commentaries on 
reactions to are also valid ways to respond to the imperfections of a document.  
And so, I ask you to keep that in mind, as we think about how it might be done, 
not done, restructured, and so on.  
FRANCIS: I agree with you that it’s really important to have a document.  
My question has to do with what kind of document and at least as a start, I 
wanted to suggest we think about drafting something that could look like best 
practices or guidelines or something like that, rather than either a model code 
or a restatement.  And I’ll just flesh that out a little bit.  It’s much more in 
keeping with what you would see in other fields.  So, if you get on the website, 
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for example, of the Committee on Publication Ethics, you will see documents 
like that.  You’ll see them for authors, you’ll see them for journal editors, you’ll 
see them for publishers, you won’t see them in the form of a model code or 
model rules, or restatements.  So, it would put us more in the family of 
publication and how this kind of thing is done.  Second, I have some specific 
concerns about a model code, which is, first of all, the question about obligation 
and aspiration, that’s one piece of it, but secondly, when you promulgate a code, 
you assume somebody’s going to adopt it, that there will be an entity that enacts 
it like a legislature.  So, I’m curious about what enacting entity we have in mind, 
for a model code.  Is it going to be law schools?  Is it going to be law journals?  
And if so, what kind of enforcement authority will any of them have?  With 
respect to a restatement, it’s super controversial what the role of restatements 
are.  Are they recommendations?  Or are they what they initially purported to 
be, restatements of law?  So, as for a restatement, I have a question about what 
we’re restating.  So, those are my more specific—if we were to produce a best 
practices document, or, if I lose on my little contrarian rant, I think if we do 
anything, the best thing we could do, that could go along with any of these, is a 
model document of instructions for authors, that law reviews could put up on 
their website, and it could be a template, it could say something about how you 
submit and then there could be some suggested alternatives for law reviews, 
like directly to the law review or to some Scholastica or whatever.  There could 
be instructions for authors about what you may or may not do after you get an 
offer.  You know, there are all the kinds of topics [such as], “What information 
you can send us?  Do you send us your CV?” for example.  And law reviews 
could make choices.  And actually, another piece of my slightly contrarian 
suggestion is that I think the three of you [speaking to Marquette Law Review 
editorial board members] should be up at the table, helping us to think about 
what would help you, if you’re going to be either the enforcers, if it were a code 
of some kind, or if you’re going to want a document of instructions for authors 
to have up on your website.   
HORWITZ: Let me say, first of all, I don’t want to impose on you at either 
a distance from the table or coerce you to the table, so to speak.  [Speaking to 
Marquette Law Review editorial board members] You are very welcome to sit 
in and participate in the session.  If you prefer, kind of to be there, because 
you’ve got work to do and you’re thinking about how this all looks, I 
understand, but you’re welcome to participate and to interject.  
WEST: Okay.  Maybe we could all have a contrarian rant.  I won’t just 
repeat what you said that I agree with, but my main reservation about the way 
we proceeded yesterday is that we didn’t seem to pick up what strikes me as the 
two major problems facing legal scholars and facing legal scholarship, 
particularly as I hear them voiced by new entrants to the legal academy and by 
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candidates and by my own fellows.  And the first—we don’t have to go on and 
on about this, because there’s a huge body of literature on this now, but there’s 
skepticism and outright disbelief, both in law schools and outside of law 
schools, about the value of legal scholarship.  As I said, it’s coming from both 
inside the legal academy and outside the legal academy.  Schools that are in 
precarious financial straits are seriously considering cutting way back on 
scholarship, meaning cutting way back on what they expect or demand or even 
allow of their law professors in scholarship.  Others are talking quite explicitly 
about eliminating all together the mission of legal scholarship or eliminating 
legal scholarship as a part of the mission of the law school.  Rather, the mission 
is to train lawyers and to do so in a way that prepares them for law jobs—legal 
scholarship doesn’t contribute to that—and therefore, we shouldn’t be paying 
for it.  It’s a luxury, if people want to do it at home in their spare time, they’re 
free to do so, but it’s not part of their job.  So, even if it’s brief, I would think 
some code or some aspirational statement should say something that amounts 
to an argument, it could be no more than a paragraph, about why legal 
scholarship should be part of the legal academy’s mission and say something 
about the mission of legal scholarship.  So, that’s the first thing, that if we’re 
really writing a code about legal scholarship and I think it would be the best to 
defend the value of the enterprise, because it is under attack.  That’s a little 
different from other parts of the academy, where the academy’s also, of course, 
under attack, and in a defensive posture, very broadly speaking, but legal 
scholarship in particular, I think, is under attack because it’s not obvious what 
the point of the whole thing is.  And then the second problem that I still feel we 
haven’t satisfactorily addressed is the distinctiveness of legal scholarship 
definition.  Much of the conversation yesterday, that worked toward a definition 
of scholarship, would work as a general definition of scholarship.  If we looked 
at what is distinctively legal about legal scholarship, my own attempt to do so 
is to say something like, “Except for the interdisciplinary work, legal method is 
at the heart of legal scholarship,” and I explained that in terms of an orientation 
toward justice rather than simply the truth in knowledge.  Maybe there’s a better 
way to explain it, but my idea, just having read this stuff and written some of it 
for three decades is that normative legal scholarship is still most of what legal 
scholars do, it’s not all that different, in method, from what lawyers or judges 
do, except to the degree of it borrows from disciplines.  But what the legal 
method of legal scholarship is not only different, but for two dimensions, 
disinterestedness—it’s not done on behalf of a client or an interest—and depth.  
And so, depth and breadth I guess.  But anyway, when I talk to fellows, new 
entrants, junior faculty and even J.D. students with an academic orientation 
toward law, that’s what’s expressed sometimes with a real sense of panic—
people coming into the academy who don’t have Ph.D.s in other disciplines—
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coming in as J.D.s, plus a clerkship or plus a fellowship.  This is what they 
worry, worry, worry about, “What is my method?”  What do I say to 
appointments committee when the person says “Well, what’s your method?”  
“Do I have one?  I don’t know, but what is it?”  And again, I think we should 
address that.  The other thing about the code, what’s the response to well, “Who 
are you?” addressed to all of us.  And so, I wonder what the claim of authority 
of this group is and should we address that?  Should we just say at the outset, 
“This is intended to begin a conversation about what our aspirations should 
be?”  If we wind up with an aspirational statement, or what the code should be 
if we wind up with a code, inviting not just comments but inviting the beginning 
of a conversation toward this thing.  And then lastly, I’ll say, I think the Journal 
of Legal Education would be quite interested in participating in this. 
HORWITZ: So, roughly speaking, I want to give everybody a chance to 
weigh in on this general question, and either it will emerge organically or I’ll 
kind of make sure it’s there, the second part to the question will be, “What to 
do about it?”  That’s to say—assuming we come up with either a consensus 
about what some document should look like or not quite agree to disagree—but 
we do our best to reflect these things in a document imperfectly, what are good 
ways to respond to that?  And to acknowledge these broader questions.  And I 
will note that I’ve been trying to think as we go—and one thing is I assume 
there will be an “editor’s introduction to the symposium” and I think one of the 
things that the introduction will do is contextualize the document.  That is to 
say, “Here is why we thought it was worth doing, here is our lack of authority.   
We hope to start a conversation, we think it’s valuable to have a document to 
do it with, and receive it in that spirit, why it’s different from or not a code,” or 
what have you.  So, some of this can be addressed there, not all of it, and I just 
want you to keep that in mind.  But I hope that the three of us are extremely 
responsive to these concerns and that whatever happens again, given our 
discussion yesterday, we try to be open about them in print, so that people can 
understand and make reasonable judgments about it.   
WALD: The type of statement or document we end up producing should 
take into consideration who we are trying to reach and how we expect our work 
product to be used.  Is our audience individual law professors?  Deans of law 
schools?  Roof organizations like the Association of American Law Schools? 
Yesterday we talked about the tradeoff between drafting rules of conduct 
and a restatement, and I suggested we keep in mind that the former are designed 
to guide practice and protect vulnerable constituents whereas the latter usually 
focuses on codification of existing law.  Another aspect of the tradeoff is 
promulgation and enforcement.  The Model Rules of Professional Conduct start 
as a model drafted by the American Bar Association.  Then every jurisdiction 
contemplates and adopts a version of the model, usually in a process involving 
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its state supreme court.  The process is important because by the time the rules 
are adopted in each state they have been vetted and have considerable buy in 
from the regulated.  After the rules are adopted they become state law and 
enforced by a disciplinary agency.  In contrast, restatements are published by 
the American Law Institute.  With that in mind, if our desire is to one day simply 
publish a statement that informs the conduct of individual law professors, then 
a restatement format might be appropriate.  If in contrast we’d like to 
promulgate rules that may be adopted by the AALS and by law schools, we 
might want to circulate our work product widely and get buy in from affected 
constituents akin to the process entailed in the Rules’ promulgation and 
adoption. 
I also want to completely second and join Robin’s other two points, in terms 
of the importance of acknowledging in our text the value of scholarship and 
exploring what might be distinctive about legal scholarship.  As we do that, we 
should be mindful of the charge of lawyer exceptionalism.  On the one hand, 
when we talk about the distinctiveness of legal scholarship we need to do that 
without being perceived as engaging in a form of legal exceptionalism, that is, 
saying that there is something unique about law professors as opposed to other 
professors and something special about legal scholarship as opposed to other 
forms of scholarship, unless we mean it and can explain the uniqueness.  On 
the other hand, if we are going to say something about the distinctiveness of 
legal scholarship, for example, its inherent commitment to justice, I’d like us to 
say something substantive and meaningful and avoid platitudes.  One thing I 
dislike about the Rules of Professional Conduct is that they lead off in the 
Preamble with high rhetoric about justice stating that “A lawyer is a 
representative of clients, an officer of the legal system, and a public citizen with 
a special responsibility to the quality of justice,”24 only to then essentially 
abandon justice infusing it with little substantive content in the body of the 
Rules.  I’d like us to explore legal scholars’ commitment to justice meaningfully 
and avoid such empty rhetoric.   
HORWITZ: So, two quick points.  One is why—the initial restatement 
idea—the way it came up, and some of it is, so to speak, “marketing value,” 
that it’s a clever way to frame it, that might draw attention in a different way 
than another code or best practices.  What it turns out to be, in fact, is kind of a 
different story, but I think that’s one reason we thought about it in those terms.  
And the second is, again, I just want to—not that it is unimportant to focus on 
what the document contains, you’re all here, you all have a stake in it—but I do 
want to also say introductions, and commentaries are also places that can 
 
24. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble, cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
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contextualize, and to say, “We have a paragraph about justice in here, it is 
important that it be in there, here’s why it’s important.”  So, there are ways to 
address some of these that might be outside the document, although again, I 
think this discussion about the doc so, have an intervention?  I want to make 
sure everybody gets a chance, editors included, if you would like it. 
FRANCIS: I want to make sure that if we say something about justice, we 
do it in a way that’s not perceived as having a certain political slant, that’s the 
risk of it.  An alternative would be to say it is in some way or another, 
scholarship without law.  If you’re writing about the circulation of the planets, 
you’re not doing legal scholarship, if you’re doing something about how we 
ought to think about the law for outer space, you are doing legal scholarship.  
So, it’s more a topic area than a direction of a point of view. 
WEST: Yeah.  I’m just trying to characterize what other people call internal 
legal scholarship as opposed to external.  External legal scholarship is 
scholarship about law; internally, the scholarship participates in the legal realm 
of this and that is doable, and that’s what I think is distinctive about legal 
scholarship is well, a lot of people call it not scholarship at all, I don’t think we 
should do that. 
FRANCIS: I guess I’ll just push back on that because I think we want to 
cover both internal and external legal scholarship. 
WEST: Right.  And so, sure, we can say, “It’s all scholarship about law in 
some sense.”  It just doesn’t seem to me to capture the kernel of it, that internal 
scholarship is scholarship that adopts a legal method for one thing.  That is not, 
I think, all that different in kind from lawyerly writing except for 
disinterestedness and depth and what is it that all of that legal writing does?  It 
aims toward justice.  I don’t want to use a loaded term, I certainly don’t want 
to use an overly politicized term, and you always have to drop a footnote saying, 
“I’m not talking about social justice here,” and so it could be aiming toward 
legal justice.  I don’t know, I completely acknowledge the problem, but I would 
like the document to be written in such a way as to not take a stand on this, I 
think, quite divisive and damaging issue about this legal scholarship, isn’t really 
legal scholarship.  I think we should embrace both, there is so much of both and 
so, I’m just looking for a way to do that. 
HORWITZ: Can I just ask, as a question of interest—I think I know the 
answer.  Let’s say appearing in the Journal of Empirical Legal Scholarship that 
there is a piece on settlement rates by jurisdiction, just pure data, no 
conclusions.  I take it that it would called legal scholarship? 
WEST: Yeah, that’s true. 
HORWITZ: Yeah, as opposed to some other statistics or some other 
discipline about law? 
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WEST: Correct.  Sure. 
HORWITZ: Yeah.  No, I’m not surprised to hear that but wanted to ask.   
WEST: No, I don’t know where the question was coming from because 
again, what I want to do is be inclusive of those two very basic types of 
scholarship that appear as legal scholarship in journals—to referee to not 
referee, to peer or not to peer.  The bulk of articles that appear in law reviews 
are not of that type you just described, that you just gave an example of.  It’s 
more like, “This circuit is right and that circuit is wrong and here’s why and 
here’s a bunch of legal reasons for it.” 
SCOVILLE: Two points.  One is that I agree with Leslie that the 
“restatement” term in particular seems problematic; it just seems inaccurate 
because there’s really too much of a blank slate on the matter of scholarly ethics 
for that term to describe what we’re doing.  It’s also inaccurate in the sense that 
the apparent plan seems like it will be too prescriptive to constitute a 
“restatement.”  The second point is that it’s a little unclear to me how we’ll be 
adding to or improving upon draft codes that already exist. 
WEST: I have just a quick one.  I know I’ve talked too much already.  
Another way to get at my point would be just to use Dworkin’s phrase, that 
much of legal writing in law reviews, as well as judicial opinions, is aimed at 
making the law the best it can be, and so your empirical piece of it suggests jury 
deliberations, et cetera, would redeem them, but this piece about, sort of, 
[indiscernible] that’s problematic. 
HORWITZ: Thank you for the comments.  Particularly the question, again, 
whether the restatement term is inept.  Let me ask, plus comment.  I think the 
Dodson, et al, point is a valuable one and I hope the journal doesn’t mind adding 
depth, numericity, and volume to a discussion even where it’s been broached 
before, but certainly if it is mere recapitulation, that is a separate question, so 
that is food for thought.  And let me ask do you have—you don’t have to—but 
do you have a proposal or a suggestion about what you think the right kind of 
title would be?  I understand that it depends on what the document is, but do 
you have views on that? 
SCOVILLE : Well, just by process of elimination, taking off “restatement,” 
taking off “code,” it seems that something like “draft principles of scholarly 
ethics” might be best. 
BOOTHE-PERRY:  I actually echo a lot of Leslie and Robin’s thoughts, so 
I won’t repeat a lot of those.  My concern with having a model code is the 
enforcement and the consequences, the ramifications, if you don’t abide by the 
code who is going to police that.  And thinking of a different way to frame it, I 
know that there are best practices, but there aren’t specifically best practices for 
legal scholars, with specificity.  I was thinking about MacCrate, when 
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MacCrate came out with lawyering skills and values and it started a huge 
conversation.  I don’t know if that was the intent when MacCrate got together 
and drafted that, but maybe if we could have something similar to that.  So, 
using maybe Ryan’s terms about maybe “principles and scholarly values” with 
“best practices,” combine a lot of it, because I agree with Robin particularly 
with younger scholars, they don’t know what to do, where they’re going, where 
to start, and there needs to be some guideline and certainly there’s literature out 
there, but how many of them are going to look up a law review or articles that 
specifically discuss how I’m supposed to go about with these scholarly values. 
So, I think there is great value in having a document, a source of reference, at 
this space, particularly with, as Robin has pointed out, people are questioning 
what’s even the value of legal scholarship.  Well, it’s valuable and we know 
that it’s valuable because the values we have that make it valuable, so— 
HORWITZ: And let me add to that if you’re thinking about audience.  One 
obvious possibility, if you’re thinking about who do you mail the 
complimentary issues of the symposium to, who do we follow up with via email 
and personal contact, the AALS New Law Professor Conference is an obvious 
thing to think about.  Let Dean Kearney secure yet more sources of great wealth 
and then every new law professor will get a copy.  On the principle that the 
most important are first, do you all want to add anything?  Not obliged, but 
welcome to. 
MICHAEL ANSPACH: Along the lines of what Professors Francis and 
Scoville brought up, a “restatement” to me doesn’t seem to make a lot of sense, 
because the question is, “What are we restating?”  I really like the idea of the 
guidelines, especially for me, as Editor in Chief.  I came in here, I had to make 
my own guidelines, which is to say I made my own rule to live by, which is, as 
I mentioned yesterday, to do what’s in the best interest of the law review.  No 
one told me that, it was just, “I’m going to take lawyering principles, and that’s 
going to direct my conduct.”  However, for a predecessor of mine a few years 
ago, this individual’s idea of best interest was to have the most pages in our law 
review history.  And this person may have done that, but if that is what one 
considers to be the standard to live by, then what standard is it, for what 
qualities in the paper and that sort of thing.  So, like I said, it is a standard that 
I’ve kind of put upon myself, but it would be nice if I had that off the bat, 
someone said to me, “Your job as Editor in Chief is to do what’s in the best 
interest of the law review,” and every time I have to ask a question of what do 
I need to do, that’s the first question I ask myself.  But it’s something like that, 
that I don’t know that every Editor in Chief or every editor asks that question.  
And just having guidelines that set that up, on the editorial side, I think would 
be very helpful for me and law reviews everywhere, in terms of what the quality 
of the work is, and what their goals are in putting out the best possible volume. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3217300 
CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPT 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/18  9:24 AM 
1176 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:1083 
HORWITZ: So, I thank you.  Hesitate to remind you that at the end of the 
day, you wield a red pen, maybe not the only one, but a red pen, do not get 
drunk with power.  So, let me kind of feed it to the organizers or just—and 
briefly what should we do about it and then again, what have we missed. 
HESSICK: I think a lot of people have said a lot of really important things 
here and I don’t want to wait until what is a code versus what is a restatement 
and I want to ask what maybe is just a super obvious question, which is, when 
we say something like “best practices,” are we saying, “We would hope that 
people would do this, it would make for a better scholarship if people did this?”  
Or are we trying to set norms?  Are we trying to say, “We should all be doing 
this and to the extent that we’re not doing it, it’s a shortcoming?”  It’s not just 
that it wasn’t as good of scholarship as it could have been, but that we perceive 
there to be a flaw in the scholarships, that we don’t just judge as a matter of 
quality?  An ethical floor.  Although, I think, implicit in this discussion about 
whether it’s a restatement or whether it’s something else, is that we’re not just 
articulating norms here, we’re also trying to shape them, so maybe the phrase, 
“draft principles” is appropriate.  I’m not sure, because I don’t know what 
people usually say, what they’re trying to say is to both articulate and to shape 
norms, and I think that that’s where the value comes, because I think a lot of 
the principles that we’re talking about tie into problems that people are 
complaining about now: the puffery, the claims of novelty, methodological 
questions, whether there has to be methodological rigor and doctrinal 
scholarship.  It’s important for me, for us to keep in mind that if this is about 
articulating and shaping norms, that I think that we want those norms to extend 
to everyone, so I like Robin’s intervention about talking about scholarship in 
terms of both what it’s about, but also in terms of—it’s about rigor, it’s about 
depth, it’s about legal method.  We’re not leaving people out then.  And then 
we just have to make sure that when we’re saying what we think the norms 
ought to be, that it sweeps as broadly as possible.  I’m comfortable saying that 
pedagogical scholarship should be disinterested, and I like having a really broad 
definition of scholarship, to try to say that these norms should apply across all 
of the various points. 
HORWITZ: I’ll say given that I’m at least self-identified or card-carrying 
pluralist, I obviously agree with a lot of what’s said.  The goal is not to read 
people out of the legal academic profession in the first instance, and so I’d 
rather be broad as well.  And this, I think, goes to the first part of your statement.  
There are kind of three things we can say, again, whether they’re said in the 
document or elsewhere, and one is there is a large amount of perhaps 
unacknowledged or un-explicit consensus that something—that people have 
concerns, and that this is not limited to people on a particular methodological 
or ideological or prescriptive path, it’s a wide-spread concern among law 
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professors.  And second, that maybe more than one would acknowledge, there 
are a lot of things that everybody can agree on.  Not everything, but there are 
probably a number of things where the reaction would be similar across, again, 
internal and external and so on, and that is important.  And the third, I think 
is—although again, one can acknowledge, to the extent that there are deeper 
disputes, it is a good thing to argue about it, and I think that really leads to the 
third point—the value of a document and a symposium on this subject is to have 
a document and a discussion, physical or I guess, electronic corpus, that says 
law professors are worried about this, need to be explicit about it, need to bring 
that discussion out into the open and try to figure out where the agreements are 
and where their intentional differences lie.  And in other words, the usual large 
statement, that this is not a perfect document, but we need to have a discussion. 
OLDFATHER: Just to sign onto a lot of what’s been said, and really to pick 
up—in particular, I think what Carissa, was saying—I’m persuaded to the 
position that something less concrete, less prescriptive than restatement or 
model code is an appropriate approach, to the “draft principles” sort of idea, the 
idea of being much more explicit about it tending to start rather than conclude 
any sort of conversation.  I think, in part, that has to be the large part because 
this is really a norm driven activity, a norm driven profession.  Certainly, as an 
associate dean, one sees that a substantial number of law professors are not into 
rule following in any sort of precise way.  
I think as well, and this—this is a point—I’m going to give Ryan a lot of 
credit for, we talked about it at dinner last night, that we could at least think 
about acknowledging what might be a root cause of some of the behavior that 
we are here talking about, which is that it is also a profession that is almost 
ridiculously status conscious.  So, that you can take Stanley Fish’s—you know, 
Yale talks only to Yale—I mean, it really is sort of one of those “Lowells speak 
only to Cabots, and Cabots speak only to God” type situations, to a large degree.  
And that drives, I think, a great deal of the pathological behavior that we see.  
I think that the context in which it is taking place has also shifted 
dramatically since when I entered this profession to now, largely as a result of 
the advent of electronic submissions to law reviews. 
WEST: Wait, what do you mean?  
OLDFATHER: Maybe I overstated the point, but it has certainly changed the 
game of legal scholarship in substantial ways, I think, to have gone from a world 
in which the almost physical limitations placed on the submission process made 
it much more difficult.  You couldn’t easily send a piece to 100 journals, 
because that meant somebody had to make 100 copies and stuff 100 envelopes 
and there had to be 100 separate cover letters printed and signed.  And on the 
journal side, it was physical manuscripts coming in.  There were fewer of them 
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and so the process was easier to manage, there was a greater likelihood that 
things were getting read, there was less of a felt need to rely on proxies. 
HORWITZ: Were there abstracts when you were reviewing? 
OLDFATHER: I don’t recall abstracts when we were looking at the physical 
pile of paper, and we had a process by which every single piece was read by at 
least two people, and I just don’t think that happens anymore because I don’t 
think it can happen, realistically. 
HORWITZ: All right.  And I definitely will suggest, by way of, structure—
I think everybody’s had at least one shot in, and let me say, in addition to that, 
I will try to take a quick round.  I guess a combination, because of time 
constraints, of what to do about it but also because some of these, I think, have 
already been that, what have we missed.  And I know that Francis might want 
to weigh in, for instance, on SSRN and the point that Chad just brought up, 
possibly, possibly not, but yeah, go ahead. 
SELIGMAN:  Just weighing in with a point of process, since I didn’t know 
until yesterday what a restatement was, I’m actually pretty neutral on what you 
call the document.  But it might be worthwhile to think of it as writing 
something that’s draft or preliminary, and to think about what a follow-up might 
be, so you might plan that there would be a larger conference of people who 
respond to the symposium and the statement, and get something a little bit more 
permanent at that point. 
FRANCIS: First of all, I really love what Ryan said as a way framing it, and 
I think we can link that to what Carissa said.  Because when you draft principles, 
some of them can be obligatory and some of them can be recommendatory.  So, 
I would suggest linking those two together and going along those lines.  
Secondly, I brought up the role of SSRN and it might be worth our just thinking 
about it a little bit because I think it does several things: One is people can post 
stuff on SSRN and try to preempt, in a way, so before you actually had 
something, go through any kind of review process, you can stick something up 
on SSRN and expect other people to cite it, which might or might not be 
pernicious.  So, it’s essentially a self-publishing vehicle and it can undermine a 
bunch of what else goes on.  Second, I think SSRN can undermine journals in 
a funny way.  You know, a lot of journals in other fields, you’re not permitted 
to publish until the journal publishes.  That’s the policy of Science.  So, if you 
give a paper at a professional meeting then Science will no longer publish it.  
Now, that’s good and it’s bad.  I mean, it’s good because it gives a special pride 
of place to the fact of journal publication, but it may hinder the sharing of ideas.  
So, SSRN has the advantage of the sharing of ideas, but some of those 
disadvantages.  I also worry that any time the journal holds the copyright, it’s 
very hard to put something up on SSRN except the abstract.  So, if I publish 
something in a peer reviewed publication, where the journal holds the 
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copyright, I—before it went through the editorial process, but still it’s not the 
official copy in a way, and I think that skews, in some ways, what people cite 
and potentially devalues peer-review publications over stuff that’s coming out 
in law reviews.  I also worry for you law review editors whether—my personal 
policy is I never put anything up on SSRN until it’s out in the journal, because 
that way people can cite to the actual journal page numbers and so on.  But, if 
somebody puts it up on SSRN before you have gone through it, it’s just as likely 
to get cited to the SSRN as it is to the journal, depending on when something 
comes out and the result of that is that you guys get less in the way of credit.  
So, I think in law, SSRN has kind of had a pernicious effect, but I don’t know 
whether people use SSRN in the same way I use PubMed and I use Glosser’s 
Index and I use other sources when I’m looking for work in other fields, and I 
use SSRN when I’m looking for work in law, and I think that skews what I see 
and is problematic. 
HORWITZ: So, if I can, comment and then pass it along.  I’m always a big 
fan of means of production analysis and in the legal academic profession, 
combination of means of production, technology, norms, which are largely, 
kind of, ungoverned.  These two working together, and then the “go-ahead” or 
“get-ahead to go ahead” kind of spirit that sometimes prevails in a credentialist 
and/or ambitious academic profession can have bad combined effects or under-
examined effects.  So, for instance, Chad and I were speaking about the 
lamentable absence of book reviews in many of today’s law journals.  Book 
reviews are not cited as often and that’s one reason they don’t appear as much, 
even if once upon a time, if you were thinking about what a book looks like, an 
issue of a journal, it would make sense to have different kinds of content.  
Moreover, SSRN generally does not treat book reviews as part of the main 
body, so if you want your downloads to count, then don’t write a book review 
or call it something else and hope that it squeezes by the SSRN review process.  
These are unobserved influences and incentives to act in a particular way, right?  
Also, again, questions about workshopping for instance, whether you present 
the half-baked paper because that’s when you can actually learn and therefore, 
the peer review is real, or whether you present the polished, “already-through-
the-editorial-process” paper for purposes of looking fancier when you’re in a 
room full of strangers, or if you’re thinking about lateral hiring and so on and 
so forth.  Lots of determinants of behavior—to my mind, all the more reason 
therefore, even if we want some structural remedies, all the more important to 
have law professors educated and steeped in thinking about the ethics of 
conduct, so that they can negotiate these things with something more than 
advice about what it takes to get ahead, right?   
SCOVILLE: I agree with part of what you said, Leslie, but I’m a little more 
comfortable with the posting to SSRN before publication, in part because, 
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insofar as the draft that you post is, as far as you’re concerned, complete, and 
insofar as law review editing is largely stylistic, there will often be no material 
difference between the version that goes up on SSRN and the version that 
comes out in press.  In those cases, pre-posting to SSRN doesn’t seem all that 
bad.  In addition, my impression is that authors typically submit to law reviews 
soon after posting to SSRN.  I think that also reduces the significance of the 
practice. 
HORWITZ: Unless you’re Larry Solum, in which case, the law review 
article is an ongoing iterative process on SSRN, and I mean that with affection.  
He’s done this great work on originalism that keeps on being a work in progress, 
where we get different versions.   
So, again, everything on this board will graphically, I think, be either 
recorded or included.  Other considerations, other values, things that need to be 
considered or haven’t been or what have you, and this, of course, goes to 
anything, the document or broader discussion issues. 
SCOVILLE : I think we might have dismissed the sincerity issue a little too 
quickly by overlooking some sub-issues.  One is withdrawal obligations: if you 
no longer believe that a piece is accurate, or no longer agree with one of your 
prior conclusions, do you have an obligation to try to remove the piece from 
online sources?  It seems like the answer could be “yes,” if sincerity matters.  
And then also, I think I disagree with my comment yesterday on the importance 
of consistency. 
[LAUGHTER] 
HORWITZ: Well-played, sir. 
SCOVILLE: I think my earlier concern was just that an obligation of 
consistency might be interpreted too broadly.  If you are taking a position at 
point A and then at point B, you take a logically contradictory position without 
any attempt to justify or reconcile the two, that’s a problem.  But I don’t see 
any problems with, for example, publishing an article saying that under an 
originalist interpretation of the Constitution, the conclusion is X, and then later 
publishing another article arguing that the conclusion is the opposite of X under 
a different modality.  As long as the obligation of consistency is not too broad, 
that’s fine. 
HORWITZ: Well, I wouldn’t say more than fine and I would probably 
add— and I can think of one article where I criticize this—if you have changed 
your mind, you should not do so sub rosa.  I mean, if you have a major work 
out there that says X and then you come along and write Y, and possibly the 
only thing that has changed is the topic under dispute, one would expect you to 
have an obligation to say either, “I changed my mind,” or, “But see my earlier 
work,” or something. 
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SCOVILLE : Right.  And this also goes back to the issue of, “What are we 
adding to the existing draft codes?”  One of them already talks about 
consistency, so do we have problems with the way that the principle has been 
articulated or are we just copying and pasting on some issues—maybe that’s 
okay, I don’t know. 
HORWITZ: Others?  Again, this can cover a pretty wide variety of what 
have we missed initially, and it’s also what else would you want to say before 
time’s up? 
OLDFATHER: So, one point, as I was going through things yesterday, that 
we might not have talked about.  We did discuss some ideas about the form of 
discourse, I guess treating one another respectfully in our interactions.  But I 
think there’s another point to consider, and this is one that Dan Farber makes, 
encouraging a greater willingness to engage critically with one another, right.  
So, I think there are problems in two respects there, and we spoke about the 
first, but not necessarily the second, which is that there may not be enough 
critical interaction with other people’s work, and that that sort of interaction is 
actually a significant part of advancing the scholarly enterprise. 
SCOVILLE: I mean, that’s sort of a product of an over-emphasis on novelty, 
isn’t it?  At least in part.  You’re not viewed as doing sufficiently novel work if 
you’re simply responding to the work of others. 
HORWITZ: Other additions? 
HESSICK: So, I’ll just say, I think that Ryan’s probably right, that part of it 
is because we want to come across as novel, but I also think that might be 
because the respectfulness norm isn’t well entrenched enough that—I will 
definitely admit that I have worried about engaging with particular people 
because they don’t have a reputation for—I’m going to go with politeness—I 
would rather use the colloquial word there than anything else.  But, I think that 
Chad’s right, that those are two sides of the same coin and maybe if we could 
increase the sort of “respectfulness of tone,” it might encourage people to 
engage more critically or more substantively.  I like the word substantively 
better because I think critically has a connotation of maybe being less polite.  
But I also want to say, and this is just circling back to something we talked 
about briefly yesterday, I think it’s worth saying the things that are not 
scholarship, but then to also make clear that we can nonetheless have certain 
obligations for our non-scholarship behavior, in which we identify ourselves as 
law professors, and I think that we can do that briefly; it doesn’t have to be a 
big part of the code, but I think it’s worth saying that these particular norms 
exist, in part, because we’re professors and not just because of the enterprise 
that we’re engaged in.  I mean, I think that they apply maybe with less force or 
that there are other countervailing considerations, for example, when we teach, 
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but we nonetheless care about a lot of these things, in all of the roles that we 
perform. 
HORWITZ: And as I said yesterday, that is certainly a huge hobby horse for 
me in part because of what I see as the general increased phenomenon of trading 
on authority, of using one’s status as a legal academic and the authority or cache 
that that gives one—to push ideas—ideas that are not always entirely related to 
or in the best practice of one’s legal academic status.  So, whether it’s done in 
a document or noted in a document as an important issue, and then I know a 
couple, at least, of our pieces that expand on it is an open question.  I’m glad it 
will be dealt with; I think it is important, how it’s dealt with.  I’m more catholic 
on. 
BOOTHE-PERRY: Just a quick comment.  We touched on this a little bit 
yesterday, but when you’re sitting in the choir, you don’t think about the people 
who just came to the church because somebody dragged them here, and they 
don’t really know why they’re here.  And when I teach or I write or even when 
I present on professionalism, a lot of times I’m preaching to the choir.  It’s those 
individuals who understand why there is a need for professionalism in the legal 
profession, but there is a whole percentage of individuals who think, “Why do 
we need it?” like, “Why should I care? why should this matter?”  And so I think 
we need to address in our document, whatever it is, “Why should you care about 
having some ethical standards or ethical principles for your scholarship?  Why 
does it matter?  Is it just because of the status of being a law professor or is it 
because we have some social contract with society?”  But I think we definitely 
need to include in there, for the non-choir members, why this should be 
something that they should be talking about too. 
HORWITZ: And let me say, one of the responses I’ve gotten, particularly 
privately, and I know I mentioned this in my contribution, when I raise these 
kinds of concerns on the blog or in-person or elsewhere is, “You don’t need to 
worry about this or that or make a disclosure about this because everybody 
understands what’s going on,” let’s say talk about the professor’s letter, or the 
amicus brief, where people have signed on, where they may not actually agree 
with propositions or whole pages in an amicus brief and so on and so forth.  The 
answer, I get it, “Look, everybody kind of understands this,” or the op-ed thing, 
“Everybody knows that you’re just trying to be persuasive and doing it in 800 
words,” and so on.  And I get this, especially, I think, this is just annex data, but 
I get this especially from people higher up in the hierarchy.  So, I worry about 
that.  I certainly worry about it if it’s the whole explanation, and there’s no best 
practices, agreed upon practices, et cetera, as a background.  I also think that 
people who are in a small and select discussion either are thinking about only 
the people in that discussion or are making too many assumptions about what 
everybody outside knows and whether everybody’s in on the game and so on.  
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Especially where the audience is law clerks, some of whom have been mentored 
and tutored by these people in the so-called realities of the game and some of 
whom haven’t, and so on and so forth, or if the audience is the public or the 
media.  Also, even if they’re right that everybody knows, I’m not sure why 
living with, accepting—encouraging the cynicism is the right way to proceed.  
But this relates to, I think, something that Nicola said, which is a word that I 
want to at least throw out, not least because of the location where we’re holding 
this conference, is the idea of vocation.  It’s not quite antiquated but not a word 
used with frequency these days.  I would like to think that one ought to have a 
vocation to be a law professor or at least treat that work in vocational terms; 
“calling” may be putting it strongly, and I don’t think it is for everybody.  I 
would like to think that one thinks it is a necessary and sufficient reason for 
thinking about the ethical obligations of being a law professor or a legal scholar, 
that this is your profession, but also your vocation and so you ought to want it 
to be undertaken with a sense of the larger goal in mind or the larger ethic in 
mind, and it’s not easily codified, but it’s a word that I would like to at least 
have kind of on the record. 
FRANCIS: When you were talking, I thought of something that I’m not quite 
sure how to formulate, because I think what you said is super important and we 
talked a little—part of the vocation of a law professor is that we’re teaching law 
students and we’ve talked a little bit about how some of the obligations of the 
professoriate are to mentor folks as journal editors and not to be mean to them 
and not to be rude.  Here’s what’s sort of an inchoate thought and I don’t know 
quite what to do with it, but are there ever circumstances in which authors could 
do things that put journal editors in a context that could actually harm them, 
and what might those look like and what are our obligations to protect them?  
And by harm, I mean not just that their dealing with somebody who’s being an 
asshole, but that they’re dealing with somebody who might put them in a 
position of having to sign on to something that could harm them professionally 
or make them feel deeply uncomfortable morally. There’s a concept of moral 
harm.  I’m trying to think of some of them but it could be a situation in which 
it’s not just that the author is being rude to you, but you think that the author is 
cheating in some way, and you might be implicated in that cheating, and the 
journal has accepted it, but then the author might come back and bite the journal 
in some way or another or, well, I’ll leave it at that.  It’s speculative because I 
don’t have great examples, but I worry that there might be situations like that 
and we need to be very clear that law schools should step in. 
HORWITZ: And if one digs through Westlaw—two things.  If one digs 
through Westlaw, one can find some histories of retractions and things of that 
sort, so if you’re failing in your obligation of thoroughness, of course, you’re 
also putting the editor at risk.  And one last thing I’ll note about novelty or 
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originality means of production, the fact that many of the law reviews only exist 
in easily searchable form on Westlaw elected from 1980 is a further structural 
aspect, at least where people don’t go and do thorough print research.  That 
affects the novelty question.  Mark Tushnet has a great piece in the Supreme 
Court Review—a few years ago, reviewing a couple of articles from the first 
issue, I want to say, of the Supreme Court Review—I could be wrong about 
that—but from an early volume, and he talks about how many times he’s seen 
these points come up since then in subsequent articles without those earlier 
articles being cited.  Some of that is a function of, again, the way electronic 
resources work.  Let me give it to the Carissa for the last word on this session, 
and then a break.   
WEST: I was just going to say that there’s a role for the advisors to refuse 
to intervene and perhaps the student should be more cognizant of their right—
not just an obligation—but their right to rely on the law review advisors to add 
this media and mediaries and as advisors in those instances. 
HORWITZ: All right.  So, let’s take a break, refuel, recharge and then have 
the last session.  And thanks to everybody for a very productive discussion. 
 B. Session Six: Final Session 
HESSICK: Should we go ahead and get started?  So, this is our last session 
and, in a fit of practicality, I’m wondering how much progress we can make 
towards securing this sort of document; so I’ve outlined, I think, not necessarily 
the structure of the document itself, but a few issues that I think it would be 
worth seeing if we have consensus on, or a few issues where we need to make 
a decision or at least make some progress on a decision.  And wow, did that 
sound like an academic-sane thing to say—if we can’t make a decision, can we 
make some progress on a decision?  I’ll use that at my next faculty meeting.  
So, I’m not sure if it’s the first thing that we want to deal with, but something 
that obviously came up in the last session is the idea of what the document 
would be titled.  I think that Ryan’s suggestion of a draft statement of principles 
seemed to resonate with a number of people, even if it’s not their first choice.  
I like the word “norms” in addition to “principles,” but I wonder if anyone 
would prefer to call this a restatement or do we want to call it something like 
“a draft statement of principles” or “a draft statement of norms.”  Do people 
have strong feelings about this?  Or do we put a pin in this and come back later? 
Does that sound good to everyone, should we call it draft principles and 
revisit?  Does anyone want to voice doubt about draft principles?  Draft 
principles, it is, woohoo!  I guess the good thing about putting this last is 
everyone’s like, “I’m tired.”  Okay.  Then, I think, we have a question of 
introductory paragraphs or paragraphs that sort of set the stage.  I agree with 
Paul that there should probably be some sort of editor statement, so I guess the 
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question is which ideas do we think are important enough that they need to be 
in the statement itself and which could be a sort of editor’s type statement?  The 
two that I wrote down as possible candidates for the document itself are the 
importance of scholarship and then why we need scholarship ethics. 
FRANCIS: This is just a research ethics question.  You were using the word 
“editors.”  I think we need to have a brief conversation about who are the 
authors and to be entirely honest, I am happy with either the three of you being 
the co-authors with the rest of us being footnoted as participants.  I’m also 
happy with the possibility that we’re all co-authors and the recognition that that 
means that we all bear equal responsibility for everything from drafting to 
editing. 
SELIGMAN:  I just wanted to say that I don’t think I should be an author, 
though I’m happy to be listed as a participant since it’s so far outside my field, 
I don’t think that I can authoritatively sign on to anything.  It’s humility. 
HESSICK: Anything else on this question? 
WEST: Well, I think you’ve reached—you should get a pride of authorship 
and I’m happy to be signed on as a participant, and that’s assuming that you 
actually do write it. 
OLDFATHER: Come up with something? 
WEST: Good. 
HESSICK: Okay.  I’ll have to say honestly when it came to the statement 
itself, I didn’t imagine there being authors for the statement, that the editors’ 
preface or whatever it is, mentions that this was a conference and that these are 
the people who participated, we organized the conference, here is a document 
that grew out of the conference, but not that every participant in the conference 
necessarily signed onto it in toto, but maybe that’s a crazy thing to think. 
SCOVILLE: The only argument for including more authors is that it may 
help with notoriety.  For better or worse, a publication with the names of people 
like Stanley, Robin, and others at the byline will attract more eyes than one that 
doesn’t have those names.  We may not like that, but I think it’s the reality.  So 
if the point is for this to be influential, it might be worth adding more authors. 
HESSICK: We’re doing this in part to counteract sort of the role of hierarchy 
and prestige. 
[LAUGHTER] 
HESSICK: People with better places in the hierarchy and more prestige. 
[LAUGHTER] 
WEST: Well, you might want to wait on this until you see what the work 
entails. 
HESSICK: Good idea.  I’m happy to put a pin in it. 
FRANCIS: Yeah.  And I don’t have an answer. 
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WEST: No, I don’t either. 
FRANCIS: I mean, what I was going to say is I don’t have an answer—I’m 
happy with whatever you all and all the participants feel comfortable with, but 
I think you all, because you’ve done so much work to convene it, have some 
kind of special role in that. 
HESSICK: Okay. So, we’ll go ahead and— 
SCOVILLE: I agree with that, by the way. 
HESSICK: Pardon? 
SCOVILLE: Yeah, I’m not trying to upset anyone. 
HESSICK: We’re not and I love that you said it.  It was [indiscernible] and 
some truth.  Okay.  So, let’s leave it for now, but I think Leslie’s right, it’s 
something that we need to think about.  In addition to the importance of 
scholarship and why we need to have a conversation about scholarship ethics, 
is there anything else that we think belongs in this sort of introductory statement 
to the statement itself? 
SCOVILLE: Yes.  Chad made a comment in the last session about some of 
the underlying causes of the pathologies we’ve been talking about.  It might be 
good to mention some of those in the preamble. 
HESSICK: Anything else?  I was once told by a trusted colleague, you have 
to count to seven in your mind before you move on.  Ryan? 
SCOVILLE: Purposes, broad goals, including what we hope to achieve with 
this. 
FRANCIS: Who’s our audience? 
WEST: Now, I’m counting with you. 
HESSICK: I know, right.  You’re like, “Think I’m already at eight.”  You 
got to go Mississippi.  Okay.  So, then I think from there, we move onto the 
definition of scholarship.  And I want to hear from people about the—did you 
have something to add? 
BOOTHE-PERRY: I’m actually—I know you counted and you waited and I 
shouldn’t go back.  Just the document title—it’s not just going to be “draft 
principles,” right?   
HESSICK: “Of Scholarly Ethics” or “Scholarly Norms,” that’s right.  Okay. 
Thank you.  So, in terms of the definition of scholarship, I think this is 
something that we talked about a bit this morning, I’ll weigh in pre-emptively 
to say that I really like the idea that came out in some of the admissions tickets 
about—that there has to be sort of substantial analysis, there has to have been 
substantial labor that goes into scholarship.  I also really liked Robin’s points 
from earlier today, that would both include interdisciplinary scholarship, but 
would also make clear that legal method is not just a legitimate, it might also 
be the predominant methodology of legal scholarship.  And you made one more 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3217300 
CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPT 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/18  9:24 AM 
2018] CONFERENCE ON THE ETHICS OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1187 
point about—that it would include clinical scholarship, I think that that’s right, 
yeah.  Do we all have additional things to add beyond that?  I’ll write down 
really quickly what I—and please, feel free to disagree with me.  Analysis and 
labor, inter-disciplinary and legal method, and then I think an explicit nod to 
inclusiveness. 
FRANCIS: I think that it needs to include what Robin was calling both 
internal and external legal scholarship and it needs to do so in such a way that 
it embraces work of all political walks and points of view, so it’s not—we need 
to be very careful to be non-ideological—how do we frame it. 
HESSICK: I guess, I should also add, we did say about specifically 
excluding—I’m so sorry I was not paying attention—explicitly excluding 
amicus briefs, op-eds, those sorts of things, so— 
SELIGMAN:  So, actually, I was going to address that.  I wanted to just 
remind you that yesterday I suggested a typology of things that could count as 
scholarship, that might be worth listing explicitly.  And then throughout this 
conversation, I’ve been bothered by the term “non-scholarship.”  It seems to 
me like there should be some sort of positive expression of what that other stuff 
is.  Even if it doesn’t count as scholarship, it might be useful to have a list of 
whatever the positive name of “non-scholarship” is and say, “These are all 
legitimate activities but we’re not counting them as scholarship for purposes of 
this conversation.” 
WEST: Such as blogs.  This is a big issue.  Right. 
HESSICK: It is an issue. 
OLDFATHER: Just as a point of departure, here’s what AALS, somewhere 
in its standards, defines as within the scope of scholarship “covered activities 
include any published work, oral or written presentation to conferences, 
drafting committees, legislatures, law reform bodies and the like, and any 
expert testimony submitted in legal proceedings.”  It seems to me we’re doing 
something broader than that, the— 
WEST: Wait, that’s not scholarship or that is scholarship? 
OLDFATHER: That is scholarship. 
WEST: Oh, I think the scope is going to be narrower. 
OLDFATHER: Well, it’s both broader and narrower, right, if we’re willing 
to include things like blog posts.  I think there are two dimensions to this.  There 
are—there’s the field of the forms it might take and then there’s the component 
of it that starts to lead us into candor and neutrality and originality and so forth, 
such that one could, I think, write a blog post that advances a new idea and does 
it in a relatively exhaustive way, and so forth, that could count as scholarship, 
even though that’s not going to be the meat and potatoes of what scholarship 
means. 
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WEST: Okay.  Again, I would just raise a red flag here.  I think it’s 
important for us to define scholarship for purposes of these ethical norms or 
some other way to put it, and remain neutral on whether these different kinds 
of forms are in some absolute sense scholarship because it’s a hot button issue 
at a lot of schools what to count, what not to count, for purposes of tenure and 
promotion and they just can’t weigh in on that.  I don’t think we want to. 
FRANCIS: Yeah, I think that—just to second that.  I think it’s very important 
that we make it absolutely clear we’re not weighing in on that and we could 
even drop a line to the effect that the AALS may list different things and maybe 
doing that precisely for different purposes. 
HESSICK: Okay.  I want to flag that there’s disagreement here and I think 
that we might be able to craft something that both says that there’s legitimate, 
I think, disagreement about whether blog posts, op-eds, comments submitted to 
administrative agencies, expert testimony, whether these things count as 
scholarship or whether they are ways of furthering scholarship.  And I think 
that we can simply say either, “We’re not going to take a position on this,” or 
“We ourselves don’t necessarily agree on a particular position.”  Either way. 
FRANCIS: So, I think the critical thing to do is to say that we don’t think 
the same ethical norms necessarily apply to them, because if you’re doing an 
amicus brief, or if you’re trying to persuade a legislator, to go back to what 
Chad said yesterday, you start with the outcome and how you frame it and the 
ethical norms that go along with that might or might not—I just don’t want to 
take a position on the norms of advocacy—be quite different from the ethical 
norms that apply to what we’re really focusing on, which is what you publish 
in more standard sources, like law reviews. 
HESSICK: I’ll say, quite frankly, this is something that I struggle with 
because I think that something could both not be scholarship and yet we could 
have professional norms that people could violate when they engage in it, under 
the auspices of their expertise as a law professor, but I’m not sure that this is 
the document to get into it.  Maybe the answer is—in light of circumstances, it 
may be fluid—the amount to which they apply. 
OLDFATHER: And I should say, I’m okay with bracketing these other 
things.  I think maybe this is something for the introductory paragraph, to 
explicitly note that we are speaking about only a certain variety of scholarly 
activity or scholarship or—it would be phrased better than that—that we believe 
that some of the same sorts of ethical norms that we are articulating here apply 
to other things that academics do in their capacity as academics, but that there 
may be differences that we’re not specifically addressing. 
HESSICK: Did you want to add something, Ryan? 
SCOVILLE: No, I was just agreeing. 
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HESSICK: Okay.  Do we think we’re good with the definition of 
scholarship, both trying to capture, I think, variation in methodology and types, 
but then also not try to take position on the blog post/amicus debate without?  
Okay.  I don’t know that this will be the structure at the end of the day, but I 
thought it made sense to try to separate out the individual principles or the 
individual norms that we wanted to talk about and then have article placement 
as a separate issue to comment on, but I understand that people might not agree 
with that approach.  In some ways, I think that that might help to answer Ryan’s 
concern about whether we are simply repeating Dodson & Hirsch, because I 
read what they were doing as very explicitly about article placement process, 
and I think, from my perspective, our project is much broader—and it may bear 
on behavior during the article placement process, but that might also be 
something else to think of.  I’m curious about your thoughts on that, Ryan. 
SCOVILLE: Well, I think my comment was inspired not just by the Dodson 
& Hirsch piece, but by the others as well.  There’s a collection of pre-existing 
draft codes, so I think we need to account for that in deciding what we put to 
paper. 
HESSICK: Does it make sense to start talking about individual principles, 
Leslie? 
FRANCIS: Okay, if you’re going to go for that. 
HESSICK: Are you sure? 
FRANCIS: Yeah. 
HESSICK: Okay.  Again, not that we’re agreeing on format and structure at 
this moment, but in my mind, at least, the idea that there could be conflicts of 
interest, sort of “un-consentable” conflicts of interest if you wanted to think 
about it in Model Rules of Professional Conduct terms.  And then also sort of 
conflicts that ought to be dealt with in disclosures, so sort of hint at the fact that 
there might be some situations where writing an article would be unethical and 
then other situations where there would be an obligation to make particular 
disclosures.  I mean, what that conflict would be—I don’t know if people would 
agree, but there are some times where an article would not be appropriate.  
Maybe it’s something as simple as when writing an article would require 
compromise with other duties that someone has, such as if someone is 
representing someone and then writes an article in that area, where the article 
would necessarily be limited by those duties, or if there’s a confidentiality duty, 
say because someone clerked on a case or something like that. 
FRANCIS: Yeah, I think those are important.  A thought—this is another 
sort of inchoate thought that I don’t know how to deal with.  We’re talking 
about law professors as authors here.  Law journals often get submissions from 
practicing lawyers as well and whether the same norms apply.  I think one of 
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the things that’s really problematic is if you know you’re going to be involved 
in litigating the case and you write an article, or maybe you’ve even been 
looking to litigate a case, and you write an article that you specifically are 
writing to give your client a litigational advantage.  I think that sometimes 
happens when law firm folks are authors and I wonder whether we ought to at 
least raise that question.  You know, “Are the ethical obligations the same?  
What’s the story for law reviews when we get these?” et cetera. 
WEST: I think we should raise this.  I think it’s a really complicated 
question because there are instances in which people will write an article and 
will say, “I’m writing this as an outline to guide future litigants on my side of 
this issue,” particularly in public interest and I’m not sure that disqualifies it 
from being a scholarship.  I do think that the other extreme, that’s a clear case, 
is when somebody’s being actually paid at the moment as a lawyer and writes 
as a scholar, they’re compromising the roles [indiscernible] as well.  So, I think 
it should be raised, but I don’t think there’s a cut and dry answer to it. 
HESSICK: Let me just clarify.  When I was talking about a conflict of 
interest, which would suggest the person couldn’t write the article, I was too 
trying to limit myself.  I don’t even mean necessarily to paid representation, but 
when someone had ethical obligations that could impede them from these 
ethical obligations such as— 
WEST: Zealousness. 
HESSICK: Right, if they have confidentiality or zealous or zeal-type 
obligations to a client, but I don’t know if people agree with that. 
OLDFATHER: Would it be too broad or too controversial to say that a 
scholar should—a law professor, and I think maybe one way to address that 
issue is just to get our scope provision, say we’re dealing only here with 
scholarship written by legal academics, understanding that other forms of legal 
scholarship present other issues.  But with respect to the specific disclosure 
question, say that a law professor should disclose any information material to 
the evaluation of a piece of scholarship, which sort of inherently incorporates 
neutrality, disinterestedness—any factor that a reader might want to know in 
order to assess the value of this piece as scholarship, whether there is some 
potential motivation or other factor that could be affecting this person’s analysis 
or perspectives, consciously or unconsciously.  I’ve killed the conflicts. 
[LAUGHTER] 
HESSICK: I’m thinking about what Chad said, so I agree with that, and the 
only thing that I would want to add is to the extent that they think that that is 
necessary, in order for people to evaluate whether they’ve complied with our 
obligations, I would just want to make clear the disclosure itself does not 
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somehow lessen their other obligations, but I assume you don’t care if I add 
that. 
OLDFATHER: No, I agree with that. 
SELIGMAN:  I just want to say that I think this question seems to go to the 
point that Robin’s made several times about defining the purposes of ethical 
principles, for what purpose, so that people who are litigators wouldn’t need to 
worry about this in the same way. 
HESSICK: Are we good with disclosures?  Is there anything else that 
someone wanted to add on the issue of disclosures or conflicts? 
FRANCIS: I think we want to make clear that getting money is over the line 
in every case.  So, if you’re being paid to represent a client or if you have a 
grant or a contract with the foundation, whatever, you need to reveal your 
funding sources. 
HESSICK: So, just so that we’re all on the same page, we’re not going to 
say that they can’t write the article, because otherwise there are people who 
couldn’t write their articles, even though I may someday write about how 
ridiculous it is, but it has to be disclosed, I agree.  Financial funded research 
funding has to be disclosed.  Should we move onto candor?  Okay.  So, I know 
we’ve spoken a lot about candor up until now.  Do people—and one could 
arguably think about disclosure as sort of part of candor.  One of the things that 
we’ve spoken about is that people would need to be explicit about the 
methodology that they’re using and explicit about the substantive assumptions 
that they’re making, and I think we also talked about—and that that sort of 
explicitness would probably be worth sort of drawing in the work by Baude and 
his co-authors, whose names I don’t remember.  And that we think that there 
should be disclosure of data sets.  Is that true?  Would empiricists agree with 
that or would they freak out if we were like, “And you need to disclose your 
data set?” 
SCOVILLE: No, I think that’s smart. 
WEST: Well, I know of one instance, that’s become a hot problem.  The 
ALI is putting together a set of proposals about this grand bargain such that—
I’m sorry, give up on the idea of consumers actually reading their shrink wrap 
contracts in exchange for the courts being urged to apply unconscionability 
doctrine more rigorously.  This is on the basis of a large, data-driven study they 
did, which they’re not sharing.  So, I’m just passing these on—a colleague of 
mine is writing a piece about his attempt to say the people who did the study 
have an ethical obligation to share the data because it was based on a study that 
analyzed case results and the suspicion is that the people analyzing the case 
results are getting some of their cases wrong because they think they’re actually 
accommodating a bunch people who coded the cases are not lawyers, and they 
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refuse to put it in.  So, I’m not sure that there would be no push-back if we make 
obvious that people should share their data. 
HESSICK: Yeah.  And that’s worth talking about.  Does that then mean that 
this is not sort of “moral failing,” but instead something that although it’s 
controversial, like we should obviously flag the fact that it’s controversial. 
SELIGMAN: I think if you’re going to make a pronouncement about data 
sets, you need to have an asterisk, because I can think of a bunch of social 
science circumstances in which the data set shouldn’t be public, because people 
have gone through IRB process in which they say, for example, we’re going to 
hold your results confidential. 
OLDFATHER: And on that specific point, we can, I think, track what the 
American Political Science Association says, the provision on data access, 
“researchers making evidence-based knowledge claims should reference the 
data they use to make those claims.  If these are data, they themselves generated 
or collected, researchers should provide access to those data or explain why 
they cannot.” 
WEST: And so, they lose the [indiscernible]? 
OLDFATHER: APSA. 
FRANCIS: Yeah, I think that’s good.  The most relevant ones are either Law 
and Society or the APSA.  We might want to look at Law and Society as well.  
Law and society review whatever they say. 
HESSICK: Let’s see.  I think that when we talked about candor, we also 
talked about two other issues.  We talked about the value or the need to 
acknowledge uncertainty, to the extent that people project more certainty than 
actually exists.  And then we also talked about counter-arguments, but in 
knowing omission of an important kind of argument would be unethical and 
that we all have a duty to carefully try to identify the counter-arguments and 
response to them, so one being a positive obligation and one being a failing, if 
you then have certain mens rea.  Do you folks have thoughts either on the ideas 
of certainty or counter-arguments? 
OLDFATHER: I agree with both.  I think just for purposes of creating a 
record and a solid source to draw on, Dick Fallon articulated a similar sort of 
norm and called it confrontation, that seems to capture these ideas pretty well. 
HESSICK: Agreed.  I agree with you and I felt that way as well, about what 
he said. 
FRANCIS: Yeah, I’m a little concerned with the “you have to reply to it” 
and I think it might be fair to say there are possibilities—there are 
circumstances in which what you would do is you would flag it, but either for 
reasons of space or maybe you just haven’t figured out how to reply to it, you 
would flag the counter-argument without actually developing a reply. 
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HESSICK: I see what you’re saying.  I think that’s been a question—I think 
that in some ways that leads into certainty, and, “Here’s this counter argument 
and I really can’t figure out what to do with it.”  I think that that would satisfy 
it, because the response would be, “I don’t know.” 
WEST: Or, “It’s my next article.” 
HESSICK: Right.  Or, “It’s beyond the scope for the following reason.”  Are 
we good on candor?  Do you think we’re missing anything on candor?  You 
have a look on your face, Ryan? 
SCOVILLE: Well, was this where we had the discussion about candor 
regarding research assistance? 
HESSICK: Oh, it is.  Oh, you know what?  I think I might have that down 
here with attribution, but that’s a really good point.  I mean, attribution in some 
ways is sort of a sub-set of candor. 
FRANCIS: And that’s not just acknowledging your RA, it may be co-
authorship or first authorship. 
SCOVILLE : Can I just say, as someone who’s relatively junior in all this, 
the point at which that sort of attribution or co-authorship is ethically required 
is a little unclear to me.  So, to the extent that you try to verbalize some sort of 
formula on the issue, what would it be? 
HESSICK: I don’t know.  The norms about this have changed over time, but 
it’s unclear—let’s put it this way.  The statistics on co-authorship with students 
have changed over time, but it’s unclear if that’s because there was a change in 
norms or if there was a change in how much work the RAs were doing, or if 
there was a change in the idea that you would help out your RA by giving them 
authorship, so they could go on the market.  I think it’s a little unclear.  I would 
say, I personally—I’d feel comfortable with something flagging the issue to say 
that—and sometimes the work of an RA may rise to the level where co-
authorship is appropriate, if not necessary. 
FRANCIS: I think we could also say some of the kinds of considerations that 
go into that.  So, responsibility for the intellectual content, responsibility for 
drafting, those would be two things that would count in favor of co-authorship.  
Something that we’d count against, saying it rises to the level is pulling all the 
cases, finding sources, but a major contribution to the analysis, that’s the kind 
of thing that in other fields you’d consider co-authorship. 
SCOVILLE: I think there’s some value in being detailed on these types of 
issues in the sense that a lot of the problems seem to arise from the fact that, 
with junior faculty in particular, it’s not that people know the norm and are 
simply disregarding it.  It’s that people don’t know the norm.  They might 
accept that, yes, at some point an RA’s contribution will be enough to warrant 
co-authorship, but I would imagine that few have a firm sense for what the 
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threshold is.  So, it’s an educational document in addition to a norm-
reinforcement document. 
HESSICK: I’d be interested in what Amanda has to say, but I’ll tell you that 
my entirely unscientific impression here is that there is no real norm and that at 
some schools, professors routinely have RAs that write pieces of their articles 
for them.  And if you doubt that, look up the plagiarism scandals that occurred 
in the 1990s and 2000s at Harvard. 
SELIGMAN:  I just wanted to observe that this is a problem that seems to be 
extremely muddled for your field, in a way that is not for other fields, because 
you’re so promiscuously inter-disciplinary.  So, imagine a J.D.-Ph.D. whose 
Ph.D. is the sciences, where the norm is you do a little bit of research on the 
project and you get to be on the nineteen-page list of co-authors for a physics 
article or whatever.  That would be very different from a J.D.-Ph.D. in history, 
where a student RA help is almost never rising to the level of co-authorship. 
WEST: I was going to make a similar point that on plenty of pieces in the 
social sciences someone does much less than what Leslie just described and is 
listed as a co-author and the person who is responsible for the number crunching 
and who may not have conceptualized the idea continues to get authorship.  So, 
I think it’s worth stating what some of the norms are in introducing their work 
and that there isn’t any concrete norm, for paralegal cases that I’m aware of, 
and I know people have very disparate practices on that, and it differs from 
school to school.  I don’t know what maybe more could be said. 
HESSICK: Maybe note the lack of agreement and then flag other areas, and 
maybe even flag this as an issue that we, as a discipline, need to spend more 
time talking about and grappling with, so that we can have clearer norms for 
the fields. 
FRANCIS: In some fields, what has emerged as a norm is disclosure, what 
the relevant contributions were.  And I think it’s Anne Hudson-Jones that has a 
particularly interesting discussion of that in the scientific integrity area and 
basically, it’s a discussion of—it’s you describe what you’ve contributed and 
so in some fields, you’ll actually see a footnote at the beginning of what 
everybody did. 
HESSICK: Do we want to leave attribution and go to neutrality and 
disinterestedness?  Or does anyone have anything else to add on attribution?  
Oh, I guess, I should say, questions have arisen, on whether there’s attribution 
that has to occur beyond for RAs.  Like if you speak to someone and they talk 
to you and they really help with a particular section, or they come up with a 
counter-argument that you hadn’t, do you need to have particular attribution or 
is it enough to thank them in your star footnote?  I have to say, I’ve never 
encountered this being particularly controversial, but what do I know? 
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SELIGMAN:  This is a question about what’s norm in your field.  Do you 
need to disclose or attribute that you’ve presented previous iterations of the 
project at a workshop or a conference? 
HESSICK: I think people often do, but more to show off because there’s a 
sense that it’s you’re indebted to them and it needs to—but maybe I’m wrong. 
SELIGMAN:  Well, that can also be a way of thanking or not (or 
condemning) colleagues for their contributions to your project. 
HESSICK: Okay.  Well, if folks don’t have strong feelings on this issue, 
then maybe we should turn to neutrality and disinterestedness.  I know we 
talked about this a lot yesterday.  I think Chad had a comment that resonated 
with me initially about, “Do you start with the question or do you start with the 
answer?”  But I was actually speaking with Robin at dinner last night and she 
flagged, I think, something that I knew, but wasn’t thinking of, which is, 
sometimes we work on a project because we have very strong feelings about 
something that happened, so we don’t necessarily start—it depends on how you 
might frame the whole starting with the question versus starting with an 
answer—but sometimes we go and we think to ourselves, “That case can’t be 
rightly decided, that’s got to be wrong.  Now, let me try to figure out why.”  So 
it’s almost like you’re starting with the answer and seeking the question.  That’s 
not to say that I don’t think that there’s such a thing as disinterestedness, 
because I do think that there’s a difference.  Me personally here, I’m just 
speaking, between saying “I can feel that this is wrong, I need to try to figure 
out why,” and maybe, “I might change my mind and actually come to the 
opposite conclusion,” and maybe it’s that last bit that matters.  I’m getting some 
positive reinforcement here from Chad.  And maybe it’s that idea that we’re 
trying to capture. 
WEST: So, last night, I was remembering this piece that I’m sure most of 
you have read in which [the author] said judges always start with the answer 
and then they look through the precedent to see if there’s any case that actually 
prevents them from writing the opinion, Posner says something similar in his 
most recent book.  Nevertheless, I think the formulation is fine because of that 
qualification.  I just want to say, disinterestedness, my idea was not so much 
neutrality as it was that there’s a shared legal method between lawyers, judges 
and academics, but the difference, again, is the scholar has the luxury of time 
and depth and breadth, and also that the scholar’s just plain not representing 
their client.  That’s pretty much all I meant, it’s a kind of bare thing.  That’s 
what makes me queasy, frankly, about an ecumenical definition of scholarship 
that includes amicus briefs.  There’s no client, per se, but there’s an interest.  
And my gut instinct, institutionally, is to think of that work as service and not 
as scholarship.  I know that plenty of other people disagree, but that’s where 
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it’s coming from.  I do think of scholarship as something that just can’t have a 
background client, that that’s the difference between the lawyer and the scholar. 
HESSICK: So, I want to hear from other people, but I wonder if open-
mindedness might be part of it though, maybe open-mindedness? 
HORWITZ: Yeah.  So, I think Stanley in particular would have a conniption 
not only—but if we kind of treated disinterestedness as neutrality—while I 
don’t mind terms like “neutrality” or “objectivity” in other areas and I don’t 
treat them as anathema, yeah, I agree.  That the goal is not neutrality as such 
and for me, a lot of it is covered by disclosure, but there are different ways to—
I’m not pushing for that, so I agree on that point, and maybe a different 
conversation—it seems to me that somewhere in-between—I mean, insofar as 
you’re a friend of the court, and insofar, more importantly, as you’re using your 
affiliation with your institution, there may be particular obligations.  But I don’t 
feel it necessary to call them scholarship just to think that the scholar has some 
ethical obligations about how he or she does kind of work. 
OLDFATHER: Just to riff on the judicial intuition point a little bit, because 
I firmly believe in that, as a thing.  I think it’s a valid thing.  I think coupled 
with it though is the phrase you sometimes hear from judges, which is, “It just 
won’t write.”  And so, there’s this habit of mind or a frame of mind that is 
perhaps best described as disinterestedness—is it, “This case is wrong?” or is 
it, “Can this case possibly be right?”  And I think you’re talking more about 
that latter idea.  So really, I’m willing to call that, starting with a question rather 
than an answer, because you approached it with the right attitude of, “I think 
my reaction here is going to prove to be the correct reaction, but I’m going to 
test it.” 
HESSICK: Oh, and I really like that you said test.   
SELIGMAN:  So, from my privileged status as outsider here, I’m hearing two 
entirely different things at work that are intermixed, one of which is about the 
process of scholarship and where does the idea come from?  Therefore, where 
does it head to and whether open-mindedness is salient?  The other thing I’m 
hearing is, is there some real-world consequence at stake, which would be more 
about neutrality, less about open-mindedness? 
HORWITZ: Can you expand on that? Just the last part. 
SELIGMAN:  I don’t know. 
HORWITZ: Fair enough. 
SELIGMAN: So, the first part was clear? 
HORWITZ: Yeah. 
SELIGMAN:  So, the disinterestedness—I think this is the disinterestedness 
that Robin was speaking of, but I’m not positive since I’m not enmeshed in this.  
But it has to do with the person who wants a particular outcome for cases that 
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are currently under discussion and wants to influence the outcome.  I think 
that’s something different from the process by which one gets from point A to 
point B intellectually. 
HESSICK: Yeah.  And, I’ll add the more time I spend thinking about it, the 
queasier I got about the idea that we had to have sort of like a purity of motive 
sort of test.  For one thing, I don’t think it would just accurately describe the 
norms of the profession, but also because when trying to think more about this 
last night, I think where I was, was the idea, as long as people are open to the 
thought, that they are drawing the wrong conclusions, and they are in the 
process, trying to test those conclusions and to test those arguments, and here, 
I actually thought there’s a law review article by Eugene Volokh and he makes 
this point that, as a former computer programmer, he runs test sweeps with his 
theses, like his legal thesis.  My understanding from his explanation of a law 
review article is you try out your code in lots of different ways, to see if it 
actually functions, and so that was sort of what he was proposing people to do, 
to make sure that it’s not the circumstances that are driving the legal argument 
or the legal conclusion that you’re drawing, that that legal conclusion or the 
legal argument would stand on its own in a number of different contexts, and if 
not, why not, and to think that that’s part of what we have to do. 
WEST: Let me just give the hackneyed example.  One might imagine a law 
review article that argues that there should be recovery for tort victims of 
emotional distress even if there’s no touching, and this is against the weight of 
considerable authority saying, “No, there should not be such recovery for 
emotional distress injuries.”  One can imagine a law review article that argues 
that and comes to the conclusion, strongly stated, nothing neutral about it, 
“Yeah, there should be recovery.”  One can also imagine, of course, a brief 
doing the same thing, on behalf of a client.  What I mean by disinterested is just 
that the author of the law review article should not be, also, in the business of 
representing clients in those circumstances, and so then that frees that author to 
treat this subject in more depth, to take on the counter-arguments and more 
depth, and so on.  And the lawyer, who’s got the same basic argument in mind 
and is using basically the same method, is just engaged in a different enterprise 
of representing an interest. 
HESSICK: So, I guess maybe the question then to you, Robin, is do you 
think that unlike the lawyer, the law professor has the obligation to be open to 
the fact that that actually isn’t the right rule to arrive at? 
WEST: Yes.  Absolutely. 
HESSICK: Unlike the lawyer? 
WEST: Correct. 
HESSICK: Okay. 
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BOOTHE-PERRY: An incomplete form thought at this point.  Are we then 
back to defining what this legal scholarship, that these principles apply to? 
Because if you are writing, even though it applies to the law, but it is for 
advocacy purposes or you’re bound by some other ethical constraints because 
of the capacity in which you as the law professor are writing, this doesn’t apply 
to you. 
HESSICK: So, I could be wrong, and Robin should correct me if I am.  I do 
think that we are excluding people who have a client and are writing for a client, 
from the realm of scholarship.  I don’t think that we are excluding people who 
say, “I am writing this article because I think that there are tort plaintiffs out 
there, who could be making these arguments and here’s an argument that we 
could use to change the law in this area.”  I don’t think that this excludes that, 
because we’re nonetheless imposing an obligation on the person who is writing 
that scholarship, that he or she may come to the conclusion that the law actually 
does not support this, right? 
WEST: Absolutely right, yeah. 
BOOTHE-PERRY: Right. 
HESSICK: Okay. 
SELIGMAN:  So, I’m almost thinking, in response to what I’m hearing about 
this dual role, that law professors sometimes have advocacy as part of their 
work.  That should be addressed in a major point, parallel to intro, definition of 
scholarship, and individual norms and principles.  It should say, “Here’s the 
conflicted role and these are some of the consequences: conflict of interest or 
disclosures are different, candor is different, disinterestedness is a problem.”  
To say that explicitly and to say tenure and promotion committees need to 
realize that you’re going to have to parse what somebody does. 
HORWITZ: So, I guess a subject of scholarly interest for me these days is 
the concept of office.  Not in a sense of how to interpret office or trust under 
the United States, although it’s relevant to that, but kind of the idea that 
particular jobs, like judge, like scholar, are an office, and the kind of old-
fashioned sense of the word.  You enter into a particular realm where you have 
particular duties and so on.  And that, I think, is part of how I respond to this 
thinking.  Are you acting in the office of a law professor or acting in the office 
of a lawyer representing a client?  And I’ll say for me, one of the ways this 
plays out is—to add a third, are you acting as a citizen or, in my case, permanent 
resident, but as a civic resident?  And there are ways in which, as I said, I think, 
for democratic purposes, it is valuable sometimes to offer your opinion without 
offering your letterhead because it’s egalitarian and so on.  But, for me, it plays 
out in part in terms of, “How is the person representing him or herself?”  Is the 
letterhead there because it’s the mailing address where you need to send replies 
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to the lawyer or is it there to give weight and authority and say “I am invoking 
the office of the scholar in this work?” What it’s not always doing, but that’s 
how it plays out for me, how it plays out in the document is a somewhat separate 
question. 
HESSICK: I hear what you’re saying, and I actually just wanted to highlight 
one more thing.  I think that in saying that people can write an article in which 
they’re saying, “I want to make this argument because I think advocates might 
be able to make it,” maybe they even have an obligation to do that, as a matter 
of candor.  I don’t know, but, from my perspective, they would not be relieved 
of the obligation of confrontation or of any other obligations of candor as well.  
And I think in some ways, this illustrates the inter-dependency of these values 
and that—it-just-won’t-write idea is one that, by having to go through the 
exercise of confrontation, that’s how we help to ensure open-mindedness as 
well. 
WEST: Just one more quick point.  I like the way Amanda put it very much, 
but I do think we need to drop an asterisk or a footnote or something that we 
are not dictating to schools or tenure committees, what they will count as 
fellowship purposes of tenure.  And Georgetown has a very broad definition of 
scholarship, that seemingly includes letters you write home from summer camp.  
And so, that’s a whole different conversation, right, what should be included 
for purposes of tenure. 
HESSICK: I think that’s right, and I think we should be quite explicit about 
that, I agree with you, Robin.  Is there more on open-mindedness?  Do we want 
to call it open-mindedness?  Maybe even, does it go a little bit beyond 
disinterestedness, that we want to link them together?  I don’t know. 
WEST: I say just try to write it and— 
HESSICK: Okay.  That’s fair.  Does it write?  Is it time to move on to 
exhaustiveness or thoroughness, do we think?  I’ll count to seven really quickly 
as I look at my notes.  Okay. So, I think that when we talked about 
exhaustiveness and thoroughness, we spoke both in sort of general obligations 
that a scholar has, that could arguably, tie into ideas of expertise, in terms of 
their general ongoing obligation to remain engaged and well-read in their fields.  
But I also think that we also said something more specific for a specific project, 
that not only do we have an obligation to treat our topic however we may have 
defined it in an exhaustive manner, but that also, too, we have an obligation to 
canvas what has come before, so that we can try to situate what we’re doing.  
And then, yeah, where that then ties into, do we have an ethical obligation to 
situate what we’re doing and what has happened before, and how that ties into 
concerns that we have about over-claims about originality and novelty.  So, 
again, these things are sort of all inter— 
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WALD: Yesterday I jotted down competence, reasonableness, and good 
faith. 
HESSICK: No, I think that that is helpful.  Competence, reasonable—can 
you talk just a little bit more about—since you wrote those down, what you’re 
attaching to those ideas. 
WALD: An example of incompetence would be failing to identify a 
previously published source directly on point in terms of one’s subject matter.  
Reasonableness entails questions such as how many hours of research must you 
commit to your work, how many cases and articles must you review and in what 
fashion before you say can reasonably say enough is enough?  Must one cite 
and discuss every source ever published on or relevant to the subject matter?  
Can one make a professional judgment call and if so, applying what standards 
as to what to engage with substantively and what to omit?  Finally, there’s the 
issue of good faith.  If you find something in terms of competence and you 
decide to engage with it in terms of reasonableness, how do you do so and what 
do you do with it?  Yesterday, we talked about how intentional exclusion or not 
giving credit when it is due is an ethical fault and an instance of bad faith. 
HESSICK: No, I think that that’s really helpful.  Do people have more on 
exhaustiveness or thoroughness? 
SELIGMAN: Almost.  Something about obligation not to suppress relevant 
sources. 
HESSICK: Right.  So, we have both an obligation to learn about what they 
are, but also an obligation to make sure that we include them or nod to them.  I 
will say, I do have a little bit of a concern about this for people who write on 
issues that come up all the time.  I think Chad’s example from yesterday really 
resonated, because it didn’t look as though the person tried to find out whether 
there was anything that had been written, but I do think that sometimes there 
will be a topic that’s been so well-canvased and the question is how many of 
the 3,000 hits from the JLR database do you read?  How far back in time do 
you have to go with what you’re doing?  Do you have an obligation to look for 
law review articles that aren’t captured on those electronic databases?  I’ll say 
I don’t think that that’s the norm of the profession. 
HORWITZ: No. 
BOOTHE-PERRY: Just to address that point really quickly then.  That would 
go to Eli’s point about reasonableness and, somebody said it yesterday, 
reasonable exhaustiveness.  I don’t remember, maybe it was you that said it, so 
I really liked that.  On the thoroughness, the politeness norm that we’re talking 
about and the willingness to accept and to give criticism of other scholarship, 
would we put that under thoroughness or would we put it under candor?  The 
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principles are so inter-related, but I think—I didn’t see it on the board yet, so 
wanted to make sure we didn’t forget about that. 
HESSICK: No, I think that’s a really good point.  And if we’re talking about 
engagement, and that we need to have substantive engagement and we also have 
to worry about tone, it’s a fair question about where to put that on that list, we 
don’t have it up there on that list at all, it’s not—I agree, we need to remember 
that. 
FRANCIS: Carissa, I really like the way you pose those as questions and I 
think, to the extent we’re doing this as informative, there’s room in this 
document for some things that don’t take a position one way or another, but say 
in considering reasonableness, these are some of the things you might want to 
think about, because that really gives guidance to your fellows and folks like 
that.  I also don’t know where we want to bring up and I’m still a great 
proponent of peer review, and I think we sort of gave up on peer review, in the 
sense that we thought law reviews aren’t going to do it, but we also talked about 
the way authors can do it.  So, maybe it’s remembering that scholarship is not 
a lonely process and that while peer review has a great deal of—we recognize 
the problems with our field, we also recognize the problems that peer review 
has, but some of the advantages are that the potential for getting neutral, if it’s 
done in the way in which you mask your identities mask, getting neutral eyes 
that are expert eyes, and I think we need to talk about—somewhere, that needs 
to be on the table.  Engagement of other scholars—attempting so far as possible 
to help—to move the quality of your scholarship in the direction of the kind of 
quality you get from peer review.  I’m not quite sure how to phrase it but I don’t 
want it to be forgotten. 
HESSICK: No, I think it’s a good idea and I just—in light of what Nicky 
just said and what you just said, I’ve added to the board that maybe what we 
have here is an independent norm of engagement that includes solicitation of 
feedback or review of one’s own work.  So, did I see a hand up here? 
SELIGMAN: So, much as I agree with you about the value of peer review, 
Leslie, the way you described it sounded to me more like an argument that about 
quality rather than ethics, so I would sort of put a pause there.  But I’ve also 
noticed that there was a series of issues that have come up over the course of 
the past couple days.  I think we’ll get to article placement, but also about the 
world of law reviews, that suggest a whole separate document, a separate 
statement of some sort is needed, which is not identical with this project, but is 
tied up to it. 
HESSICK: Yeah.  And I’ll add—maybe we can disagree about whether the 
solicitation of feedback or engagement is in itself the norm.  I think it might be.  
I’ve certainly had conversations with people where they say, “Look, you have 
a draft that’s criticizing someone else’s work, it is appropriate to send it to that 
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person, to ask them for their views.”  And Cass Sunstein is not going to write 
back, and that’s fine, but for other people, you have an obligation to send it to 
them, so at the very least, they can push back on how you’re characterizing 
what they’ve said and that it is considered poor form to publish something 
without having engaged with the person first.  I don’t know if other people have 
had that experience or share that view, but I have to say the idea that you have 
to give somebody an opportunity to at least respond to how you’re 
characterizing their work, I thought that that was a fair criticism and I now try 
to observe it. 
FRANCIS: That’s actually something you wouldn’t be expected to do in 
many other disciplines.  The peer review process would take care of that 
because presumably the peer reviewers would have read the views of the person 
you’re criticizing and would say, “You’ve mischaracterized Jones,” or, “You 
left out something really critical for the Jones’ line of argument,” and because 
Jones is going to come back and give you potential garbage, Jones isn’t neutral 
either. 
SELIGMAN:  Carissa, I just want to push back at you a little bit because this 
conversation makes clear to me that norms and ethics are different, right.  You 
can have an unethical norm. 
FRANCIS: Yep. 
HESSICK: Maybe.  I agree, I think puffery might be a norm at this point. 
WALD: There’s a way to share your work with people you criticize and 
with those you agree with.  A scholar needs to but also should want to share 
work with both to improve the quality of the work. 
HESSICK: That it’s a failing if you don’t do it, that it’s instead something 
that can help further some of these other values or these other principles. 
WEST: Okay.  That’s all well and good, but it doesn’t really get to Leslie’s 
point, which is that the peer review process is a gatekeeping role and that there’s 
nothing comparable in the law review process in terms of peers doing this.  And 
you send it to your friends, you send it to people you’ve discussed, you send it 
to people you’ve criticized who might get back to you, none of that is blinded 
and none of it is just genuine peer review, so I don’t know if we want to take 
the bull by the horns and say something about that, or if we don’t.  It seems to 
me the threshold question is, “Do we want to address this or do we not?”  And 
then we can talk about what we have to say about it. 
HESSICK: How do people feel about me putting that here with article 
placement—article placement/peer review, and we take it up in just a minute 
after we—I don’t think that we have much left to go through, for the individual 
principles, does that sound good?  Okay, great.  So, sincerity made a bit of a 
comeback this morning, I just wanted to flag that.  I remember Ryan said a 
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couple of things.  Ryan mentioned the idea of a duty to withdraw and—oh, there 
was one more thing that he said that I’m—oh, and consistency—a duty to 
withdraw and consistency.  I have to say, I thought that the duty to withdraw, 
that it not happen sort of sub rosa, I don’t know whether we would be 
identifying a norm that exists or identifying the fact that sometimes people do 
it and when they don’t, they ought to.  But I thought that one in particular was 
certainly worthy of consideration.   
OLDFATHER: This is another one of those instances where I was going 
back through the notes I had taken and found that Dick Fallon characterized it 
in a little bit different way that I think it’s helpful and I think I agree with it.  He 
identified a principle of trustworthiness and here I’m quoting, “Which demands 
that she sincerely believe all of her claims or arguments and that she state them 
in ways not intended to mislead her readers about their relation to other 
arguments or evidence.”25  Which isn’t quite sincerity, although it’s a piece of 
it. 
HORWITZ: I don’t know what it means in this context to sincerely believe 
in one’s arguments.  First of all, the second point that Ryan made, which he did 
under the rubric of sincerity, I see as potentially falling within kind of integrity 
or candor and so on. 
HESSICK: Which was the second one, again? 
HORWITZ: The second one with consistency.  The first one, the duty to 
withdraw under certain circumstances.  I guess I’d also view as it doesn’t have 
to be made as a consistency argument.  The point is valid, but I’m not sure we 
need a new slot, so to speak, to put it there and I would think more in terms of 
good faith, thoroughness, some of the values that we’ve talked about, even 
again, candor rather than sincerity—at least I don’t think we need to—can’t 
speak for Stanley in his absence by relabeling it as sincerity, but I’m happy to 
hear everyone. 
HESSICK: Amanda? 
SELIGMAN: So, I’m actually troubled by the notion of a duty to withdraw.  
It strikes me as unrealistic and maybe even undesirable.  If you want to have 
something like that, I might call it like a duty to reconsider.  I can imagine the 
scholar who wrote something that twenty years later, they don’t particularly 
agree with anymore, but they also have moved on intellectually and they’re 
exhausted by that and putting on them a duty to withdraw or even to write an 
article rebutting what they wrote twenty years ago strikes me as something 
that’s simply is not going to happen.  What if they change their mind after they 
retire? 
 
25. Fallon, supra note 1, at 240. 
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HESSICK: Robin? 
WEST: I completely agree.  I’m not sure there’s a duty to retract or 
withdraw a piece if you come to change your mind, you might change your 
mind again, and you may think there’s value in the article, even if you no longer 
agree with it, and that there’s something to be said for letting it be.  You thought 
it at one time, so I would soften that anyway.  I do think it’s worth saying 
something about this because sincerity so clearly contrasts with our lawyer 
sense of consistency or lack of obligation to consistency or even to believe 
everything you say.  I mean, there’s that famous Daniel Webster line about 
argue in the morning for one side and the afternoon for the other side, and that’s 
a clichéd observation, but it’s one that’s routinely fed to students, anyway, 
about lawyers.  And so, I just think there may be something worth saying along 
these lines.  Again, not a consistency over time, but a sincerity with respect to 
arguments made before [indiscernible]. 
HESSICK: So, in sort of Fallon’s trustworthiness vein? 
WEST: Yeah, I like that. 
HESSICK: Okay. 
FRANCIS: In another field, if I discover that I miscalculated my statistics, I 
have an obligation to let the journal know. 
WEST: That’s different. 
FRANCIS: And if I discover that I inadvertently omitted 20% of my dataset 
and when I recalculate it, it comes out differently, there’s an obligation to let 
the journal know.  I’m stewing about whether there’s an exact equivalent of that 
in law, but, certainly, if I’m doing empirical legal research, it would seem I 
have an obligation to meet some of those standards.  It would also seem to me 
that, suppose I make a claim like there are no cases on point.  Now, of course, 
there might be later cases, but suppose I realize that my Westlaw search, I got 
bored and I omitted twenty cases or my RA reported to me that searching  
everything in the Westlaw database up to a particular point in time, and then I 
later learned that the RA had been in a fight with a significant other and lied to 
me.  I think I have got an obligation to let journals know those kinds of things. 
WEST: I think that’s right.  I just don’t think it’s—I think when we overstate 
it. 
FRANCIS: Oh yeah, I want to be really careful not to overstate. 
WALD: Not to add to our can of worms, but when I asked Ryan yesterday 
about scholarly consistency, I had something totally different in mind.  Not 
whether scholars can over time change their minds in published work, but rather 
the phenomenon of legal scholars testifying as expert witnesses and 
contradicting in court their own published work, or at least testifying in a way 
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that is useful to a particular client but not entirely consistent with their published 
work.   
HESSICK: So, I know Amanda raised her hand.  I do want to flag—maybe 
the duty to withdraw, at least it appeared to me to be the most important, if 
people are, sort of, sub silentio contradicting something that they had said 
before, that maybe part of the duty of candor that’s also related to this idea of 
sincerity, but maybe it’s not related to sincerity, is to then explain why.  To both 
flag that you’ve changed your mind in whatever it is that you’re now saying is 
contradicting something that you said previously, and why it is that you’ve 
chosen to contradict yourself previously, but I don’t know how people would 
feel about that.   
SELIGMAN:  So, it seemed to me what Leslie was describing was discovery 
of errors in research or flaws in the research method, and that’s something that 
definitely I would think would be an ethical obligation to report for correction, 
which is different from the notion of withdrawing or requiring somebody to 
write a new article explaining why they think something differently, which is 
also different from what you were saying. 
WEST: You know, Richard Posner famously said that he no longer believes 
what he used to argue passionately, which is the pursuit of justice is fulfilled by 
the duty to maximize wealth.  It’s a pretty important claim he made there about 
maximization of wealth being the sole goal of law, and it’s important that he 
changed his mind.  But I think it would be quite regrettable if he felt the need 
to withdraw the 200 pieces in which he argued that, in the ten books.  Those are 
still important resources.  He doesn’t believe it anymore, plenty of other people 
do. 
HESSICK: No, I think that that’s actually a perfect example, Robin, and so 
maybe that’s, then, what he would need to do, is if he’s writing something else 
that disagrees with it, explain why, that that is also valuable.  More on sincerity?  
I think we’re still on track to finish on time, which I am very excited about.  I 
did have a question for you guys about originality and novelty, because I think 
when it comes to claims about originality and novelty, my concern is largely 
one of candor that’s related a little bit to thoroughness, but I wonder whether 
it’s worth breaking out, individually, here, to talk about originality or novelty 
because there was  some of the reading that we did, talked about how 
scholarship needs to break new ground.  Maybe it’s enough to mention this 
issue when speaking about candor and when speaking about exhaustiveness or 
thoroughness.  I actually have to say, I think it might be useful to say 
scholarship need not be original, it need not be novel in order to be good 
scholarship and perhaps we’ve overvalued the norm—or we’ve overvalued the 
worth of originality and novelty such that we’ve led people down this path, or 
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maybe it’s enough to just deal with it when we talk about candor and 
exhaustiveness, but I’d be curious what you guys think about it. 
WALD: It might depend on what we mean by originality and novelty.  I 
don’t know that we always need to either aspire to or actually attempt to 
reinvent the wheel in our scholarship.  But presumably, everything we write has 
a component of originality and novelty, moving beyond the mere summary and 
synthesizing of existing work.  In any event, whatever we do write, we must 
avoid puffery and describe the originality of our contributions accurately.   
HESSICK: Thoughts on maybe drafting the question about how to deal with 
originality or novelty or other thoughts on it and its place and legal scholarship?  
Okay.  So, expertise—it had gotten broken out at some point, but I wonder how 
much we think that expertise is something other than—or in addition to 
competence.  Do we think that there is anything about expertise that’s beyond 
trying to become competent in an area?  I mean, I will add, expertise sounds 
like a different concept to me than competence, and I would personally hope 
that law professors are striving for expertise and not merely competence, and I 
guess that this goes to Robin’s point from before, about how one of the things 
that differentiates legal scholarship from brief writing is the time and the 
thoroughness that sort of goes into it, but I’d be curious what others have to say. 
SELIGMAN: So, when I heard this discussion yesterday, what I thought it 
was about was not overstating the depth of one’s expertise in the non-scholarly 
context.  So, if you were going to comment in a blog or in some other format 
on some matter that was really a civic opinion rather than something that came 
out of your scholarship, to not trade on that with your letterhead or whatever 
else one might use.  So, this was less about the content of the scholarship itself 
and more about what to do with it in other contexts. 
HESSICK: Yeah.  Other thoughts on expertise? 
OLDFATHER: This, I think, too, might be better characterized as relating to 
competence, but I recall seeing an—and I don’t remember which of the 
standards I saw it in, but—maybe it’s history, maybe it’s political science, 
perhaps it’s even AALS, at least one of them makes reference to an obligation 
on the part of scholars to continue to develop or refine their methodologies, 
their expertise, their scholarly apparatus—you know, to continue to grow, 
which isn’t merely keeping up with the latest developments in the field, but, I 
think, continuing to be mindful about the approaches one takes.  Maybe that’s 
just competence.  
FRANCIS: If what we’re looking at is publication ethics, it might be a little 
different than what are our ethical obligations as scholars, which I think are 
broader than our ethical obligations as authors, but it’s important. 
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HESSICK: And I’ll add that, although I think that we have an obligation to 
become experts in our field, I certainly think that people who are just entering 
the field can publish scholarship, I just think that there needs to be a certain 
amount of modesty and humility involved in that, and maybe even special care 
associated with it.  
HORWITZ: Well, I’ll again, briefly—and acknowledging there are 
problematic applications—say the Model Rules of Professional Conduct have 
something to add here, I mean that you can develop an area of expertise, but 
you have to work up to it—and certainly, and it’s a problem, given that our 
structure requires fellows to write ground-breaking huge claim articles, not your 
fellows—the job process seems to encourage them to make huge claim articles 
right from the get-go rather than modest ones, at exactly the time when we 
should be saying, “Write on the narrow field.” 
HESSICK: And I’ll add, maybe this is something for the editor statement 
beforehand, to say, “Look, we have all of these pathologies and the idea that 
we expect ground-breaking work from entry-level people is one of those 
pathologies.”  Is there more on expertise?  Did you want to add something, 
Ryan?   
SCOVILLE : On audience, I think law schools are an important part of the 
audience in the sense that people engage in unethical behavior for a reason—
they have incentives to do it.  In our case, some of those incentives come from 
our institutions—from promotion and tenure policies and the like.  To that 
extent, it’s important for law schools to consider their own roles and whether 
they might reform their personnel policies to make it easier for law professors 
to abide by principles of scholarly ethics. 
HESSICK: Yeah, I think that that’s right.  You know, Paul said this in our 
last session, but I don’t think that there’s any denying the fact that some of these 
pathologies are because ours is sort of a “hierarchical system” and we’ve 
created incentives for people to act in a particular way, that then there’s a race 
to the bottom, to the extent that those behaviors are effective. 
WEST: Do we also get to list our own egregious breaches of all of these 
norms? 
HESSICK: Oh, I plan on just atoning for mine later. 
HORWITZ: You know, the editor’s introduction can have the sin-eater— 
HESSICK: There we go.  Sin-eater section.  I like that.  And yes, I actually 
was thinking about—as we’re talking about these things, how often, I, myself, 
have violated these norms and why you even feel better confessing that 
publicly.  Unless people had more on the idea of engagement or solicitation and 
feedback, which I’m actually not sure is going to make it into this, in any sort 
of broken out way, it was just something that I added at the end, sort of this idea 
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about, “Do we have an obligation of engagement or an obligation to solicit 
feedback?”  Maybe it’s a good time to turn to article placement, peer review, 
those sorts of things.  Did you have something to add, Leslie? 
FRANCIS: Another way to do it would be to note in the editor’s note at the 
beginning, some of what this group regards as pathologies of legal publishing 
and that we don’t think that these can be changed by this document but this 
document is written within those constraints and we would hope that those 
constraints continue to be re-evaluated. 
HESSICK: I like that idea.  Are we ready to turn to article placement and 
peer review?  So, let me just say a couple of things at the outset that we’ve 
already talked about, that are relatively uncontroversial.  The first is the idea 
that so much of legal scholarship appears in law reviews that are edited by 
students, and because of that, it may lead to sub-pathologies or it may create 
additional incentives for people to behave in a strategic manner.  Maybe it’s 
also worth noting the hierarchy concerns here or not, but I do think that a couple 
of the things that we want to highlight here are the idea that importantly, candor 
should extend to a submission process, that it ought not be accepted that people 
make affirmative misstatements, for example, in the materials that they submit, 
that accompany, their article placement, and that’s sort of directly misleading 
the law review staff.  And there’s going to be sort of shades of this.  I think 
Ryan’s right.  A lot of people engage in puffery, I’ve engaged in puffery.  I was 
actually advised to engage in puffery, it seems like a fabulous idea, and I 
benefited from it, I will say.  But I do think that it’s worth pointing out, that 
these norms don’t just apply to things when they are published, but that they 
ought to apply during the submission process as well.  But I’m happy to hear 
more what we’d like to talk about in addition to that. 
FRANCIS: So, does it make any sense for us to recommend that that 
submission process be anonymous? 
HESSICK: I think that it is worth discussing the fact that—I think it’s with 
the exception of Stanford—I think Stanford is the only one where you actually 
have to certify that you’ve removed your identifying information.  I think 
Harvard and Yale may say that they prefer it, I don’t remember. 
HORWITZ: Some of them say they do it and may or may not do it.  Some 
of them do it, but also the authors are not—I mean—not without reason.  
Sometimes, obviously you’re going to discuss your own work or cite to, but the 
authors know ways to signal.  Whether it’s totally prescriptive or, again, 
guidance and so on, I think it is a valid concern to raise.  Whether it comes in 
the form—I think it’s both actually, obligations to authors but also, 
recommendations to law review editors that they review articles as the title 
“article review editor” suggests, and not review extraneous material. 
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FRANCIS: So, another little thing that we might tuck in here, and I’m 
interested in what the students think about it, is that law reviews must disclose 
fully and honestly the nature of their submission and review process, including 
whether review is anonymous, whether they consider pieces or give preference 
to pieces from their own law schools, et cetera. 
HESSICK: Yeah, and I’m going to hand this to Paul in just a second, but I 
actually think that if what we’re trying to state is an ethic or a rule of ethics or 
a norm, I think that it would be uncontroversial to say that the article submission 
process, that when articles are reviewed, the primary—if not the sole criteria 
should be the quality of the manuscript itself, and I understand that sometimes 
things are used as a proxy for that, but I think it’s worth stating of the reason 
for acceptance or rejection should be the quality of the manuscript itself. 
HORWITZ: So, I’ll avoid a rant about disciplinarity and how that plays out 
in the use or overuse of proxies in our field, but the only edit or add-on I’d make 
to that is obviously we want to make recommendations to law reviews and law 
review editors without treating them as the primary culprit so we’re burdening 
them.  I mean, this is about what the profession, what the legal academic 
profession, ought to be doing and so part of the answer is the profession, 
through its bodies or otherwise, ought to encourage and compile accurate 
statements of the law review process or the journal in order to be published. 
SCOVILLE : It seems like this part of the discussion—everything about the 
article placement process—doesn’t really belong in the broader discussion on 
principles of scholarly ethics.  I think it’s an important topic, but we might 
consider putting it in a separate document, which we’d also publish. 
HESSICK: That’s a fair question. 
OLDFATHER: And I think the point that it’s covered well in the Dodson & 
Hirsch article already makes it less important for us to spend the time on it.  I 
agree with the approach that they articulate.  And the only thing that they really 
don’t touch is the bit that we just did talk about, which is the process of review 
and what criteria should be—which I think ought to be non-controversial. 
HESSICK: Yeah, and let me add, if what we’re identifying in part are the 
pathologies that have created incentives for law professors to act other than 
ethically, we do have other places in the document where we can say—one of 
the pathologies is that the quality of an article—one thing that would have to 
change in order for these incentives to change, is that the quality of an article 
needs to be its primary, if not sole criteria for article submission and that law 
professors and law schools should work towards that goal or that end, but I 
don’t know how people feel about that.  Leslie? 
FRANCIS: We might want to consult Neil because he just wrote the piece 
about peer review as well. 
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HESSICK: Good point.  More on article placement or peer review?  We’re 
at 12:31. I am so proud of us.  No?  All right.  I’m sure that Chad and Paul want 
to say things to you and here I don’t have to hold this up anymore.  I feel a little 
bit too much like a talk show host.  I really appreciate all of you coming and 
doing this.  Although I feel passionately about these things, I’m not sure that I 
had been very thoughtful about them and I actually feel very differently after 
having talked to everyone for a couple of days, and I do think that it’s perfectly 
legitimate for us to come up with a document and have a bunch of back and 
forth on what that document looks like and not even agree on the document.  I, 
in fact, am always shocked whenever a faculty group of more than two people 
agrees on anything.  So, I really hope that this will lead us to talk—maybe even 
decide that, in addition to what we’d originally spoken about here, I may 
personally addend like a little statement that talks about the things that I think 
are particularly important and the things that I have reservations about, and I 
don’t know if that’s something that Paul and Chad think are good or bad.  Or, 
I’ll call it “Hessick, P., concurring in judgement” or something. 
HORWITZ: So, let me say, I agree with Carissa first that—and I mean this 
as a good thing, not as an expert or anything—that I think people ought to feel 
free to respond and react to the document, not because I want to encourage 
people to do more work than they’ve already done, which is considerable, but 
they should feel the freedom to do so.  I appreciate that we’ve talked so much 
about how much we value the law review editors and the mechanics of their 
process.  You don’t have X number of pages plus an extra two hundred and 
what’s more it’s not your personal goal to make this the most number of pages 
ever and I’ll say my contribution, as—which is typical of hastily written case, 
was too long and I intend to shorten it as much as I can, but I certainly encourage 
people to have their addenda as they wish and I just want you to understand that 
that’s something that people might want to do.  To the extent that I am at all a 
co-organizer, I really want to thank you two and especially Chad and 
Marquette, the system, the resources, the helpfulness and the hospitality.  I’ve 
never seen law professors not be decent about acknowledging this, so it’s not a 
problem, but I think we all know that the staff who don’t always get named are 
nevertheless lynch pins who make our lives much, much better and I just want 
to convey our thanks to them.  And I would say, it’s probably typical for any of 
us who organize round tables or conferences, feedback is always welcome and 
appreciated.  This is not a format like an annual round table that we’ve been 
doing every year, but one can always improve and if there are things we can do 
better, by all means, we’re happy to hear it.  Or, if there are things that you 
thought were novel and good, so that we ought to— 
HESSICK: Or even not that novel— 
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HORWITZ: Fair enough.  We’re totally not original, but a good idea that we 
ought to do the next time—you know, any of us individually are planning, we’re 
happy to do it. 
OLDFATHER: That we can recharacterize as completely novel. 
HESSICK: That’s right. 
HORWITZ: Fair enough.  It’s something the three of us have been talking 
about doing for a long time and since you’ve urged for me to be on social media, 
the happiness is a two-day conference on this subject, at least some of which is 
a discussion of overclaims and novelty and it’s something I’ve ranted on my 
blog for so long that it’s nice to do it in a better format.  Anyway, it’s been a 
real treat and much appreciated. 
OLDFATHER: Yeah, so just briefly, thank you all.  Please take a coaster 
with Marquette Law School on it as a token of our appreciation for your 
coming.  I really want to thank our law review editors who have been wonderful 
to work with, patient, as they have come to me and asked well, how many pages 
are we talking about here and saying, I have no idea because this is a new thing, 
and I think they were relieved to see the quality and even the length of the five 
pagers plus that came in, and so thanks to them, both of what you’ve done so 
far and your work going forward, thanks to you all.  This was a lot of fun and I 
look forward to continuing to move it forward, and I hope that we get a 
transcript that we can work with.  I hope that the mic that was out wasn’t out 
too much.  I suspect that there’d be some gaps in the transcript, but 
unfortunately—which we can try to fill in, but we’ll get it transcribed as quickly 
as we can and get it out to everybody and we’ll see what we have to work with.  
So, thank you all. 
 
